Studi Tentang Political Tie, Pengaruhnya Terhadap Keputusan Pemberian Kredit Bank di Indonesia

Elisa Tjondro and Basuki (2012) Studi Tentang Political Tie, Pengaruhnya Terhadap Keputusan Pemberian Kredit Bank di Indonesia. Jurnal Akuntansi dan Keuangan, 14 (2). pp. 116-134. ISSN 1411-0288


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This study uses bank loan data to examine the effect of (political tie) between the company and the government to on the assessment of companies financial leverage and profitability in the bank lending decisions in Indonesia. The numbers of samples are 1465 observations. This study uses moderated regression analysis (MRA). The study finds that a political tie affect corporate profitability assessment in bank lending decisions. Firms with lower profitability receive larger bank loan because their political tie (rent-seeking hypothesis). However, this study inds that a political tie does not affect the assessment of financial leverage in bank's lending decisions. This finding also supports Faccio (2010), Fisman (2001), and Backman (2001). Indonesia condition which has a weak institutional regulation and high information asymmetry is beneficial for companies that have a political tie. This leads to more trusted political tie as an indicator of the profitability.

Item Type: Article
Uncontrolled Keywords: Political tie, financial leverage, profitability, bank loan, rent-seeking hypothesis, politically exposed person, state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
Subjects: J Political Science > JQ Political institutions Asia > 6651 Political institutions and public administration (Asia,Africa, Australia, Pacific Area, etc.)
H Social Sciences > HG Finance > HG1-9999 Finance > HG1501-3550 Banking > HG1641-1643 Bank loans. Bank credit. Commercial loans
Divisions: 04. Fakultas Ekonomi dan Bisnis > Akuntansi
Peer Review
Depositing User: Ika Rudianto
Date Deposited: 16 Apr 2017 05:34
Last Modified: 16 Apr 2017 05:34
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