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The family state: a non-realist approach to understanding Indonesia's foreign policy

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ABSTRACT

The existing literature on Indonesia's foreign policy has excluded the state from the category of an agent which shapes the country's external affairs. This trend certainly ignores the notion that foreign policy is a unique state activity taking place in the interface between domestic and international politics. To fill the gap, this article explores the idea about the family state and looks at its influence on the conduct of Indonesia's international relations. The argument is that the family state pursues order in international society in which sovereignty can maintained. Indonesia plays the role of an order-maker in Southeast Asia through the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The order-oriented actions are displayed by Jakarta's diplomacy to resolve border disputes with neighbouring countries in the region.

Introduction

In line with the developments of the subfield of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), scholarly works on Indonesia's foreign policy have experienced the trend of applications of diverse approaches, from the micro to macro levels of analysis. Examples of this include individual and group decision making focused on elite views, used by Weinstein (1976), domestic political structure, promoted by Leifer (1983) and Suryadinata (1996), and the domestic-international nexus of neo-classical realism, employed by Sukma (1999) and He (2008), which become useful instruments for analysing both general pictures and specific events in the evolution of Indonesia's participation within world affairs. These academic analyses have resulted in the advancement of a middle-range theory of the pattern of behaviour and empirical assessment of wide-ranging cases. They are framed in a discourse of continuity and change in the larger scheme of the country's external relations. This area of study has received more attention after the Cold War ended as Jakarta's key diplomatic products and achievements have been facing new challenges.

Despite the utility of FPA methods for researching and studying Indonesia's foreign policy, they have overlooked the concept of the state and its relationship with the Indonesian government's international stance. The existing scholarship has only considered the state existence as a place where political pressures and constraints contribute to shaping

situations and choices available for decision makers in Jakarta. Perhaps, the long period of centralisation of policy making in the hands of few elite figures, particularly under the Sukarno and Suharto administrations, reduced the relevance of inquiries into state-driven foreign policy. This article aims to explore the concept of state which can help provide an analytical basis to further comprehend the major tendencies in Indonesia's external activism. It focuses on Jakarta's role in the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). ASEAN is the cornerstone of Indonesia's foreign policy (Weatherbee, 2013, p. 1). Jakarta persistently relies on diplomacy within ASEAN's multilateral schemes to pursue its international purposes. This raises important questions as to what kind of state was it which prompted Indonesia's engagement in intergovernmental organisation of ASEAN and how did Indonesia conceive of and achieve its objectives in interaction with other states?

The attempt to conceptualise the state in FPA is significant because the disappearance of the state concept causes ontological, epistemological, and practical problems. Ontologically, foreign policy which is actually a distinctive type of state action cannot be depicted in its particular site: at the interface between the internal and external politics. In an epistemological context, FPA specialists have no space to recognise the state entity which is important to their foreign policy studies. Then, a practical issue arises from this difficulty to verify the long-held view about the autonomy of the state from domestic and international actors, due to the absence of its conceptual subject, the state as an institution with its own agency (Alden & Aran, 2017, p. 87). Moreover, the claim that states are not agents, but only those human beings who truly decide and act are the agents of foreign policy, which is insisted on by prominent academics such as Hudson (2014), Brummer and Hudson (2015), is no longer relevant. This is because of the phenomena of the rise of many kinds of states, based on their economic, political, and cultural developments, which has transformed world politics. For example, in East Asia developmental states play the leading role in the process of regionalisation which has spurred regionalism in the region (Dent, 2016).

This article proceeds in four sections. After this introduction is a discussion about the dominant theories of state in the Study of International Relations (IR). The focus here is on the comparison between realism's and rationalism's theory of state, in which state sovereignty is the subject of conceptual contention. The rationalist theory of order-driven state policy in international society is deemed to be more salient for the purpose of this article. However, it requires additional conceptions about the state form related to its domestic background. Then, the second section offers a description of the concept of the family state which is derived from Indonesia's historical, cultural and political experiences. The third part highlights the influence of the family state on Indonesia's foreign policy behaviour, focusing on diplomacy in ASEAN. This section also discusses what the objective of Indonesia's foreign policy is and what the importance of ASEAN is to the state's international relations. Cases of Indonesia and Malaysia territorial disputes and Jakarta's efforts to resolve the South China Sea disputes are presented to further high-light the significance of the familial diplomacy. The argument is that the family state pursues order in international society in which sovereignty can be maintained. Indonesia plays the role as an order-maker in Southeast Asia through ASEAN. This argument was developed through library research conducted in Indonesia between January and March 2019. Relevant information was collected from both primary and secondary sources.

The primary sources were official speeches and accessible diplomatic archives. The secondary sources were publications such as books, journal articles, newspapers and the Internet. The article concludes by emphasising essential points which have been put forward in the article.

The state in IR theory: realism, rationalism, and their limits

The state in modern world politics is understood to be an entity consisting of four elementary components; territory, population, government, and sovereignty. Territory refers to a bordered geographic area which can shift as a result of both natural and social circumstances. Populations create a nation which carries a spirit of nationalism. In the nineteenth century nationalism flourished and turned out to be the sociocultural self-identification of the modern state. The term government denotes an institutional structure which becomes the centre for decision making. Therefore, the state describes a particular model of the relationship between society and politics in which the state is conceived as sovereign. Weber (1948, p. 78) considered the state to be a community which monopolises the legitimate use of physical force to rule over the territory. The sustainability of the state relies on what the government does. The government makes and implements laws to regulate social life within the state territory. To do so, coercive means are allowable. Mann (1986) and Tilly (1992) strengthen Weber's conception about the state by highlighting the means states use to undertake their functions, mainly by enforcing control over the people and territory. Every state has the organisational power which underpins its political control. The state is portrayed as an actual political organisation, supported by administrative, policing, military, and capital forces, which is centralised and well-coordinated by executive officials.

States can claim the right to seek control and utilise violent means in order to build order and peace within its territory. However, this does not mean that they are legitimate actors or automatically possess the legitimacy to coerce. State legitimacy and authority stem from sovereignty. But, the question is where does sovereignty come from? The origin of sovereignty is usually linked to an absolutist assumption presented for instance by Bodin (1992) and Hobbes (1968). Although recent developments such as globalisation and cosmopolitanism raise critiques of absolutist sovereignty, Bodin's and Hobbes' ideas remain influential. Both Bodin and Hobbes were convinced that social order could be built only if there were a single, central, and supreme authority which was powerful enough to rule all segments of the society. Bodin regarded that the king, the representation of the old form of state, must be obeyed by everyone living in the kingdom, or otherwise disorder and civil war would break out and destroy them. Hobbes argued that authority of the *leviathan* to govern the state arose from a social contract between the ruler and the ruled, in which the former was given legitimate power to undertake state functions, especially the creation of security and prosperity for the latter. Hobbes' idea implies either political right or obligation of the sovereign state within a jurisdiction.

IR theorists, who point out states as the central unit of analysis in international politics, problematize the feasibility of state sovereignty within the system of interstate relations. Realists such as Morgenthau (1978) and Waltz (1979) argue that states enjoy institutional autonomy in face of non-state forces influence in domestic politics. Nevertheless, in international politics the state's behaviour is primarily determined by the constraining

structure of anarchy. There is no world state, like Hobbes' *leviathan,* which can provide security for all parts of the international system. Therefore, every state has to be prepared and struggle for a self-help mechanism. To Waltz, co-operation among states in the hostile environment is dangerous, because it will lead states to reduce their commitment to be independent. Wars are unavoidable as states pursue individual interests to survive. Two strategies for self-help include emulating the successful practices of other states and balancing against greater powers. Morgenthau insists on the role of intelligence besides emulation and the balance of power as the effective means of establishing foreign policy. Three types of rival states' policies must be anticipated through intelligence. These consist of imperial policy, which is intended to alter the distribution of power among states in the system in favour of the interest of a particular state, *status quo* policy, which is the opposite of imperial policy, and is usually directed by a dominant power, and prestige policy, which is a modest policy and is realised through diplomatic ceremony and the show of military capability at home.

Morgenthau and Waltz conceptualise the state as an adaptive actor which seeks to defend sovereignty in the anarchic world. The state has no capacity to change the anarchic international system into the harmonious hierarchy as in the domestic political system. Consequently, the understanding about the principal role of the state in international politics is highly reducible to activities pertinent to competition and conflict perpetuation. This is the logic behind the invisible hand which preserves anarchy (Buzan, Jones, & Little, 1993). Thus the anarchic world is produced and reproduced spontaneously and continually. Bull (1977) rejected this realist theory, especially its fundamental assumption asserted by Hobbes, which is about the reality of a war of all against all in the condition called the state of nature. Instead, Bull's (1977, p. 8, 13) rationalism theory of state regards sovereign states are the source of order in international politics. States are not adaptive but socially progressive actors who can shape their system of interaction and further mitigate the impact of international anarchy. Through long-term co-operation among states, they can make an international society or a society of states under the anarchic international system. The society of states is formed when a group of states is aware of certain common interests and values: that their relations are bound to a set of rules shared within a working common institution. Bull's society of states also reflects an objection to the liberal position, such as Mitrany's idea (1966), which maintained that the elimination of the system of sovereign states was necessary so that international order could exist.

Against the Hobbesian realist theory which invokes the indispensability of coercive power to enforce laws to make order, Bull (1977, p. 48) said that every individual in a society has the capability to build order, because they value it. Bull (1977, p. 8) defined order as rule-based activities which preserve the elementary or primary goals of the society of states. The goals are normative, including the absence of war, preservation of state sovereignty and independence, maintenance of the system, and protection of national wealth (Bull, 1977, pp. 16–19). Order is enabled by rules even though they are not upheld by a supreme authority (Suganami, 1986). The rules governing order are supported by norms and conventions which are based on morality, custom, and religion (Bull, 1977, pp. 53–60). Bull (1977, pp. 47–48) emphasised the three most important rules to ensure that states do not pursue their own interest. These are security which means that life is secure, agreements are kept, and the relatively stable possession of things or property

rights is honoured. Without these three constitutional rules, states will not be able to preserve order. In contrast to Morgenthau and Waltz, Bull claims that the need for order produces and reproduces an international society of states as opposed to international anarchy. Furthermore, according to Bull (1977, chapters 5, 7–8), as well as the realists, a world state is not necessary. However, this is not because of the primacy of self-help, for the sovereign state is capable of becoming a guardian of international order. In addition to this, there are four fundamental institutions created by states, including the balance of power, diplomacy, great power management, and international law. There are some parallels between international society and international regime. But, the international society concept has more constitutive implications to the state than international regime; that is states shape and are shaped by the society of states (Dunne, 1995, pp. 140–143).

Compared to Morgenthau's and Waltz's theory of state, Bull's is more plausible. Morgenthau's and Waltz's realism portrays national power as the determining factor to state foreign policy directed to obtain self-interests. It means that attributes mainly the size of geography, population, and natural wealth differentiate states' positions in interstate relations. States with larger power will become dominant powers in an international system, while the smaller ones are placed in a marginal position. Nevertheless, this is not the case for all states in today's world politics. Tangible and quantifiable power cannot be the sole accurate measure of strength or weaknesses. Indonesia possesses a considerable amount of these three elements of national power, but its foreign policy has not benefitted from the country's physical size. In fact, the country's strategic resources have long been the objects of external penetration, and the jeopardy of outside intrusion in the state's sovereign territory is persistently alarming. In contrast, the qualitative and intangible components of power, such as nationalism, regional diplomacy, and norm creation are more evidenced to be effective in serving Jakarta's international objectives (Thompson, 2015). In a global South context, Braveboy-Wagner (2016) argues that the so-called soft power as an alternative to military build-ups has become the feasible diplomatic instruments to get into regional leadership.

A surge of nonmaterial sources of power also shows that the realist conception about self-help is problematic. Morgenthau and Waltz maintained that the traits of international politics, competition and conflict, prevent states from co-operating with each other. This makes weak states, with limited physical and material resources, being under disadvantageous circumstances. Weak states have to rely on other stronger ones for protection and security. The unaffected anarchical system forces states to chase relative gains. This is to prevent others to achieve more than what they can attain. More importantly, under anarchy states cannot know precisely what the intention of others is. Therefore, there arises a security dilemma. Although agreement is achievable through negotiation, no state is able to control the potential for free-riding and defection which corrupts the implementation of co-operative policies. Realism then suggests balancing against the rising power to stabilise the system. Ironically, according to Little (2007), realists believe that a balance of power is an automatic and mechanical outcome of the international structure. They deny the need for consensus among states about their common goals and actions prior to making choices that lead to a balance of power.

In the history of international politics, a balance of power comes about as the result of conscious behaviours of states prioritising order over anarchy (Kaufman, Little, &

Wohlforth, 2007). This observation supports Bull's (1977, p. 106) argument that a balance of power which is the fundamental condition of international society, is constructed by states not only to resist the supremacy of power throughout the system, but also as the common goal of all members of society. States regard order as more important than the pursuit of egoistic national interests. The recognition of order in international society opens up the nuanced space for discussing about the state as having foreign policy agency, regardless of their quantitative national attributes. This social understanding about the state in world politics stresses that through the roles of rules, norms, and institutions every state shapes, and manages the impact of, their external environments (Buzan, 2014, pp. 12–21). This is noticeable for instance in the cases of *quasi*-states. Jackson (1990) identifies *quasi*-states as independent states representing the post-colonial territories in Africa, Asia, the Pacific, and the Caribbean which enjoyed equal legal sovereignty in international relations, even though their domestic institutions had not completely functioned like those of European states. International sovereignty of *quasi*-states were enabled by virtue of the enshrinement of the sovereign norm in the United Nations Charter (chapter 1 article 2). The norm became a judicial barrier for foreign actors to interfere in the *quasi*-states' affairs.

While Bull's approach to explaining the state external sovereignty is favourable, it has conspicuously 'black boxed' the state. Just like Morgenthau and Waltz, Bull tended to underestimate the effects of domestic variability. They assumed the state could always impose its authority on the people and territory, be autonomous of any internal influences, and be free to undertake foreign policy. In contemporary world politics, however, it is nearly impossible to ignore the consequence of domestic developments on the conduct of the state's external relations (Hobson, 2000, p. 5), except for the case of highly self-isolated and totalitarian states like the Taliban Afghanistan and North Korea. Arguably, the state's inside characteristics, stemming from the society's dominant culture, historical values, political thinking, as well as customary law, all contribute to form a particular type of state. In Indonesia, Ruland (2018, p. 32) argues local ideas and norms have become the filter for what is appropriate and therefore legitimate to do in the state's external relations. Hence, it is necessary to conceptualise the state in a specific way in accordance to its domestic features. A state's foreign policy behaviour should be understood by referring to the state concept.

Indonesia as a family state

The intellectual foundation of the family state was built upon the marriage of political and legal thoughts which dated back to the early 1920s when the first generation of Indonesian nationalist figures were educated in the Netherlands, particularly in Leiden University, the home for customary law tradition led by legal anthropologist Cornelis van Vollenhoven. In Leiden the Indonesian students discovered that customary law in local communities in the archipelago of Indonesia demonstrated essential similarities and coherence. This galvanized them to believe that their country actually belonged to one large cultural identity (Burns, 2007, p. 68). The Leiden school of thought further contributed to founding the notion that national law had to represent the nation's unique legal and cultural system. The linking up among custom, law, and identity provided the basis for Indonesia's constitutional order which would be constructed on the grounds of the country's

communitarian heritage. This encounter was coupled with the conviction that Indonesian culture which was communally oriented, spiritual, and harmony-loving was contradictory to the Western one which was individualistic, materialistic, and conflictive shown by the condition of the interwarring larger European society (Bourchier, 2015, pp. 4–5, 21–34).

Supomo was a prominent lawyer graduated from Leiden, who then strongly advocated the basing of the Indonesian state on the familial *staatsidee*. According to Supomo (cited from Rahardjo, 1994, pp. 495–496) the very basic difference between the conception of state in the Indonesian view and that of the Western society lies in the profoundly contrasting assumption about *aku* (who I am or who the self is). Through the expression *I* in the Indonesian society, Supomo referred to the Javanese philosophy of social organisation, connoted an understanding about union between individuals and society they belonged to, whereas in the West the word *I* just represented the individuals themselves. From his integrative framework, Supomo further argued that conflict was a strange thing in society, by virtue of the unity between the individual members and their own society. The relationship between the individual and society, between society and the state was bound tightly by a deep feeling of reciprocal possession. In the Javanese statecraft there was no need to develop a legal system which would protect the individuals from the state, while in the West, provisions were made to shield individual rights from the threat of the state.

Against the Western liberal foundation of the rule of law, Supomo (1945, pp. 51–54) underscored that the family state of Indonesia was established to serve the interest of the whole society, not that of an individual or a group of people. The state was ruled on the basis of the principle of *gotong royong* (mutual service to others), an idiom meaning all works are accomplished in a spirit of togetherness. Based on *gotong royong,* the state did not practice separation of power, but a sharing of power. The constituent parts of the state are conceived as related to each other functionally (Bourchier & Hadiz, 2003, p. 41).

The family state imagines popular will in the context of its entirety. The state accommodates the aspirations of the entire people, considering regional elements and ethnic groups which make up the nation. It is an objection to the liberal view of popular will associated with the majority politics applied in an individualistic state system. The family state does not allow the dominance of a small group of people related to a social class to rule and mobilize popular interests as practiced in a communist state (Reeve, 1985). The refusal of both liberalism and communism was inspired by the moral and spiritual values of *gotong royong.* Communities in the country were described like members of a village society where they would help each other without expecting profit or calculating loss. The villagers are convinced that ones who receive genuine help will in future reciprocate with goodwill if there are troubles facing them. This reciprocated action was not derived from a contractual social foundation, but was inherent within the society's long implanted cultural system. Religious teachings added strength to the effect of *gotong royong* as the fundamental force of cohesion in Indonesian society, in which disputes and conflict were resolved through conciliatory means (Dewantara, 2017).

The political manifestation of the family state was visible in the state institution known as Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People's Consultative Assembly/MPR), in which there were representatives of different provinces, professional associations, ethnicities, and parties. They were selected in accordance with criteria entailing proportionality as

well as specific contribution to national development, while members of Dewan Perwaki-
lan Rakyat (House of Representatives/DPR) were elected politicians through general elec-
tions. According to the 1945 Constitution, MPR symbolises people's sovereignty, and
therefore is the highest state institutional structure which is able to enforce the consti-
tution. The family state's MPR political arrangement was taken from the living example
of traditional institutions in village society, and considered to be an expression of the prac-
tice of Eastern democracy.

The process of decision making in the MPR subscribed to the principle of consensus.
Since it was, and is still, the top political arena of the family state, under Suharto, the MPR
was mandated by the 1945 Constitution to produce broad guidance for state governance,
usually exercised for five year term. It was named in Bahasa Indonesia Garis Garis Besar
Haluan Negara (Guidelines on the State Development/GBHN) which was used by the gov-
ernment (executive, legislative, and judicative) to make and implement policies. For its
central position in national life, MPR's decisions had to be approved by all of its
members unanimously. This political process although allowing for difference and com-
promise, at the end had to be decided through an all-embracing agreement. It did not
recognize the method of majority vote, by virtue that it would mean that the minority dis-
agreement with the MPR's decision did not indicate the will of the whole national family
members. Thus, the MPR as the representation of the family statesmanship had three
interrelated features: common, comprehensive, and consensus-led organization.

The strategic dimensions of the family state have come about as the country's geo-
graphical traits which generate a paradox for its international sovereignty. On the one
side, Indonesia is a complex of over 18,000 large and small islands stretching across the
cross roads of two oceans–the Indian and Pacific oceans–and two continents–Asia and
Australia. Java is the most populous and prosperous island, and is where major political
and economic capitals are concentrated. This has for decades become the cause of internal
fragmentation between Java and non-Java. Socioeconomic sentiments were disastrously
politicized by local political elites and armed groups to shake the central government
through various unconstitutional activities, especially during the 1950s. It was believed
that external interests of the great powers played out separatist and irredentist movements
against the nationalist leadership. The reasons for interfering into Indonesia's domestic
affairs were not merely for ideological purposes, i.e. Cold War proxies, but taking on
the resource competition of the powerful economic actors (Djalal, 1995, pp. 298–299).
These were made possible by the government's lack of capacity to police the country's
vast territories composed mostly of seas. Therefore, two levels of strategic problems over-
shadowed the state in its formative years (1945–1965).

The challenges to the state's internal and external sovereignty made the nationalist
thinking of the importance of the connection between the family state concept and the
country's natural attributes. This gave birth to the doctrine of an archipelagic state as
the extension of the family statehood. What is significant from the archipelagic state
concept is its integral vision involving the archipelago and the whole social, cultural, econ-
omic, security, and defence power components of the state, called *wawasan nusantara.*
The main source of national power in this regard is conceptualised as the spirit of
oneness binding the people and their lands, waters, and living ecosystems. This is
expressed in the rhetoric if a particular part of the integrated system of life is under
attack by other parties, the whole elements of the nation and state will take a collective

defence against them. Hence, the state relies on close co-operation among its people, rather than begging for outsider protection. This insistence turned out to be Indonesia's concept of national resilience (Anwar, 1996).

Foreign policy of the family state

This section looks at how the concept of family state influences Indonesia's regional relations and foreign policy. It is divided into three subsections which depict the uses of familial diplomacy to construct order in the Southeast Asia region and resolve border disputes. Before going further, an outline of the nature of Indonesia's foreign policy will be helpful to understand the state's external behaviour.

The basic thinking of Indonesia's foreign policy was founded during the revolutionary period following Indonesian independence that was declared in August 1945. Vice President and Foreign Minister Mohammad Hatta (1953) called foreign policy of the newly independent republic *bebas aktif* (independent and active). By independent and active Hatta meant that Indonesia should have no formal alliance with either of the rival blocs in the Cold War world. Indonesia's foreign policy had to be conducted with the aim of serving the country's vital interests. Indonesia was obliged to undertake active participation in international affairs for the benefit of the country and the people. Drawing on this principle, we see that the evolution of Indonesian external relations demonstrate a flexible stance. Under Sukarno (1945–1965) Jakarta could lean towards the socialist bloc, then during Suharto's administration (1966–1998) it moved to the capitalist camp. These directions were guided primarily by pragmatic considerations for achieving the respective regimes' national priorities (Sukma, 1995). In the Reform Era after Suharto the independent and active position has been sustained.

It is also important to note that during the history of its independent and active foreign policy, Indonesia has paid much attention to diplomatic activities to establish regional organisations in which cooperation with other states is pursued to manage common problems. This line of policy is taken on account of Indonesia's domestic circumstances, especially its weak military capability and less developed economy, as Jakarta cannot expect to act unilaterally in the international system. Foreign policymakers in Jakarta preserve a cautious view about the outside world (Tan, 2007). They believe that competition and conflict are the natural characteristics of international politics. Therefore, to survive, Indonesia must be able to protect itself from external penetration (Sudarsono, 1998). Domestic politics must be stabilised in order to allow the government to carry out effective diplomacy. In other words, internal stability can favour external conduct. In this context, the idea about family state matches with the objective of Indonesia's foreign policy.

As a foreign policy agent, the family state of Indonesia is institutionally strong. This is by virtue of the ability of the ruling regime, especially Suharto's New Order, to construct a political system in which the ideas about unifying collectivism, common good, and harmony were inculcated systematically into the society's life. In parallel, the constituent parts of the society were organised vertically along functional lines in order to enable the state to function properly. In such a hierarchal structure, the national leadership controlled the state administration, resources, and pivotal sectors. Interest groups were allowed to operate so long as they did not challenge the state hegemony, and their

inclusion in the policymaking process was arranged on very selective basis (MacIntyre, 1994, p. 6). Thus, the quest for order justifies the use of any effective social and political instruments to create popular obedience. Even under the Reform Era, in which Indonesia has democratised, the substantive notion and practice of the family state are maintained for reasons mainly linked to the keeping up of national identity, stability, and unity (Bourchier, 2015).

Consequently, the state can monopolise the making and conduct of foreign policy. As argued by Morin and Paquin (2018, pp. 134–139), strong state centralisation, weak and fragmented social mobilisation, as well as controlled channels of public communications lead to the pre-eminence of the ruling government in foreign policy formulation and implementation. Compared to the pluralist model, the family state can better manage the demand and pressure coming from bottom-up currents. The polycentric distributions of power in today's Indonesian politics do not result in a significant change in the ways the country's international relations are viewed and undertaken (Rüland, 2014, p. 244). Although the state faces sensitive issues on which the vital national interests are jeopardised by other states' activism, and that subsequently spark mass protests, the government is still able to isolate its foreign policy from the societal influences. This tendency is visible in Indonesia's role within ASEAN, and how Jakarta refers to the importance and relevance of an order-oriented stance for the country's regional affairs. The case to highlight here are the territorial disputes between Indonesia and Malaysia and Indonesia's South China Sea policy.

The evolving role of order maker in ASEAN

For two decades after World War II, the region of Southeast Asia was beset by social, economic, and political upheavals. Ideological conflicts appeared as proxies of the West and communist powers, involving territorial disputes among neighbours, economic backwardness, communal violence, ethno-nationalist rebellion, and other disintegrating currents which shook the new-born states. In Jakarta there emerged an idea, especially by the New Order leaders, mainly Foreign Minister Adam Malik (1978, p. 277), to reorganise the ways regional relations were conducted in order to sort out their problems together. Initially, this idea was not responded to enthusiastically by Southeast Asian states. Perhaps, this was because of geopolitical and strategic considerations which prevented them from trusting each other. However, the Indonesian foreign minister did not give up his personal diplomacy. In Malik's famously cited words 'everything is possible when we can talk together' (1978, p. 279). Eventually, other Southeast Asian colleagues agreed with the Indonesian idea of making a peaceful region by enhancing social, economic and political cooperation, and avoiding the formal mention about the establishment of a security bloc in the region (Irvine, 1982, pp. 8–11).

ASEAN was founded in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines with its chief objective being to promote peaceful relationships among Southeast Asian countries. The founding document of ASEAN, the Bangkok Declaration (ASEAN, 1967), stresses a stable and harmonious region underpinned by strong cohesion within ASEAN, which will secure Southeast Asia, and further contribute to world peace. Before ASEAN, two attempts at regional organisations had failed to make tangible progress, which were the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and Maphilindo. This was

because of their members' inability to overcome bilateral antagonisms. Instead, ASEAN was founded on a common awareness of the necessity to strengthen collaboration rather than to prolong disputes (Ba, 2009). To this end, ASEAN founding members concurred that a regional order had to be created through a set of common rules (Acharya, 2001, pp. 3–4). The first ASEAN summit, held in Bali in 1976, gave birth to two major normative foundations of ASEAN internal interactions: regional resilience and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) (ASEAN, 1976). In concept and practice, regional resilience and the TAC illustrate the transfer of Indonesia's familial ideas and code of conduct into ASEAN.

The concept of regional resilience is an extension of the family state's notion of national resilience. In order to create regional stability and security, each member country has to improve their own national resilience. They have to overcome internal threats coming from subversive actions. At a regional level, resilience means to be self-reliant, preventing interference from outside forces in regional affairs. Thus, ASEAN functions to facilitate solid and co-operative inter-Southeast Asian state relationships to support the efforts to strengthen regional resilience (Anwar, 1996; Leifer, 1989). The interdependent characteristic of national and regional resilience leads to a sense of Southeast Asian identity. Indonesian strategists, such as Wanandi (1990) noticed ASEAN's regional resilience connects member states' objective to retain internal and external sovereignty collectively. It did apply to Southeast Asian security when in the mid-1970s the danger of superpowers' intervention to regional issues, particularly in Indochina, haunted the capital cities of founding countries. President Suharto undertook regional tours to hold marathon talks with fellow leaders of ASEAN to endorse the significance of regional resilience (Hansen, 1976, p. 146). Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in late 1978, and its subsequent consequences on internal conflicts, became momentous events for Jakarta to promote the effect of regional resilience. Fears of enlargement of Chinese and Soviet roles in the sub-region incited Jakarta to intensify diplomacy for Southeast Asia without a great power presence (MacIntyre, 1987). Resistance to external parties' involvement in intra-ASEAN affairs gave weight to the making and the preservation of regional order in states which were undergoing the process of nation-building.

The institutional infrastructure for regional resilience is ASEAN's TAC. This intramural treaty was built on the Bandung spirit of 1955, the Bangkok Declaration of 1967, and the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of 1971. Thus, it is comprehensible that the TAC strongly upholds sovereignty norms, including non-interference in other states' domestic affairs, respect for territorial integrity, national identity, independence, equality, and renunciation of threat and the use of force to resolve conflict, as the code of conduct among ASEAN members, then well-known to be the ASEAN way (Acharya, 2001, pp. 3–4, 21–24, 57). The implementation of these TAC norms demonstrate collective consciousness about the need for mitigation of distrust among members, which was the legacy of an imperialist order that continued to disrupt ASEAN's improved co-operation. The reference to Bandung made in the 1976 Bali Concord document, which was intensely socialised by the Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik (the story can be read in Malik, 1978), suggests the wish to regionalise the Third Worldist ordering principles. It was a useful historical legitimising source of ideas and practice for Indonesia in the construction of an ASEAN order. With the application of an ASEAN way, particularly non-interference and peaceful conflict resolution, ASEAN proved to be efficacious in

maintaining regional stability during the Cold War (Narine, 2006, pp. 201–202, 212). Among other things, there were no open military clashes among ASEAN states. ASEAN was able to insulate itself from external provocation. Economies grew impressively, prompting the outside world to praise ASEAN's successful regional order building.

The order pillared by the ASEAN way was maintained in family-like politics, in which informal, flexible, interpersonal, non-binding commitments, and consensual methods of intergovernmental discussions characterised ASEAN meetings. The outcomes were not made with reference to international agreements and universal norms like those of the European Union. ASEAN claimed to exercise the virtues of Southeast Asian regionalism (Ba, 2009). ASEAN did not undergo rigid formal institutionalisation. A comfortable atmosphere for intra-regional relationships was given greater priority than the process of bureaucratisation. Consequently, decision making became less efficient, and in many respects regional problems were left unresolved for difficulties in getting consensus; alternatively, issues considered as sensitive were discussed through bilateral quiet diplomacy (using second-track channels). As the number of ASEAN increased from five to six in 1982, with the admittance of Brunei Darussalam, and became 10 after the inclusion of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV) in the late 1990s, informality, flexibility, and consensus-style weakened ASEAN's internal political mechanism when confronting the emergence of more complex challenges, such as the financial crisis, environmental degradation, transnational crimes, human rights violations, and intensifying power contests in the South China Sea. Moreover, the proclivity for non-interference constrained multilateral intervention in terrible cases like the Rohingya genocide.

There used to be some discourse for change in the practice of ASEAN security, for instance flexible engagement as proposed by Thailand, lawful intervention promoted by Malaysia, and enhanced interactions promoted by Indonesia, all these did not matter when ASEAN's family met and talked. It was continually believed that liberal approaches and agendas brought into Asia by Western states lacked relevance. As a result, in keeping with the trend of the Europeanization of regional order outside the European Union, ASEAN took on incremental policies. It localised the form, but subjugated the substance. The developments of ASEAN's normative structures over the last two decades have shown global norms and practice, ranging from humanitarian to trade issues, and been internalised into the ASEAN body. Nevertheless, their applications are adjusted in accordance with member states' pragmatic interests. The most visible example of pragmatism is the establishment of an ASEAN Political and Security Community, one of the institutions of the ASEAN Community, in which the ASEAN way remains to guide internal interactions (ASEAN, 2004). This means that the regional order of the family state, although challengeable, is not yet removed.

The Indonesia-Malaysia border disputes

As neighbouring countries, Indonesia and Malaysia share geographical borders, both on islands and at sea. The two nations are also bounded by commonalities shaped by their similar race, religion of the majority populations, as well as cultural heritage. Hence, it is not an exaggeration if one mentions the relationship between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur as more than neighbours, but like brothers in the Malay family. For its larger size, higher population, and geography, Indonesia is called the older brother, and Malaysia

the younger one. The kinship factor helps both sides to attain common objectives through friendly political ties (Treaty of Friendship between the Federation of Malaya and the Republic of Indonesia, 1959). However, geopolitical dynamics have affected the brotherhood-defined relations. Soon after the Federation of Malaysia was established in 1957, with the favour of the United Kingdom and India, Indonesian President Sukarno launched the politics of *konfrontasi* (confrontation) against Malaysia, which was labelled as being the puppet of neo-colonialism. This episode demonstrates Jakarta's over confidence and ultranationalist standing in regional relations (Djiwandono, 1996). Following the formation of ASEAN, Jakarta-Kuala Lumpur ties were repaired and further improved by the New Order government.

When territorial disputes came about regarding the ownership claims of the Sipadan and Ligitan islands, located in the border areas of Indonesia's East Borneo and Malaysia's Sabah, Jakarta took a familial approach. The sovereignty issue of Sipadan and Ligitan stemmed from Malaysia's self-declared *peta baru* (new map) in 1979, encompassing territories of its ASEAN neighbours, such as Brunei, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines. The incompatibilities with Indonesia arose in 1982 after the signing of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which legalised Indonesia's jurisdiction, called exclusive economic zone (EEZ), extending 200 nautical miles measured from the baseline of its outermost islands, thus covering the Sipadan and Ligitan islands exclusively. To overcome the problem, Jakarta proposed an intra-ASEAN dialogue to find out collective solutions. However, Kuala Lumpur refused the proposal due to wariness about whether this would prompt more regional complications. In response, Jakarta offered bilateral talks, after considering the potential for an undesirable impact of the Sipadan and Ligitan dispute on ASEAN unity and stability ('Pulau Sipada dan Ligitan,' 1990).

Nevertheless, no real way out was reached from dialogue processes which were conducted until 1996 (Salleh, 2007). Malaysia even moved further by developing tourism resorts in the disputed islands, accompanied by the placement of forest police and sea patrols around them. This ignored Indonesia's concern and call for self-restraint. Local media and nationalist figures in Indonesia demanded that the Indonesian government issue a stronger response to the perceived act of illegality. Yet this did not make an impact on the state's policy. Jakarta retained its informal approach to the continuing dispute. Foreign Minister Ali Alatas (cited in 'Pulau Sengketa Sipadan,' 1991) stressed that the sovereignty problem with Malaysia had to be resolved in a brotherly manner, not like parties in a political negotiation. Indeed, Indonesia avoided making any efforts which could be regarded as destabilising the regional order. It reflects the attitude of an older brother in a family, who is obliged to keep all the members living in harmony. In line with the order-driven policy President Suharto ordered the case be brought into the International Court of Justice (ICJ) after Malaysia continually rejected Indonesia's settlement plan. To the disappointment of many in the country, the ICJ decided to accept the Malaysian claim on the basis of the effectiveness principle (Abubakar, 2006).

The bitter outcome of the Sipadan and Ligitan settlement process incited Indonesian nationalist reaction whenever territorial sovereignty became an issue with other states. Also, accelerated by the loss of the East Timor province in the aftermath of the referendum for independence held by the United Nations in 1999, many Indonesians are sensitive about external intervention in the country's internal affairs. Democratisation allows

interest groups and elements of civil society to express their grievances and articulate their demands for foreign policy change. In 2005, again a territorial dispute broke out between Indonesia and Malaysia. Kuala Lumpur claimed territorial rights to explore the oil-rich sea bloc of Ambalat lying next to the border areas of Sulawesi and East Borneo of Indonesia and Sabah of Malaysia. Likewise Sipadan and Ligitan, the Ambalat bloc is covered by the state's EEZ as determined by the UNCLOS. In response, the government of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono made a diplomatic note to protest against the Malaysian unilateral act. Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda ('Menlu: Malaysia Tak Bisa,' 2005) affirmed that Malaysia could not use the UNCLOS as its basis of claim over Ambalat, because it is not an archipelagic state, but only a coastal one. Therefore, the baseline of Sipadan and Ligitan from which Malaysia's EEZ stretched, as mentioned in the Malaysian claim, was illegitimate. However, the Indonesian complaint was not replied to favourably.

Malaysia even provoked tensions by sending its gunboats to the disputed bloc. Indonesians reacted strongly to the provocations. The media came out with columns exposing Malaysia's actions violating Indonesian sovereignty. Various social groups demonstrated in front of Malaysia's embassy in Jakarta and related offices in other cities, asking Malaysia to stop disturbing their country. The demonstrators urged the Indonesian government to freeze diplomatic ties with Malaysia. Such protests received the support of parliamentarians, particularly of the opposition parties. The issue of Ambalat ramified into other conflicting issues between the two nations, such as the bad treatment of Indonesian migrant workers by some people in Malaysia and the perceived theft of Indonesian traditional cultural heritage mainly *batik, tari pendet,* and *wayang.* The problem of Ambalat, which was initially associated with territorial rights, especially on exploration rights, was then politically turned into a serious sovereignty conflict ('Ganyang Malaysia Digaungkan,' 2005). Notwithstanding, Ambalat was heating up, the Yudhoyono government, especially the president and foreign minister who are formally authorised to make decision on international issue, tried to calm the situation down, and always prioritised peaceful dispute settlement.

As in the case of Sipadan and Ligitan, Indonesia initiated bringing the Ambalat dispute to a settlement through dialogue. President Yudhoyono approached Malaysian Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi personally, calling for both sides to sit down and talk. The Indonesian president emphasised the importance of ASEAN's norm of nonviolent dispute resolution, the long-standing friendly relationship between Indonesia and Malaysia, and the need for keeping the region stable and peaceful. Therefore, Jakarta did not want to wage war with Malaysia ('Indonesia-Malaysia Sepakat,' 2005). The president's policy was operationalised by Foreign Minister Wirajuda who then formed a dialogue team who would discuss the Ambalat case with their Malaysian counterparts ('Pertemuan Tim Teknis,' 2005). To respond to the public's anxiety, Yudhoyono ordered the commander-in-chief to send warships to the Ambalat waters, increasing from three in 2005 to six a year later. The navy's mission in Ambalat was set out to be a non-war territorial operation, focusing on safeguarding the state's jurisdiction in the disputed sea bloc ('Ngeper Perang Siaga,' 2005). Thus, while conducting dialogue, the Indonesian government showed to Malaysians that the problem in Ambalat was really a serious thing. In Yudhoyono's words, Indonesian sovereignty in Ambalat is final ('SBY: Tak Sejengkal Pun,' 2009). Until 2009, Indonesia and Malaysia had held 13 bilateral talks on Ambalat. However, the result was unsatisfactory. Dealing with the prolonged dispute,

Vice President Jusuf Kalla then undertook his own way of diplomacy, called the Bugis diplomacy. On his visit to Kuala Lumpur, Kalla explained to Prime Minister Najib Razak that he would organise thousands of Indonesian workers in Malaysia to irritate Malaysians if Kuala Lumpur did not end its penetration in Ambalat. The Malaysian leader asked Kalla not to do that, and promised to withdraw troops from Ambalat ('Negosiasi Ambalat Alot,' 2009). An official statement of regret was issued by the Malaysian government for causing the troublesome Ambalat case (Wibowo, 2009).

In both cases of territorial disputes with Malaysia, Indonesia was willing to restrain. The government in Jakarta held the view that a reactionary response to the Malaysian claims would only exacerbate the situations. The delay in the process of the dispute settlement displays that the state's foreign policy is guided by familial values. Indonesia regarding the cohesiveness of ASEAN as a big family is a common objective which must be maintained. Another case, the disputes in the South China Sea, has also portrayed the similar tendency towards an order-driven policy. What is at stake in the troubled waters is not only ASEAN's unity and stability, but the maintenance of the regional states' relations with China, which is a bigger power showing increasingly assertive modes of action in the ASEAN region.

The South China sea disputes

Indonesia's efforts to mediate the South China Sea disputes began at the end of the 1980s after China's and Vietnam's navies clashed in the waters of the disputed Spratly islands. Indonesia was concerned about the impact of the clashes which could spill over into Southeast Asia. Jakarta initiated regular meetings engaging ASEAN members and the claimant states, aimed at transforming the potentials for conflict into constructive cooperation. Foreign Minister Alatas facilitated the first workshop on the South China Sea in Bali in January 1990. As it was the preliminary event, invitees were only ASEAN colleagues. They met to make preparations for the following arrangements of conflict prevention. At the meeting, Alatas (1990, p. 28) emphasized that ASEAN had to keep peace in the Sea and the surrounding region. Dialogue to solve incompatibilities was conducted with the view that the interests of the Association be prioritised. He suggested the disputing parties not to enforce their own objectives over each other in order to avoid further unwanted situations. The second workshop was then held in Bandung in July 1991. Besides ASEAN members, China, Laos, Taiwan, and Vietnam were invited. In his welcoming address, Alatas (1991) did not say any words about sensitive issues related to sovereignty conflict in the South China Sea. Rather, he appealed to the participants to pursue the ground on which trust could be built among disputing states to achieve agreeable multilateral solutions.

China was not in favour of the Indonesian multilateral initiative. China even made a bilateral problem with Indonesia. At the 1993 workshop conducted in Surabaya, the Chinese delegation showed a map depicting waters as China's traditional fishing grounds. To the Indonesian government the Chinese map was problematic, because the area covered by China's nine-dash line intersected with Indonesia's EEZ in the Natuna islands. Jakarta asked Beijing to clarify its claim. However, there was no reply from the Chinese government. When visiting Beijing in June 1995, Alatas repeated his government's request for China's clarification. In response, China's Foreign Ministry said that

the government in Beijing was considering Indonesia's query. Furthermore, China offered bilateral negotiation with Indonesia to overcome their differences. Indonesia rejected the Chinese proposal for the reason that it would legitimise China's claim of territories adjacent to the Natunas (Weatherbee, 2016). The Indonesian Foreign Ministry had never made any public statements regarding the overlapping claims. This was to send a message that there was not really a matter of borders between the two states. Jakarta continued its multilateral diplomacy by proposing to all claimants to formally announce their 200 nautical miles EEZ based on the UNCLOS provision. Then the remaining area in the middle of the South China Sea could be explored on a collective and cooperative basis (Johnson, 1997, p. 157). China, which ratified UNCLOS in 1996, did not agree with the Indonesian idea, and retained its unilateral position.

This diplomatic episode demonstrates Indonesia's familial style of conflict management. In order to maintain the harmony of the ASEAN family, Indonesia pushed for the pursuance of a common objective rather than individual interest. Quiet diplomacy was undertaken to avert controversies which could have shaken intraregional stability. Nevertheless, as a leader of the family, behind the diplomacy stage, Indonesia sustained its steps to approach to the parties in the South China Sea disputes to get into dialogic solutions. Jakarta's approaches were fruitful. 1n 2002 the ASEAN-China meeting issued the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Although it is a non-binding agreement, both the ASEAN members and China agreed to comply with the principles of non-use of force in dispute settlement and self-reliance. This was followed by China, the Philippines, and Vietnam, who achieved a joint explorative agreement as part of the peaceful dispute resolution (Schofield & Storey, 2009, p. 19). In 2005 the Yudhoyono government improved relations with China to a strategic partnership. This was aimed at embracing China into more expansive ties with Indonesia, thus narrowing the possibilities of conflict between them. At the time with such various diplomatic schemes having been made for the South China Sea, Jakarta could claim to be able to maintain ASEAN cohesion.

The challenge to Indonesia's order-oriented diplomacy came in the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting held in Phnom Penh in 2012 when for the first time in the Association's history they failed to produce a joint communique. This was by virtue of internal disagreement on how to respond to the developments in the disputed waters. China had demonstrated more assertive actions to defend its claim over the Sea's territories. Sporadic military incidents took place among the claimants. These arose wariness in Jakarta that the regional problem would attract great powers, especially the United States, to get involved militarily. President Yudhoyono was quick to instruct Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa to carry out personal diplomacy to ASEAN states which held reservations about a collective response to the heated strategic environment. Natalegawa was successful. A week after the failure of the meeting in Cambodia, ASEAN issued a joint statement which in essence reiterated the commitment to implementing the principles agreed to in the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties. Following this diplomatic event, Jakarta appealed to other ASEAN members to accelerate the discussion on upgrading the non-binding agreement to a legally binding one known as the Code of Conduct for Interactions in the South China Sea (Roberts & Widyaningsih, 2015, p. 273). Indonesia believes that the ASEAN TAC's model of agreement will be effective to reduce the potentials for open conflict.

However, the regional strategic landscape was more dynamic after 2012. Political tensions and military campaigns have frequently occurred. In March 2016, the Indonesian and Chinese navies went head-to-head after an Indonesian warship seized a Chinese fishing vessel perceived as violating Indonesia's EEZ in Natuna's waters (Suryadinata & Izzuddin, 2017). Several similar events happened until June that year. These sparked nationalist sentiments in Jakarta. President Widodo and the military commanders demonstrated the state readiness to face any possibilities of war against external acts penetrating into Indonesia's sovereign territories (Meyer, Nurmandi, & Agustiyara, 2019, p. 72). Yet with careful diplomacy the issues did not go further to worsen the bilateral relationship. However, the South China Sea has deepened friction among ASEAN states in relation to their attitudes toward China. Several members have made agreements with China to remove the Sea issue from ASEAN-China regular meetings. This prevents ASEAN from producing any collective responses to China. Furthermore, the way toward the legally binding Code of Conduct on the South China Sea is getting difficult (Emmers & Teo, 2018, p. 42). For Indonesia the recent developments have indicated that its familial approaches are challenged by the powerful actor from outside the family. Yet this does not degrade the importance of Jakarta's order-led policy. Indonesia keeps on attempting to promote multilateral rule-based solutions to the disputes over the South China Sea.

Conclusion

The description of the family state and the survey of its tendency in diplomacy as seen within the organisation of ASEAN and the territorial disputes between Indonesia and Malaysia and the South China Sea issue provide a reliable basis for understanding the meaning of Indonesia's foreign policy. Indonesia's national objective is to create, advance, and maintain international order. This is possible when the state and other states involved in the process of international society building, and work together to preserve it. Indonesia's familial conception of statehood directs diplomacy as activities of socialising, maintaining, and strengthening a set of rules which govern the formed international society. Members of the society are aware of their commonalities, and therefore willing to be governed by the institutionalised rules. In this context, the family state's order policy has a constitutive characteristic, in which the state influences, and is influenced by its international society.

ASEAN stems from the need to secure the region from within. Regional consciousness about common objectives supports ASEAN's progressive moves forward. An order is founded on the grounds of member states' agreement to comply with the code of conduct, which consists of both formal and informal procedures. The principles of non-interference, peaceful conflict settlement, and consensus-style decision making and the materialisation of regional resilience and the TAC have proven to be effective in conserving ASEAN's order. Indonesia considers the cohesion and stability of Southeast Asia as a meaningful international asset. Disputes involving neighbouring states have to be based on this consideration. Therefore, when Sipadan, Ligitan, Ambalat, and Natunas turned out to be a diplomatic issue of Jakarta-Kuala Lumpur and Jakarta-Beijing, the Indonesian government attempted to restrain. An understanding about the relationship in a familial context makes Indonesian leaders promote slow but peaceful solutions to the conflicting problems. Thus, it is safe to say again that the maintenance of order is the

fundamental objective of Indonesia's foreign policy, and sovereignty can be safeguarded through familial diplomacy.

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