CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter explores two sub-chapters related to assertions and motivation program. The first part of the chapter deals with theoretical framework of assertions while the second part concerns with review of related studies about assertions. Because the main topic is about assertions, the portion of theoretical framework of motivation is less than the assertions.

2.1 Theoretical Framework

2.1.1.1 Definition of Speech Acts

The term *"speech acts"* was introduced by Austin as he introduced his ideas in *How To Do Things With Words* (cf. in Sadock, n.d.). Austin is a pioneer in speech acts. His basic idea of speech acts is that by the time people utter sentences, they are actually not only saying something, but also doing something. Therefore, speech acts are acts performed via utterances (Searle, 1969). The speech acts are public utterances, not merely silent thoughts. Hence the effects are obtained in virtue of their being public thoughts (Capone cf. in Mey 2009: 1015). Since they are performed in public, speech acts have framework of social institutions and conventions. As Huang says in slogan form, "Saying is (part of) doing, or words are (part of) deeds" (Huang cf. in Mey 2009: 1000). Furthermore, some examples of speech acts in daily communication include apologizing, thanking, asserting, asking questions, giving directions, and so on.

8

2.1.1.2 Speech Acts Classification

Austin is the first developer of speech acts system. At first he introduces the concept of performatives and constatives as part of speech acts system. The earlier is the utterances performed by speakers whereby by saying something, the speaker performs certain acts. Meanwhile, the latter as opposed to performatives, i.e., mere statements. However, such classification has weaknesses because linguists start to realize that truth conditions are not central to language understanding. In sentence "I christen this ship Titanic"; the speaker does an act of christening the ship (performatives), not only say a sentence about christening a ship without specific purpose. Here, the speech acts go wrong if the ship has already another name, the speaker is not authorized to name it, and there are no witness and celebration of christening ceremony.

As illustrated above, the classification of performatives and constatives creates confusion. Realizing weaknesses in his previous classification, Austin fixes the speech acts system. Thus he creates new nomenclature of speech acts. The new system consists of three interrelated acts called locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary.

Locutionary act (or locution) is what is said or the form of the words uttered. It is the basic act of utterance, producing a meaningful linguistic expression. For this reason, therefore when someone says in English "Aha mokofa bla blo", the utterance is not locutionary act since such expression is meaningless in English. But when someone says in English "I've just made a coffee."; it is indeed a locutionary act.

Illocutionary act (or illocutionary force) is what speakers are doing with their words, the function of the word, or the communicative force of the utterance, or the specific purpose that speakers have in mind. Therefore the illocutionary acts can be a statement, an offer, a direction, a request, etc.

Perlocutionary act (or perlocutionary effect) is the result of the words. It is the intended effect of the action on the hearer, or the hearer's reaction.

As an example of how to differentiate speech acts system as mentioned above, see the example below:

Context: in a directive speech act, a mother asks her son to close the window in a windy day.

The locutionary act is when the mother produces a sentence "Honey, can you please close the window?". Her utterance is a meaningful language expression consisting of understandable words that can be performed by the hearer. Next, the illocutionary act is when the mother says so, the son closes the window as told. Hence, because the hearer performs an act after such speech, the speaker's utterance contains illocutionary force that is understood by the hearer as a request and later on is performed. The perlocutionary act is when the window is closed by the son.

However, Sadock (n.d.: 3) states potential problems of such classification.

> Though it is crucial under Austin's system that we be able to distinguish fairly sharply among the three categories, it is often difficult in practice to draw the requisite lines. Especially irksome are the problems of separating illocutions and locutions, on the one hand, and illocutions and perlocutions on the other, the latter being the most troublesome problem according to Austin himself.

For reasons above, Austin's main suggestion for discriminating between an illocution and a perlocution was that the illocution is *conventional*, in the sense that at least it could be made explicit by the performative formula; but the perlocution could not" (Austin cf. Sadock, n.d.).

Because of such overlapping classification, speech acts are often narrowly interpreted as just the illocutionary force of an utterance. Meanwhile, the fact shows that the same locutionary act can count as different illocutionary forces. For example "I'll see you later." can be a prediction, promise, or warning.

Based on the analysis of the weaknesses on Austin's speech act theory, Searle proposed an alternative theory. In his book 'Expression and Meaning', Searle described his speech act theory based on the direction of fit between the world (the fact) and the words (the utterances). Searle's classification includes five categories comprising declaratives, representatives, commisives, directives, and expressive.

The basic difference among those speech acts lies in the direction of fitness between the words (speech) and the world (fact). Below is the summary:

a. Declarative Speech Acts refer to speech acts in which the words change the world and the speaker causes certain situation, symbolized as X

b. Representative Speech Acts refer to speech acts in which the speech act makes words fit the world and the speaker believes situation X

c. Commisive Speech Acts refer to speech acts in which the speech acts make the world fit words and the speaker intends situation X

11

d. Directive Speech Acts refer to speech acts in which the speech acts make the world fit words and the speaker wants situation X

e. Expressive Speech Acts refer to speech acts in which the speech acts make words fit the world and the Speaker feels situation X

Because the focus of this study is on assertion, thus the next discussion only covers representative speech acts in which assertion belongs.

The illocutionary point of representative acts is to commit the truth of the expressed proposition. The example are stating, suggesting, boasting, complaining and reporting. Searle gave a note that the simplest test of an assertive is that the verb can be literally characterized as true or false (Searle, 1979). It means that people can recognize assertion more easily through the use of verb in which it can be judged true or false, for example: Barrack Obama mentions in his twitter account "Four more years" referring to his winning election. Although the tweet does not contain any explicit verb, actually his tweet is classified as an assertion. It happens so because from the utterance above, it can be made into true/false statements such as "Barrack Obama will have four more years to serve as the President of the U.S.A." or "Barrack Obama does not have another four more years to be the 44th President of the U.S.A.". Since the fact has shown that Barrack Obama is officially served as the 44th President of the U.S.A.; the first statement is true while the second is false.

According to Leech (1983), Assertiveness or previously known as Representative is the speech act that commits the speaker to the truth of the

expressed proposition. For example: I have an appointment at 5 pm today. That kind of speech acts that states what the speaker believes to be the case or not are called representatives (Yule, 1997:53). Similar with this idea, This kind of speech act includes statements of fact, assertions, conclusions, descriptions, etc (Yule, 1997:53).

Below are examples of representative speech acts:

- The earth is flat.

- I came; I saw, I conquered. (Julius Caesar, in Cutting, 2002:17)

Furthermore, Yule (1997:53) explains that in using a representative, the speaker makes the words fit the world (of belief). They are statements of fact, assumptions, opinions, descriptions, conclusions, quotations and paraphrases, etc.

2.1.1.3 Speech Acts Markers

Having defined the classification of speech acts, there are markers to classify speech acts properly. These markers are based on Searle's observation (1969). They include *Illocutionary Force Indicating Devices (IFIDs)* and a set of *constitutive rules*. A form of an utterance displays double structures, one part which determines the propositional act, and the other part the illocutionary act (Sadock,n.d.). To formulate these concepts, Searle symbolizes p for the parts of an utterance that together are used by a speaker to signal the propositional act, while F is used to symbolize formal features of the utterance that determine the literal illocutionary force (illocutionary force indicating device/ IFID). Therefore the form of a complete utterance to create a complete speech act can be formulated as

13

(I) *F(p)*. For example, when someone asserts an idea or opinion, the IFID is postulated as (I) assert (idea/opinion). Here, (I) refers to the speaker of the speech acts. Hence, when there is an assertion like "I assert an opinion that to be healthy means to exercise on daily basis," the negation of the assertion is "I do not assert that to be healthy means to exercise on daily basis."

Another important thing in theory of speech acts relate to the fact that in performing an IFID, the performative verbs are actually can be explicit performative or implicit performative. Explicit performative states the verb of a speech act clearly,such as in *"Forgive me."* In the example, the verb "forgive" clearly indicates an apology. Meanwhile, an implicit performative seems to be more difficult to be recognized automatically a speech act is made since the hearer needs to infer the meaning, such as in *"That is too expensive."* In a situation of bargaining, when it is said by a buyer, then such example can be considered as a request to discount the price although there is no sentence like *"I request you to give me discount."* As an example of assertion, the example of explicit performative verb is in the sentence "I claim that this is our land." Meanwhile, the example of implicit performative verb is when the speaker says "People say that this is our land" or "Their statement about or land is correct, isn't it?" or "Welcome back home to our beloved motherland."

Related to the markers of speech acts, Searle (cf. in Sadock, n.d.), his idea is that "speaking a language is performing acts according to rules" where by "rule" he means a conventional association between a certain kind of act and its socially determined consequences. Moreover, these are called *constitutive rules.*

14

He further argues that to perform an illocutionary act, is to follow certain conventional rules that are constitutive of that kind of act. Thus, in order to discover the rules, Searle, following Austin, proposed to examine the conditions that must met for an illocutionary act to be felicitously performed.

According to Searle's explanation above, it can be concluded that there are two main conditions and four specific conditions to apply speech acts:

The first main condition is that *general condition* is applied. It means that language is understood, no play-acting or nonsense. The second main condition is called *felicity condition.* It is expected or appropriate circumstance for a speech act to be recognized as intended, i. e. *I sentence you to six months in prison.* Here, the performance will be infelicitous if the speaker is not a judge in a courtroom.

Meanwhile the four specific conditions of speech acts cover content condition, preparatory condition, sincerity condition, and essential condition. Below are the details:

1. *Content conditions* deal with the content of the speech acts, e.g. for promises/warnings the content of the utterance must be about a future event (promise: the event will be an act by the speaker)

2. *Preparatory conditions* mean pre-existing conditions about the event, e.g., promise: event will not happen by itself, event will be beneficial; while in warning, it is not clear if the hearer knows that the event will occur, the event will not have a beneficial effect

15

3. *Sincerity conditions* mean attitude of the speaker, e.g.,in a promise, a speaker genuinely intends to carry out the future action; while in a warning, the speaker genuinely believes the future event will not have a beneficial effect

4. *Essential conditions* means change of state in the speaker, e.g., in a promise, it is a change of state from non-obligation to obligation to carry out actionl while in a warning it is a change of state from non-information of bad future event to information.

Searle (cf. in Sadock, n.d.) accepted Austin's idea, that a sufficient test for illocutionary acts is that they could have been performed by uttering an explicit performative.Therefore, he said that more than one illocutionary act can be accomplished by the utterance of a single, noncompound sentence, giving as an example the case of a wife who says at a party, "It's really quite late," and in doing so simultaneously performs the illocutionary act of stating a fact and the illocutionary act of making a suggestion equivalent to "I suggest that we go home." Therefore, Searle suggested that making a particular utterance may immediately accomplish one illocutionary act, e.g., stating something, which act, having been accomplished, may result in the accomplishment of a corollary illocutionary act, e.g., warning. Second, Searle (cf. in Sadock, n.d.) observed that an illocutionary act is typically performed with a certain perlocutionary effect in mind, an effect that follows from the essential condition: "Thus requesting is, as a matter of its essential condition, an attempt to get the hearer to do something ..." (Searle 1969:71). Searle doubted that a reduction of illocutions to associated

16

perlocutionary effects could be accomplished. However, this possibility enlightens

Austin's worry about the distinction between these two categories.

2.1.1.4 Assertion

Assertion belongs to representative speech acts since it deals with the claim

of something.

According to Searle (cf. in Sadock, n.d., p.7):

> An assertion is a speech act that contain any proposition p which has two
> preparatory conditions (*Speaker S* has evidence (or reasons) for the truth of
> p and it is not obvious to both S and *Hearer H* that H knows (does not need
> to be reminded of, etc.) p in which the S sincerely believes p and it
> essentially counts as an undertaking that p represents an actual state of
> affairs.

Assertion is generally thought of being open, explicit and direct, as opposed

e.g. to implying something without explicitly saying it (Pagin, 2012). In this

respect assertion is contrasted with implicature. The contrast is, however, not

altogheter sharp, partly because of the idea of indirect speech acts, including

indirect assertions. Therefore, basically there are two kinds of assertions based on

their directness of asserting. They are direct and indirect assertions. Direct

assertions clearly shows the IFIDs whereas indirect assertions can be achieved by

means of various ways, such as using the right intonation, stress, visual aids,

gestures, logical reasonings, and examples.

17

As this study uses Searle's idea of assertion, there are rules for doing it. According to Searle, below is the *constitutive rules* for assertion (Searle in Sadock, n.d.):

Propositional content	: Any proposition p
Preparatory	: 1. S has evidence (or reasons) for the truth of p
	2. It is not obvious to both S and H that H knows (does not need to be reminded of, etc.) p
Sincerity	: S believes p
Essential	: Counts as an undertaking that p represents an actual state of affairs

Below is the example of the *constitutive rules* for assertion:

When someone asserts a proposition "I believe that 2012 is not the end of the world", the analysis of the *constitutive rules* indicates the following details:

Propositional content   : That 2012 is not the end of the world

Preparatory   : 1. S has evidence (or reasons) for the truth of that proposition.

Here the speaker or (I) has said an utterance based on the truth that 2012 is not the end of the world. In fact, it has been shown that Mayan's calendar indicating 2012 as the end of the world is simply a mistake and it is not proven.

2. It is not obvious to both speaker and hearer that hearer knows (does not need to be reminded of the proposition). When the speaker asserts

18

such opinion, she does not now whether the persons she is talking to really understand about the topic or not.

Sincerity : The speaker believes in his proposition. Although she does nt have any idea about the other people's belief, however she sincerely believes in her faith that 2012 is indeed not the end of the world.

Essential : Counts as an undertaking that the statement represents an actual state of affairs. Eventhough finally it is proven that in 2012 there is no end of the world, such claim is essentially important to represent the reality. This is very true especially when the speaker speaks the utterance long before 2012 where there was no proof or guarantee either the assertion true or false. For that reason, the statement of a speaker like mentioned above is assumed by both speaker and hearer as a representation of the truth.

2.1.2 Motivation

According to Ryan and Deci, motivation can be described as an intrinsic or extrinsic thing that can move or energize or activate someone to do something to

19

an end (2000: 1). Ryan and Deci further state that intrinsic motivation remains as an important construct, reflecting the natural human propensity to learn and assimilate. However, extrinsic motivation is argued to vary considerably in its relative autonomy and thus can either reflect external control or true self-regulation.

Intrinsic motivation is defined as the doing of an activity for its inherent satisfactions rather than for some separable consequence. When intrinsically motivated a person is moved to act for the fun or challenge entailed rather than because of external prods, pressures, or rewards. Although, in one sense, intrinsic motivation exists within individuals, in another sense intrinsic motivation exists in the relation between individuals and activities.

Extrinsic motivation is a construct that pertains whenever an activity is done in order to attain some separable outcome. Extrinsic motivation thus contrasts with intrinsic motivation, which refers to doing an activity simply for the enjoyment of the activity itself, rather than its instrumental value. Extrinsic motivation can come from outer sources, including from friends, reality, experiences with books, TV programs, radio programs, testimonies, etc.

Famous psychologist, Abraham Maslow (in Sriwidiati, 2009) states a hierarchy of human beings' five basic needs that motivate them: (1) Physiological needs (food, clothing, and shelter), (2) Security needs (both physically and psychologically), (3) Social needs (social interaction), (4) Esteem needs (prestige, social status), and (5) Self-actualization needs (reaching the life dreams or goals).

20

2.2 Related Studies

The study of speech acts have been done intensively. Related studies covering speech acts analysis on certain topics, such as motivation-based talk show like in *Mario Teguh Golden Ways*. Sriwidiati (2009) in her study entitled "Strategi Tindak Tutur Motivator Mario Teguh dalam Acara Golden Ways di Metro TV" found out three basic findings. First, Mario Teguh mostly uses illocutionary and literal speech acts that are started with representative (assertions) and ended with directive speech acts. Second, Mario Teguh often answers audience's question irrelevantly. However, in his answers there are hidden meaning or implictures. Third, based on the questionnaire to audiences, Mario Teguh's speech acts result impacts toward the audience, specifically 65 % of audience sometimes change their mindset after watching the show while 20 % state that the speech acts do not change their mindset at all and 15 % of audiences agree that the speech acts indeed change their mindset. She suggested that the next research should investigate more episodes of the show.

Sriwidiati's study provides the basis of related studies. In her study, Sriwidiati applies Searle's theory of speech acts and Grice's theory of maxim of cooperative behaviors. Hence, she explores both literal and non-literal speech acts. She further uses Maslow's theory of hierarchy needs to measure audience's motivation after watching the show. Thus, her study is more multi-disciplines as she studies about both linguistics (pragmatics) and psychology.

Unlike Sriwidiati's study, this thesis attempts to investigate specifically only about speech acts based on direction of fitness. Thus, this thesis does not

21

relate to Grice's theory of maxim of cooperative behaviors. It applies only speech acts theory by Searle. This thesis is different from the previous one because it only focuses on the pragmatics elements of the language used in the show, without measuring audience's level of motivation after watching the show. Thus, this study does not deal with psychology element at all.

22

CHAPTER 3
METHOD OF THE STUDY