

## References

- Abbas, H. (2014). *The Taliban Revival: Violence and Extremism on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier*. Yale University Press.
- Abbas, H. (2015). *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror*. Routledge.
- Acharya, A., Bukhari, S. A. A. S., & Sulaiman, S. (2009). *Making money in the Mayhem: Funding Taliban insurrection in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan*. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 32(2), 95-108.
- Adam, M., Doug, S. T., & Tilly, C. (1997). *Toward an Integrated Perspective on Social Movements and Revolutions. Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture and Structure*, ed. New York: Cambridge University Press, 142-173.
- Adeney, K. (2008). *Constitutional Design and the Political Salience of “Community”“Identity in Afghanistan: Prospects for the Emergence of Ethnic Conflicts in the Post-Taliban Era*. Asian Survey, 48(4), 535-557.
- Afghanistan, I. W. (2010). *Afghan Perceptions and Experiences of Corruption: A National Survey 2010*. Integrity Watch Afghanistan.
- Afghan-Women-Council. (2007). *Press Release: Domestic and Social Violence against Women*. From Afghan Women Council: <http://www.afghanistanwomencouncil.org/latest.html>
- Afsar, S., Samples, C., & Wood, T. (2008). *The Taliban: an Organizational Analysis*. Naval Postgraduate School Monterey Ca Dept of National Security Affairs.
- Ahmed, R. (2000). *Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia*. IB Tauris & Co Ltd New York.
- Ahmed, S. (2017) *The Exclusion of the Taliban from Afghanistan's State-Building and Its Human Security Vulnerabilities*, 4(1). Osaka University, Japan
- Akhtar, N. (2008). *Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Taliban*. International Journal on World Peace, 49-73.
- Akhtar, S. (2014). *Rise of the Taliban and the US Intervention in Afghanistan*, 19(8), 44-50, IOSR-JHSS.

- Alcoff, L. M., & Mohanty, S. P. (2006). *Reconsidering identity politics: An introduction*. In *Identity politics reconsidered*, (pp. 1-9). Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
- Alesina, A., & Ferrara, E. L. (2005). *Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance*. Journal of economic literature, 43(3), 762-800.
- Ali, I. (2007). *The Father of the Taliban: An Interview with Maulana Sami ul-Haq*. James Town Organization, Washington DC.
- Ali, O. (2015). *The 2015 Insurgency in the North (3): The Fall and Recapture of Kunduz*. Afghanistan Analysts Network.
- Almukhtar, S. (2017). *How Much of Afghanistan Is Under Taliban Control After 16 Years of War With the US?*. New York Times, August, 23.
- American Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq*. (2011). The New York Times, 22.
- Angelina, S. (2011). *The Connection between Terrorism and Organized Crime: Narcoterrorism and the Other Hybrids*. Skopje Security Faculty-Republic of Macedonia.
- Antoine Blua, (2004 ) “*Central Asia: Is The IMU Still A Threat To Regional Security?*” <http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1051302.html>
- Anwar-ul-Haq Ahady. (1995). *The Decline of the Pashtuns in Afghanistan*. Asian Survey, 35(7), 621-634.
- Arnson, C. J., & Zartman, I. W. (Eds.). (2005). *Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed*. Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- Arnson, C. J., & Zartman, I. W. (Eds.). (2005). *Rethinking the economics of war: the intersection of need, creed, and greed*. Woodrow Wilson Center Press.
- Atran, S. (2010). *A Question of Honour: Why the Taliban Fight and what to do about it*. Asian Journal of Social Science, 38(3), 343-363.
- Azamy, H. (2017). *Afghanistan: An Asset or Liability for Central Asian Neighbors?*. Central Asia Institute for Strategic Studies (CAISS).
- Bakrania, S. (2017). *Cross-Border Conflict Drivers and Breaks—Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq*. The University of Birmingham.
- Baldauf, S. (2003). *US Hot Pursuit Roils Pakistanis*. Christian Science Monitor, 6, p. 6.
- Ballentine, K. (Ed.). (2003). *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance*. 259-283, Lynne Rienner Publishers.

- Barakat, S. (2008). *Understanding Afghanistan: Synthesis Report*. Post-war Reconstruction and Development Unit, York.
- Barfield, T. (2010). *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History* (Vol. 36). Princeton University Press.
- Barfield, T. J. (1978). *The Impact of Pashtun Immigration on Nomadic Pastoralism in Northeastern Afghanistan. Ethnic Processes and Intergroup Relations in Contemporary Afghanistan*, Occasional paper, (15), 26-34.
- Barfield, T. J. et al. (2009). *Fundamentals of Governance in Afghanistan*. The Hollings Centre and AIAS.
- Barfield, T., & Nojumi, N. (2010). *Bringing more Effective Governance to Afghanistan: 10 Pathways to Stability*. Middle East Policy, 17(4), 40-52.
- Basit, A. (2016). *Iran-Taliban Cooperation: New Dimension in Afghan Conflict?*. 132(1), RSIS.
- Benard, C., Kvaerno, O., Thruelsen, P. D., Cordell, K., Rabasa, A., Jalali, A., ... & Rasmussen, M. V. (2008). *Afghanistan: State and Society, Great Power Politics, and the Way Ahead*. RAND Corporation.
- Berdal, M. R., Berdal, M., & Malone, D. (Eds.). (2000). *Greed & Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Bhadrakumar, M. K. (2008). *A New Journey in Search of the Taliban*. The Hindu. <http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/A-new-journey-insearch-of-the-Taliban/article15149433.ece>
- Bilgrami, A. (2006). *Notes toward the Definition of 'Identity'*. Daedalus, 135(4), 5-14.
- Bizhan, N. (2014). *Re-engaging in a Fragmented Context: Development Approaches and Aid Modalities in Afghanistan, 2001–2004*. In *Development in Difficult Sociopolitical Contexts* (pp. 202-223). Palgrave Macmillan, London.
- Bizhan, N. (2018). *Building Legitimacy and State Capacity in Protracted Fragility: The Case of Afghanistan*. Commission on State Fragility, Growth and Development.
- Bloomberg. (2010). *Kabul Bank Shareholder Assets Frozen, Except for Karzai Brother*. Bloomberg: <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-06/kabul-bank-shareholder-assets-frozen-except-for-karzai-brother-post-says.html>
- Boesche, R. (2003). *Kautilya's Arthashastra on War and Diplomacy in Ancient India*. The Journal of Military History, 67(1), 9-37.

- Bovenkerk, F., & Chakra, A. (2004). Bashir, “*Terrorism and Organized Crime*, 1-2.
- Braithwaite, J., & Wardak, A. (2012). *Crime and War in Afghanistan: part I: the Hobbesian Solution*. British Journal of Criminology, 53(2), 179-196.
- Brandt, B. (2011). *The Taliban’s Conduct of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*. CTC-Sentinel, 4(6), 19-23.
- Broschek, F. (2011). *Inciting the Believers to Fight: A Closer Look at the Rhetoric of the Afghan Jihad*. AAN Briefing Paper, 1, 2011.
- Budihas, C. L. (2011). *What Drives Pakistan’s Interest in Afghanistan?* (No. ATZL-SWV). Army Command and General Staff Coll Fort Leavenworth Ks School of Advanced Military Studies.
- Bukhari, S. (2013). *India, Pakistan and the Afghan Endgame*. The Friday Times.
- Byman, D. (2005). *Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism*. Cambridge University Press.
- Byrd, W. (2005). *Afghanistan--State Building, Sustaining Growth, and Reducing Poverty*. The World Bank.
- Byrd, W. (2012). *Lessons from Afghanistan’s History for the Current Transition and beyond*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace.
- Byrd, W., & Ward, C. (2004). *Drugs and development in Afghanistan*, 18.
- Call, C. T. (2008). *The Fallacy of the ‘Failed State’*. Third World Quarterly, 29(8), 1491-1507.
- Carrapico, H., Irrera, D., & Tupman, B. (2014). *Transnational Organized Crime and Terrorism: Different Peas, same pod?*? Global Crime, 15 (3-4): 213-218.
- Carter, S., & Clark, K. (2010). *No Shortcut to Stability: Justice, Politics and Insurgency in Afghanistan* (p. 9). Royal Institute of International Affairs.
- Cassidy, M. R. (2012). *War, Will, and Warlords Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 2001-2011*. Marine Corps University Press.
- Cederman, L. E., Gleditsch, K. S., & Buhaug, H. (2013). *Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War*. Cambridge University Press.
- Chandrasekaran, R. (2010). *Karzai Seeks to Limit role of US Corruption Investigators*. Washington Post, 9.
- Chattoe-Brown, E., & Hamill, H. (2005). *It’s Not Who You Know-It’s What You Know About People You Don’t Know That Counts; Extending the*

*Analysis of Crime Groups as Social Networks.* British Journal of Criminology, 45, 860-876

- Chelin, R. P. (2015). *From Need to Greed through Creed: the Transformation of Al Qaeda Terrorism in the Islamic Maghreb and the Sahel* (Doctoral dissertation).
- Chepesiuk, R. (2007). *Dangerous Alliance: Terrorism and Organized Crime.* Global Politician, 11.
- Chomsky, N. (2007). *Failed States: The abuse of Power and the Assault on Democracy.* Metropolitan Books.
- Clark, K. (2008). *Taliban Claim Weapons Supplied by Iran.* Daily Telegraph.
- Clarke, C. P. (2016). *Drugs & thugs: Funding terrorism through Narcotics Trafficking.* Journal of Strategic Security, 9(3), 1-15.
- Clarke, P. C. (2014). *An Assessment of the Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan,* (258), ISPI.
- Clarke, R., & Lee, S. (2008). *The PIRA, D-company, and the Crime-Terror Nexus.* Terrorism and Political Violence, 20(3), 376-395.
- Clemens, J. (2008). *Opium in Afghanistan: Prospects for the Success of Source Country Drug Control Policies.* The Journal of Law and Economics, 51(3), 407-432.
- Cojanu, V., & Popescu, A. I. (2007). *Analysis of Failed States: Some problems of Definition and Measurement.* The Romanian Economic Journal, Year X, (25).
- Coles, N. (2001). *It's Not What You Know It's Who You Know That Counts. Analyzing Serious Crime Groups as Social Networks.* British Journal of Criminology, 41(4), 580-594.
- Coll, S. (2005). *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001.* Penguin.
- Collier, P. (2003). *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy.* World Bank Publications.
- Collier, P. (2003). *Breaking the conflict trap: Civil war and development policy.* World Bank Publications.
- Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2000). *Greed and Grievance in Civil War,* World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2355. World Bank (<http://www.worldbank.org/research/PDF>).

- Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*. Oxford economic papers, 56(4), 563-595.
- Collins, J. J. (2011). *Understanding war in Afghanistan*. NDU Press. Washington, D.C.
- Consolatore, D. (2006). *The Pashtun Factor: Is Afghanistan Next in Line for an Ethnic Civil War?*. The Humanist, 66(3), 10.
- Cookman, C., & Wadham, C. (2010). *Governance in Afghanistan: Looking ahead to what we leave behind*. Center for American Progress.
- Cooper, M. H. (1990). *The Business of Drugs* (p. 18). Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly.
- Cornell, S. E. (2005). *Narcotics, Radicalism, and Armed Conflict in Central Asia: the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan*. Terrorism and Political Violence, 17(4), 619-639.
- Cornell, S. E. (2005). *The Interaction of Narcotics and Conflict*. Journal of Peace Research, 42(6), 751-760.
- Cornell, S. E. (2006). *The Narcotics Threat in Greater Central Asia: from Crime-Terror Nexus to State Infiltration?*. In China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly (Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 37-67).
- Cornell, S. E. (2007). *Narcotics and Armed Conflict: Interaction and Implications*. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 30(3), 207-227.
- Cornell, S. E., & Swanström, N. L. (2006). *The Eurasian Drug Trade: A challenge to Regional Security*. Problems of Post-Communism, 53(4), 10-28.
- Cox, D. G., & Ryan, A. (2015). *Countering Insurgency and the Myth of "The Cause"*. Journal of Strategic Security, 8(1-2), 43-62.
- Crews, R. D., & Tarzi, A. (Eds.). (2009). *The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan*. Harvard University Press.
- Crocker, C. A. (2003). *Bridges, Bombs, or Bluster?*. Foreign Affairs, 82(5), 32.
- Crocker, C. A. (2003). *Engaging Failing States*. Foreign Affairs., 82, 32.
- Cunningham, D. E. (2006). *Veto Players and Civil War Duration*. American Journal of Political Science, 50(4), 875-892.
- Curtis, L. (2010). *The US Must Move Cautiously on Taliban Reconciliation*. The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, 2684.
- D'Souza, S. M. (2016). *Taliban: The Rebels Who Aspire to be Rulers*. Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs, 3(1), 20-40.