

## SUATU LATIHAN FILSAFAT\*

(menurut metode Sokrates)

## I. PENDAHULUAN

Malam hari. Dua teman duduk di pendapa, beristirahat, dan berbicara mengenai bermacam-macam hal, akhirnya mengenai perjalanan Apollo ke bulan baru-baru ini. Kemudian mereka diam dan memandangi sang bulan yang bersinar-sinar di langit. Muncullah rasa heran, menuju filsafat. Lalu:

## II. DIALOG

- (1) A. "Kalau dilihat bulan itu benar-benar sebuah bola, ya ....".  
 B. "Ah, itu menurut pikiranmu, soalnya kita baru saja membicarakan perjalanan Apollo ke bulan. Sekarang engkau lebih sadar bahwa bulan itu sebuah bola, seperti bumi juga. Engkau *tahu* bahwa bulan itu sebuah bola, tetapi apa yang *kaulihat* itu suatu piringan saja; dulu *kaulihat* begitu, dan sekarang pun juga begitu."
- (2) A. [diam secara non-direktif].  
 B. [kurang pasti diri] "Atau tidak begitu? Coba analisa saja dengan baik-baik. Rupa-rupanya kita jarang sekali menyebut bulan itu sebagai "piringan" (menggerak-gerakkan dua jari, dari kedua belah tangannya sebagai isyarat tunda perk), tetapi waktu bulan itu pasang atau susut, maka kita *kan* juga menyebutnya sebagai bulan "sabit", bukan? [isyarat itu lagi]. Memang itu kata yang dapat kita pakai, ya *kan?*"
- (3) A. "Jadi yang kaumaksudkan ialah bahwa yang kita *ketahu* tidak sama dengan yang kita *lihat* begitu saja."

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"Menang! Mengetahui sesuatu tidak sama dengan melihat sesuatu, bukan?"

(4) A. [manggut-manggut beberapa kali] lalu: "Engkau mulai baik, tadi waktu berkata tentang 'piringan' dan 'sabit' [meminjam isyarat B. tadi]. Artinya, engkau tidak mengambil pusing apa sebenarnya piringan dan sebuah sabit itu dan perhatiannya berpusat pada cara kita menggunakannya kalau kita berbicara. Kiranya dapat kita rumuskan begini perhatiannya pada bahasa baik sekali."

B. [memutuskan mau ikut serta dalam permainan] "Akan tetapi..."

(5) A. "Akan tetapi, mengapa tidak kaubiarkan saja masalah itu mengenai apa sebetulnya mengetahui itu, dan apa sebetulnya perbedaannya melihat itu, dan apa sebetulnya perbedaan di antaranya? Mengapa tidak lebih baik memikirkan, dapatkah kiranya kita katakan bahwa kita tidak hanya "tahu" saja tetapi juga "melihat" bahwa bulan itu sebuah bola betul-betul?"

B. "Maksudmu: cara bicara kita, atau bahasa kita mempunyai hukum-hukumnya sendiri, atau apa rupanya kesadaran kita dan pengetahuan kita ditandai oleh bahasa dengan cara tertentu. Atau kaumaksudkan begini: bahasa kita mempunyai suatu konsistensi sendiri, dan itu tidak dapat kita simpulkan begitu saja dari susunan dan struktur kenyataan obyektif ..... [diam sebentar, dan angkat bahu]. Baiklah, saya dapat "melihat" bulan sebagai bola kalau itu memang mutlak bagimu."

(6) A. "Tetapi bagi saya tidak ada yang mutlak, perlunya tidak ada sama sekali."

B. "Uh, apa salah lagi? Baik, saya dapat berkata bahwa saya "melihat" bulan sebagai bola, paling sedikit kalau saya mau."

(7) A. "Tetapi kenapa mesti ada kemauan lebih dulu? Kalau cara

bicaramu begitu itu tidak dapat berlangsung tanpa niat teguh itu ...." (memandang B. dan menunggu).

B. "Apakah betul lebih baik bahasa itu berlangsung dengan caranya sendiri-sendiri saja?"

(8) A. "Tidak tahu. (Tahukah, itu pertanyaanmu yang pertama yang tidak retorik.) Apa yang kaumaksudkan dengan sebutan bahwa itu "lebih baik?"

B. "Lebih baik daripada ... aduh, sulit! Mungkin begini: lebih baik daripada yang dimasukkan dalam bahasa itu dari luar. Kalau bagi saya ada suatu kemauan khusus yang dituntut, padahal itu tidak perlu bagi orang lain, maka ternyata bahwa saya memasukkan sesuatu ke dalam bahasa yang tidak termasuk di dalam kekekalan bahasa itu sendiri. Begitukah?"

(9) A. "Rupanya demikian. Misalnya masalah mengetahui dan melihat tadi. Apakah benar-benarnya masalah demikian itu dapat dianalisa dengan baik tanpa memperhatikan bahasa yang kita pakai untuk berbicara mengenai itu? Boleh ditanyakan dari mana semua aliran filsafat yang kelihatannya tidak menaruh perhatian pada bahasa itu? Apakah dari teori yang dimasukkan dari luar?"

B. "Sungguh-sungguh mengherankan yang terjadi antara engkau dan saya sekarang ini. Saya mempunyai semacam sistem dan saya kalah. Engkau menang, padahal tidak jelas berdasarkan sistem mana. Pasti saya belum kauberitahu sistem mana yang kaupakai."

(10) A. "Saya menang? Apa maksudmu?"

B. "Lo jelas, kan? Tadi saya memakai suatu sistem mengenai tindakan melihat dan tindakan mengetahui. Sekarang ternyata engkau mempunyai sistem lain dan di dalam sistemmu itu bahasa memainkan peranan tertentu: semacam filsafat bahasa barangkali. Coba, jelaskan, supaya saya juga tahu."

(11) A. "Saya heran! Karena engkau mempunyai sistem tertentu maka dari itu saya mutlak juga mempunyai sistem? Seandainya saya mempunyai sistem tertentu mengenai bahasa maka tentu saya berpikir seperti engkau. Lebih real kita katakan saja bahwa bahasa biasa bagi saya penting dan bagimu tidak begitu. Kenapa mutlak kalau ada sistem itu mesti sistem dalam arti "sistem" mu?"

B. "Oh, begitu. Kalau begitu kita masing-masing berbicara mengenai hal yang berlain-lainan. Saya terlekat pada suatu sistem pikiran dengan beberapa unsur dari luar, dan memang selenikian rupa sehingga saya andalkan engkau juga mempunyai sistemmu sendiri. Dari hak lain engkau sebagai semacam Rousseau linguistik dengan semacam naturalisme dalam hal bahasa memandang bahasa itu sebagai sesuatu yang tak berbeda, suatu tidak pengetahuan mutlak dan segala sesuatu yang dimauis, dan ke dalam nya dari luar firdaus itu kan begitu."

(12) A. "Nah, itu memang pernyataanmu, apakah bukan pernyataan saya. Soalnya rupanya itu memang itu sendiri, dan dari oleh cacat-cacatnya dan barangnya dalam bahasa itu sudah diandaikan beberapa unsur yang sistematis, atau juga sebaliknya ada sistem yang berlawanan bahasa, dan kalau demikian, bahasa biasa tidak lagi begitu biasa. Mana yang lebih dulu, ayam atau telur?"

an dengan perhatian pada yang nampak karena itulah yang sering mudah kita lupakan. Atau mencoba saja menyusun suatu dialog lain antara A dan B, dengan sikap masing-masing, dan dengan Sokrates sebagai pembimbing. Karena kita mengetahui lebih banyak daripada yang kita sadari. Dan kita mengalami banyak hal yang belum kita ketahui.

### III. PENUTUP

Dialog itu selesai. Atau tidak. Mungkin ini dialog akan pernah selesai. Kiranya barangsiapa hendak berdialog dengan sungguh-sungguh, harus memeriksa diri tidak serampun, dan sedikit berpaling dari sikap B menuju sikap A. Dengan demikian tidak akan kunjung habis mencari jalan-jalan baru. Tetapi dialog hampir saya lupakan: suatu latihan. Untuk itu dialog ini tidak diberikan nomor. Dalam hal ini ada bermacam-macam kemungkinan. Seperti dalam selnya saja, keterampilan sikap A dan sikap B pada panjang lebar tanpa terlekat pada sistem tertentu, dan tanpa tambahan kecacatan.

**On the relation between phenomenology and psychology:  
a dialogue**

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*Psychologist:* You say that we cannot consider psychological processes in isolation from the truth of the objects to which they refer, but surely there are general structures discernible in processes such as thinking, memory and perception. The mind works in ways determined by the structure of the brain, so that we can describe stages in problem-solving, different kinds of memory, the nature of anxiety, and so forth.

*Phenomenologist:* I do not wish to argue that there are no general structures in the mind, but I do wish to propose that the identification of those structures is bound up with the correct identification of the truth or falsity of the objects that are revealed through the operation of the mind. Let it be quite clear that I am not supporting a naive realism which believes that things in themselves can be analysed and brought to clarity independently of the mind's constitution of them. Just as we should avoid supposing that because subjectivity constitutes reality it therefore creates it, so we should avoid the assumption that it is simply a question of putting subjectivity aside in order to attend to reality itself. It is a commonplace to say that both these views lead ultimately to a denial of truth or rather of the objectivity of truth; the former because it identifies what is true with what is intended or felt; the latter because everything that can be attended to is thereby true: both leave no room for the process by which one overcomes error.

*Psychologist:* But wait! I think that you are consigning us to a quite unnecessary mystery. Granted that simple idealist and realist views are mistaken, then the solution is obvious - a combination of the two. The mind is an hypothesis-testing device and the reality which exists independently of it provides the information that enables us to confirm or reject hypotheses. Such a view is quite consistent with the present activity of psychologists: they can take for granted that this is how things are and continue to study pure processing.

*Phenomenologist:* I am quite content to agree that our ideas are tested against a reality which is independent of them, but your conclusion leaves at least two fundamental questions unanswered. First, in order for ideas to be tested against reality there must be some form of relationship between the realms of the mental and the actual. How else could the one be translated into the other? The notion of hypothesis-testing can only make sense within a context which is not

a result of such testing but its necessary pre-condition. The model of input and output is not the fundamental one, therefore, since it is necessary to check our ideas against the facts. Second, the model is superficial also in that, whilst accepting the basic drive to seek the truth of one's beliefs, it does not enquire into the question as to how that which is true and real determines our mental life. This is the reason why such a position ultimately degenerates into naive idealism. On the other hand, if one regards subjectivity as aiming at the truth, as it were, then our approach has to be broad enough to include both terms, the mental and the real, in their essential unity. One would then study, not perception, but what is essentially revealed through perception, not emotion but how feeling forms the world for us, and so forth.

*Psychologist:* But, if I have understood you correctly, this would mean the introduction of value judgements into our inquiries, for we would have to ask ourselves what is true and real and of value before we could do anything else. We would be passing, not from facts to values, which is a bad enough mistake, but from values to facts, which seems utterly absurd. For how on earth are people ever going to agree on what is an 'essential truth'? This is armchair philosophizing at its worst.

*Phenomenologist:* Every endeavour presupposes certain values; even your own espousal of an empirical science is based upon a choice, a preference for certain norms rather than another set. What I am suggesting is that, rather than accept the role of values unquestioningly as we tend to do if the values happen to be our own, we should systematically investigate them with a view to determining the sorts of truth they reveal. With respect to verifying our insights, I have evidently more faith than you in our capacity to reflect upon our thoughts sensibly and communicate with one another in a critical fashion. It is important to remember that we are not reporting private 'facts' through introspection, but discussing essential ways of interpreting reality: thus insights can be verified by participants checking each other's perspectives in the same way, possibly, that a child learns a language in contact with the speech of adults, except that in these matters we are all children. I find it deeply satisfying that a direction of inquiry is warranted in which there is no discontinuity between the investigator and the investigated in the sense that I shall only truly understand the object of study, the mind, by advancing my own thoughts as to the truth revealed to us as human beings. This total correspondence of subjective and objective

parallels that identity which occurs at the most fundamental level of human being, as Husserl has shown. It is the authentic self which is the subject of the phenomenological level

being objective about the mind.

*Psychologist:* Are you saying that it is the only way in which an objective understanding of the mind can arise? There might be a slim chance of this being true for certain areas of investigation, but for many, surely, this sort of involvement is just unnecessary. To find out how a subject learns to solve a problem or why he perceives a certain type of stimulus in the way that he does must entail the investigator detaching himself from the situation in order to view it objectively. In this and countless other situations the psychologist need not concern himself with what is 'true' but just with how things happen, and this is the heart of psychology which your criticisms do not affect.

*Phenomenologist:* I think that there are three arguments that may be used here. In the first place, in the situations you describe it might be very helpful for the investigator to place himself in the subject's shoes and ask what he might be attempting to achieve or how he might be perceiving things in order to gain some insight into the subject's perspective, which is, after all, an important variable. Second, one supposes that experimental situations have been chosen by the investigator to throw light upon the basic processes of perception, learning, and so forth. I would argue that the investigator must justify his selection of an experimental situation as potentially able to reveal basic processes and the source of that justification must be an analysis of what the essential natures of perception, learning, etc. are. So we are back at our beginning; your empirical investigations must occur within a framework that goes beyond psychology. And this brings me to an attempt to answer your question. A number of authors (e.g. Macmurray, 1961; Polanyi, 1967; Merleau-Ponty, 1962) have pointed out that our impersonal knowledge must be seen in the context of a form of understanding which is both the source of that knowledge and which constantly transcends it. The error of psychology, which it is led to through an acceptance of the ultimate dualism of subject and object, so that as a science it becomes merely objective, is a failure to recognize this context. And seeing our empirical generalizations against this background is crucial to the task of giving them sense and coherence. If you refuse to do this, you will condemn our subject-matter to an artificial and unbridgeable division, whereby psychology will study man in his essential aspects and something called philosophy - in our case, phenomenology

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Phenomenology

- will be concerned with his essential nature - as a being for truth. Do you remember Miller's (1966) view that psychology has seen the end of conceptual crises and can now look forward to steady growth as a result of the accumulation of empirical findings? Compare that view with Heidegger's:

The real movement of the sciences takes place when their basic concepts undergo a more or less radical revision which is transparent to itself. The level which a science has reached is determined by how far it is capable of a crisis in its basic concepts. In such immanent crises the very relationship between positively investigative inquiry and those things themselves that are under investigation comes to a point where it begins to totter. (Heidegger, 1927, p. 29)

Note

1 In contemporary theory, the term 'sensations' is replaced by 'stimuli' and we talk of plans or schemata instead of interpretations, but the meaning is essentially the same.

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
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