

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter consists of three parts. The first deals with pragmatics, the second deals with metaphor and the third deals with principle of analogy.

II.1 Pragmatics

II.1.1. Defining Pragmatics

Pragmatics is defined by Morris as quoted by Stephen C. Levinson as the general shape of science of signs, or semiotics. Within semiotics, Morris distinguished three branches of inquiry: syntax, semantics and pragmatics (Levinson 101). In addition, Fromkin gives clear definition about the three distinct branches: *syntax* means “the way signs are arranged,” *semantic* means “what sign mean or signify,” and *pragmatics* means “the relationship between signs and their users.” Pragmatics also has to do with people’s use of language in contexts, so it is a part of linguistic performance (Fromkin 227).

George Yule in his book *Introduction to Language* adds the definition of pragmatics as the study of ‘intended speaker meaning’. He says that there are other aspects of meaning which are not derived solely from the meanings of the words used in phrases and sentences. When people read or hear pieces of language, they normally try to understand not only what the words mean, but also what the writer or speaker of those words intended to convey (Yule 97).

From all definition above, it can be concluded that science of sign or semiotics has three branches: syntax, semantics and pragmatics. Furthermore, the pragmatics has to do with the combination of the meaning of words and the

context in which they occur, throughout this combination people try to understand at what the sign intended to convey.

II.1.2. Pragmatics and Discourse Context.

George Yule and Gillian Brown in their book *Discourse Analysis* state the connection between pragmatics and discourse analysis. They said that in discourse analysis as in pragmatics, people are concerned with the using of language in context by a speaker or writer. Therefore, people will more concerned with the relationship between the speaker and the utterance rather than with the potential relationship of one sentence to another, regardless of their use. In addition, discourse analyst is describing what the speakers and hearers are doing and not the relationship which exists between one sentence or proposition and another (Yule 27).

One of discourse approaches to pragmatics is implicature. The term implicature is used by Grice as quoted by George Yule to account for what a speaker can imply, suggest, or mean as distinct from what the speaker literally says. There are conversational implicature which is derived from a general principle of conversational plus a number of maxims which speakers will normally obey (Yule 31). The general principle is called the cooperative principle which Grice presents in the following terms:

Make your conversation contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

The conversational conventions, or maxims, which support this principle are as follows:

Quantity: Make your contribution as informative as is required
(for the current purpose of the exchange). Don't make
your contribution more informative than is required.

Quality: Do not say what you believe to be false. Do not say
that for which you lack adequate evidence.

Relation: Be relevant.

Manner: Be perspicuous.

Avoid obscurity of expression.

Avoid ambiguity.

Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).

Be orderly.

However, by providing a description of the norms speakers operate in conversation, Grice also makes it possible to describe what types of meaning a speaker can convey by flouting one of the maxims. This flouting of a maxim results in the speaker conveying, in addition to the literal meaning of his utterance.

As a brief example, Levinson gives the following exchange:

A: What if the USSR blockades the Gulf and all the oil?

B: Oh come now, Britain rules the seas!

In this exchange above, Levinson suggests that B would be breaking the instruction *maxim of quality (be true)* because B's utterance is blatantly false. The only way in which B is cooperating can be maintained if the hearer takes B to

mean something rather than different from what he actually said. Therefore, B might be intending to convey that Britain does Not rule the seas, there is nothing that Britain could do (Levinson 109).

II.1.3. Pragmatics Account of Metaphor

Levinson in his book *Pragmatics* states the broad outlines of a pragmatics account of metaphor. First, we need an account of how non-literal use of language is recognized and here Grice's maxim is expected to play a central role. Grice as quoted by George Yule says that metaphors are exploitations or floutings the maxim of quality (Yule 157). Then, once recognized, we need some principle to interpret the metaphor and Searle with his framework offered suggestion of it. He suggests that once a conversational inadequacy is recognized, an utterance is matched to a series of pragmatics construal rules or principles of interpretation (Yule 158). Finally, after recognizing and interpreting, theory of metaphor we need an account of what is clearly a perfectly general and crucial psychological capacity that operates in many domains of human life, namely the ability to think analogically (Yule 159).

II.2. Metaphor

II.2.1. Defining Metaphor

Sometimes, the breaking of semantic rules within sentences can be used to convey a particular idea (Fromkin 235). For example in the sentence:

John is a snake in the grass.

The utterance can be interpreted literally to refer to a pet snake on the lawn named John. Metaphorically the sentence has nothing to do with a scaly, limbless reptile. From the utterance above, it can be said that to interpret metaphors people need to understand both the literal and facts about the world.

To come to the non-literal meaning of a sentence such the example above, the listeners need to stretch their imagination. The “stretching” is based on semantic properties that are inferred or provide some kind of resemble. Fromkin writes that such non-literal interpretation of sentence are called metaphor (Fromkin 235).

In addition, Searle in book *Metaphor and Thought* writes that the problem of explaining how metaphor works is to explain how it is possible to say one thing and mean something else, even though both the speaker and the hearer know the words uttered by the speaker do not literally express what the speaker meant. Strictly speaking, the metaphorical meaning of a word, expression, or sentence departs from what the word, expression, or sentence actually means (Searle 93).

II.2.2. Literal and Metaphorical Utterances

Searle’s definition of literal and metaphorical utterances begins when he writes about a speaker who makes a literal utterance of a sentence such as:

- (1) Sally is tall.
- (2) It’s getting hot in here.

In each of the sentences above, the literal meaning of the sentences determine a set of truth condition. The literal utterance of the sentences will also commit the speaker to the existence of the set of truth conditions determined by the meaning of that sentences. Furthermore, in each case the sentence only determines a definite set of these examples has some indexical element such as present tense and demonstrative “here”.

The sentences also only determine a set of truth conditions against a background of assumptions that are not explicitly realized in the semantic structure of the sentences. This is obvious because they contain the relative terms “tall and “hot”. These are what old-fashioned grammarians called “attributive” terms. Thus, a woman can be correctly as “tall” even though she is shorter than a giraffe that could be correctly be described as short”.

Finally, in account of literal utterance, the notion of similarity plays a crucial role. This is because the literal meaning of any general term, by determining a set of truth conditions, also determines a criterion of similarity between objects. To know that a general term is true of a set of objects is to know that they are similar with respect to the property specified by that term. Thus, all tall women are similar with respect to being tall and all hot rooms similar with respect to being hot (Searle 96).

When we turn to cases where utterance meaning and sentences meaning are different, we therefore turn in metaphorical utterance. In general, we shall need two sentences for metaphor – first the sentence uttered metaphorically, and

second a sentence that expresses literally what the speaker means when he utters the first sentence and means it metaphorically.

Thus (2), the metaphor (MET):

(2) (MET) It's getting hot here

corresponds to (2), the paraphrase (PAR):

(2) (PAR) the argument that is going on is becoming more vituperative.

John R. Searle confines the simplest subject-predicate metaphor cases. He says that the general form of the metaphorical utterance is that a speaker utters a sentence of the form "S is P" and means metaphorically that "S is R". In analyzing metaphorical prediction, we need to distinguish between three sets of elements. Firstly, there is a subject expression "S" and the object or objects it is used to refer to. Secondly, there is the predicate expression "P" that is uttered and the literal meaning of that expression with its corresponding truth conditions, plus the denotation if there is any. Thirdly, there is the speaker's utterance meaning "S is R" (R sometimes will be talking about the words, meanings, references, denotations and truth conditions).

In its simplest form, the problem of metaphor is to try to get a characterization of the relations between the three sets S, P, and R, together with a specification or other information and principles used by speakers and hearers, so as to explain how it is possible to utter "S is P" and means "S is R," and how it is possible to communicate that meaning from speaker to hearer (Searle 98).

In conclusion, Searle states the differences between literal and metaphorical utterances. In the literal utterance, speaker's meaning and sentence

meaning are the same; therefore the object referred will be true if it satisfies the truth conditions determined the general term as applied against a set of shared background assumption. To understand the utterance, the hearers only require his knowledge of the rules of language, awareness of the conditions of the utterance and a set of shared background assumptions.

In case of metaphorical utterance, the speaker's meaning and sentence's meaning are not the same. In order to understand the metaphorical utterances, the hearer requires something more than his knowledge of the language, his awareness of the conditions of the utterance and background assumption that he shares with the speaker. He must have other principles that enable him to figure out that when the speaker says "S is P," he means "S is R" (Searle 99).

II. 2. 3. Searle's Principles of Metaphorical Interpretation

The time has come to try to state the principles according to which metaphors are produced and understood. In the simplest form, the question about metaphor is how it is possible for the speaker to say metaphorically "S is P" and mean "S is R," when P does not mean R. Furthermore, how it is possible for the hearer who hears the utterance "S is P" to know that the speaker means "S is R".

In approaching the problem from the hearer's point of view, we need some principles according to which hearers understand metaphorical utterances and way to understand how it is possible for speakers to make metaphorical utterances. It is important because for communication to be possible, speaker and hearer must share a common set of principles.

Searle has discussed that in order to comprehend the metaphorical meaning of some utterances, the hearer must go through at least three sets of steps. First, he must have strategy for determining whether or not he has to seek a metaphorical interpretation. For example suppose he hears utterance, "Sam is pig". He knows that the utterance can not literally true because if it takes literally he may be obvious falsehood, violations of the rules of speech acts, or violations of conversational principles of communication. Therefore, the hearer has to look for an utterance meaning that differs from sentence meaning. Second, when hearer has decided to look for a metaphorical interpretation, he must have some set of principles for computing possible values of R. The list of principles will be written below. Third, the hearer also must have a set of strategies for restricting the range of R's – for deciding which R's are likely to be the ones the speaker is asserting of S and the commonly used is go back to the S term and see which of the many candidates for the values of R are likely or even possible properties of S.

The variety of principles according to Searle in book *Metaphor and Thought* for computing R, that are peculiar to metaphor are:

Principle I

Things which are P are by definition R. Usually, if the metaphor works, R will be one of the salient defining characteristics of P. Thus, for example,

(1) (MET) Sam is giant

Will be taken to mean

(1) (PAR) Sam is big,

because giants are by definition big.

Principle 2

Things which are P are contingently R. Again, if the metaphor works, the property R should be a salient or well known property of P things.

(2) (MET) Sam is a pig.

will be taken to mean

(2) (PAR) Sam is filthy, gluttonous, sloppy, and so on.

Principle 3

Things which are P are often said or believed to be R, even though both speaker and hearer may know that R is false of P. Thus,

(3) (MET) Richard is a gorilla.

Can be uttered to mean

(3) (PAR) Richard is mean, nasty, prone to violence, and so on. Even though both speaker and hearer know that in fact gorilla are shy, timid, and sensitive creature, but generations of gorilla mythology have set up association that will enable the metaphor to work even though both speaker and hearer know these beliefs to be false.

Principle 4

Things which are P are not R, nor are they like R things, nor are they believed to be R, nonetheless it is fact about our sensibility, whether culturally or naturally determined, that we just do perceive a connection, so that utterance of P is associated in our minds with R properties.

Thus,

(4) (MET) Sally is a block of ice.

(5) (MET) I am in a black mood.

(6) (MET) Marry is sweet.

(7) (MET) John is bitter.

are sentences that could be uttered to mean metaphorically that: Sally is unemotional; I am angry and depressed; Mary is gentle, kind, pleasant, and John is resentful. Notice that the associations tend to be scalar: degrees of temperature with range of emotion, and so forth.

Principle 5

P things are not like R things, and are not believed to be like R things, nonetheless the condition of being P is like the condition of being R. Thus, Someone might say to someone else who has just received a huge promotion

(8) You have become an aristocrat,

meaning not that he has personally become like an aristocrat, but that his new status or condition is like that of being an aristocrat.

Principle 6

There are cases where P and R are the same or similar in the meaning, but where one, usually P, is restricted in its application, and does not literally apply to S. Thus, "addled" is only said literally of eggs, but we can metaphorically say:

(9) This soufflé is addled.

(10) That parliament was addled.

(11) His brain is addled.

Principle 7

This is a way of applying principles 1 through 6 to simple cases which are not of the form “S is P” but relational metaphors, and metaphors of other syntactical forms such as those involving verbs and predicate adjectives. Consider such relational metaphor as:

(12) The ship ploughs the sea.

(13) Washington was the father of his country.

In each case we have literal utterance of two noun phrase surrounding a metaphorical utterance of a relational term. The hearer’s task is not to go from “S is P” to ”S is R” but to go from “S P-relation S” to ”S R-relation S”.

So, as applied to these, principle number 1, for example would read:

P - relations are by definition R – relations

In these cases, the hearer’s job is to find a relation that is similar to or associated with the relation literally expressed by the metaphorical expression P and the principles function is to enable him to select that relation or property by giving him a respect in which a respect in which the P – relation and R – relation might be similar.

Thus,

(12) The ship ploughs the sea.

(13) Washington is the father of his country

might be interpreted:

(12) There is some relation R which the ship has to the sea and which is similar to the relation that ploughs have to fields when they plough fields.

(13) There is some relation R which Washington has to his country and which is like the relation that father have to their offspring.

The hearer's task is to figure out what it is that the ship does and what the relations are that Washington stands in by looking for relations similar to ploughing and being the father.

Principle 8

When one says, "S is P," and means that "S is R," P and R may be associated by such relations as part-whole relation, the container-contained relation, or even the clothing and wearer relation. In each case, as in metaphor proper, the semantic content of the P term conveys the semantic content of the term by some principle of association.

Searle also states the reason why people use metaphor precisely because there is no literal expression that expresses exactly what they mean. Furthermore, in metaphorical utterances, people do more than just state that S is R, as figure 1 shows, they state that S is R by way of going through the meaning of "S is P"




Figure 1. a graphical comparison of the relations between sentence meaning and utterance meaning where the sentence meaning is S is P and the utterance meaning is S is R, that is, where the speaker utters a sentence that means literally that the object S falls under the concept P, but where the speaker means by his utterance that the object S falls under the concept R.

- a. *Literal utterance.* A speaker says S is P and he means S is P. Thus the speaker places object S under the concept P, where P = R. Sentence meaning and utterance meaning coincide.

- b. *Metaphorical Utterance (Simple)*. A speaker says S is P but means metaphorically that S is R. Utterance meaning is arrived at by going through literal sentence meaning.
- c. *Metaphorical Utterance (Open ended)*. A speaker says S is P, but means metaphorically an indefinite range of meaning, S is R₁, S is R₂, etc. As in simple case, utterance meaning is arrived at by going through literal meaning.

In conclusion, there are three main points that enable speaker and hearer to form and comprehend utterance of the form "S is P," where the speaker means metaphorically "S is R" (where P ≠ R). First, there must be some shared strategies which hearer can recognize that the utterance is not intended literally. The common strategy is based on the fact that the utterance is obviously strange if it taken literally. Second, there must be some shared principles that associated the P term with a set of possible value of R. Searle has tried to state them. Third, there must be some shared strategies that enable the speaker and the hearer, given their knowledge of the S term to restrict the range of possible values of R. The basic principle is that only possible values of R which determine possible properties of S can be actual values of R (Searle 120).

II.3. Principle of Analogy

A theory of metaphor will crucially involve the impingement of a very general cognitive ability, the capability to reason analogically, on language structure and use (Levinson 161).

Lakoff as quoted by Steen adds the cognitive view of metaphor as ‘a figure of thought’ emphasizes that it is knowledge rather than meaning that is responsible for the construal of similarity which lies at the basis of the process of understanding one thing in terms of another. Most cognitive scientists nowadays take ‘understanding one thing in terms of another’ to be guided by principle of analogy. In analogy, a mapping takes place of the structure of one cognitive domain, often called the *source* or base domain, onto the structure of another, the *target* domain. The term *mapping* suggests a kind of projection of structure from A on to B. the result of such mapping is the organization of our view of relevant categories in the target domain, B in terms of the source domain A (Steen 11).

Principle of analogy will also provide reasonably secure framework for interpretation for the hearer and analyst most of time in context. It assumes that everything will remain as it was before unless they are given specific notice that some aspect has changed (Yule 65).

From the description above, it can be concluded that a theory of metaphor needs principle of analogy. The principle of analogy will provide secure framework of mapping the source or base domain onto the structure of another or target domain. The principle of analogy also gives hearer and analyst ability to interpret as relevant to the context of situation.

II. 4. Related Studies

II. 4. 1. Ery Juliani (1995)

A thesis written by Ery Juliani entitled *An Analysis of Shakespeare's Drama "KING LEAR"* by using the politeness and cooperative principle also gives the writer many ideas in doing this study. She presented several steps to analyze Shakespeare's Drama "KING LEAR" which makes the writer interested in using them in this study.

CHAPTER III

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS