

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

II.1 Discourse Analysis and Context

Discourse analysis is the study of the organization of language above the sentence or the clause, and therefore exemplified in larger linguistic units such as conversational exchanges and written text (Stubbs in Schiffrin, 1987:1). McCarthy gives another definition that discourse analysis is the study of language in use: written text of all kinds and spoken data from conversation to highly institutionalized forms of talk (McCarty, 1994:5).

The term 'discourse' usually refers to a form of a language use, public speeches or more generally to spoken language or ways of speaking (Dijk, 1991:2). Furthermore, Dijk states that discourse analysis tries to go beyond such common sense definitions. One characterization of discourse that embodying some of these functional aspects is that of a communication event that is people use language in order to communicate ideas or beliefs (or to express emotion), and they do so as a part of more complex social events, for instance, in such specific situation as an encounter with friends.

The problem with assigning functions to utterances is that speaker's intent and utterance's meaning are not always the same. Speaker's intent may be more or less, or actually the opposite, of utterance's meaning (as in sarcasm).

George Yule and Gillian Brown in their book entitled *Discourse Analysis* state that discourse analyst treats his data as the record (text) of a dynamic process in which language was used as an instrument of communication in a context by a speaker/writer to express meanings and achieve intentions (1983:26-27). Therefore, they continue, discourse analyst is more concerned with the relationship between the speaker and the utterance, on the particular occasion, than with the potential relationship of one sentence to another, regardless of their use. >

There are two broad issues critical to the application of speech acts theory to discourse; the analysis will be concerned with both. First is the identification of speech acts *per se*: how to identify an utterance as a particular of speech acts. Although identifying speech acts as an action requires knowledge of the constituent rules for speech acts, it also depends upon an assumption that what is said can be “mapped onto” what is done. The second issue is the sequential arrangement of speech acts: how an initial speech acts create an environment in which a next speech acts is (or is not) appropriate. This issue bears centrally on discourse analysis simply because discourse is comprised of a sequentially arranged unit, and because sequential regularities are a key ingredient in our identification of something as text (Schiffrin, 1994:63).

Furthermore, Austin wants to show that the condition of defining one type of utterance applies equally well to the other, and that neither a type can be differentiated by formal clues. He states two aspects of the conditions underlying

speech acts: context (what makes an utterance “true” and “appropriate”) and text (how what is said conveys what is done) (Schiffirin, 1994:51).

Thus, there is no utterance is completely context free in terms of meaning and function. The term *context* is often employed to refer both the conditions surrounding the utterance of a word and to the other words, which precede and follow a word in discourse (Robert H. More in Anderson & Stageberg; 1962:203).

II.2 Speech Acts

Austin and Searle developed speech acts theory from the basic insight that language is used to describe the world, but also to perform a range of other actions that can be indicated in the performance of the utterance itself (Schiffirin, 1994:6). For instance, the utterance “I bet you sixpence” performs the act of ‘betting’. The utterance “I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth” performs the act of ‘naming’.

Furthermore, Austin proposes a tripartite classification of acts performed when a person speaks (Schiffirin, 1994:51). First is locutionary act, which is an act of producing sounds and words with meanings. It is the bare fact that a communicative act takes place. It constitutes as the formal literal meaning of the words that involves the uttering of an expression with sense and reference. Second is illocutionary acts, the issuing of an utterance with conventional communicative force achieved “in saying”. It is performed as a result of the speaker making an utterance—the case where ‘saying=doing’. The last is perlocutionary act. Perlocutionary act is the ‘consequential effects’ of the speaker’s utterance has on the hearer (the effect of actions, thoughts, beliefs of hearers).

Viewing speech acts as the basics of communication allows Searle to explicitly associate speech acts with the study of language (its production, its interpretation) and meaning (both speaker meaning and linguistic meaning) (Schiffrin, 1994:55). Nevertheless, Austin and Searle have shown that it is possible to classify utterance into very small set of functions (Hatch, 1993:121).

Searle proposes five basic categories to categorize illocutionary acts, namely: representatives (e.g. stating, predicting, insisting, suggesting), directives (e.g. commanding, requesting, inviting), commissive (e.g. promising, threatening), expressives (e.g. thanking, welcoming), and declaratives (e.g. blessing, baptizing) (Pratt, 1977:80).

11.2.1 Performative Verb and Felicity Condition

In his famous work, *How to Do Things with Words*, J.L. Austin outlined his theory of speech acts in the concept of performative language, in which to say something is to do something. Further, he wants to show that words are not only something we use to say things, but also something we use to do things (Petrey, 1990:3). When a speaker, for example, in appropriate circumstances, makes an utterance containing an asserting expression, he carries out a certain act that is an act of asserting.

Since a large number of acts can be performed either by means of an utterance or by some other means, Austin creates, then, a clear distinction between performative and constative. He defined constative as declarative whose truth could be judged; whereas performative is declarative that “do” an action.

The performative approach will view a statement as having the force of a command, warning, etc. and not merely a statement of fact (Schiffrin, 1994:51).

Supporting these definitions, Hurford and Heasley (1983:235-236) give another definition of performative and constative. According to them, a performative utterance is one that actually describes the act that it performs. i.e. it performs some act and simultaneously describes that act. By saying, "I bet you a hundred dollars", for instance, the speaker actually does what the utterance describe i.e. he bets the hearer a hundred dollars, which further, it means the utterance both describes and performs an act of betting.

On the contrary with performative, they continue, a constative utterance is one, which makes an assertion (i.e. it is often the utterance of a declaration sentence) but is not performative. The utterance "I argue", for instance, is a constative utterance, because it makes an assertion about a particular state of affairs, but is not performatives, i.e. the utterance does not simultaneously describe and performs the same act. Thus, although the speaker can argue with the hearer verbally, an utterance "I argue" does not constitute an argument.

Based on the illustration above, Austin, then, goes on to classify the circumstances (the condition) that allow utterances to act as performatives, or what he calls felicitous condition. He does so according to the circumstances themselves, and according to the consequence for a performative if the circumstance does not hold. Further, he notes that the circumstances allowing an act are varied: they include the existence of "an accepted conventional procedure having a certain conventional effect", the presence of "particular persons and

circumstances,” “the correct and complete execution of a procedure,” and (when appropriate to the act) “certain thoughts, feelings, or intentions.” (Schiffirin, 1994:51).

Consider the distinction between truth/falsity (applicable to constatives) and felicitous/infelicitous (applicable to performatives). Austin argues that performatives (as well as constatives) involve judgements of truth and falsity. In other words, the contextual conditions for performative are not different in kind from those for constative: both involve truth and falsity; both involve felicity and infelicity (Schiffirin, 1994:53).

Moreover, Hurford and Heasley (1983:251) defined the felicity condition of an illocutionary acts as a condition that must be fulfilled in the situation in which the act is carried out if the act is to be said to be carried out properly, or felicitously. Infelicity condition is the contrary of felicity condition. One of the felicity conditions for the illocutionary acts of commanding, for example, is that the speaker must be superior to, or in authority over, the hearer. On the contrary, if a command is issued by a particular person of lower status or power to another particular person of higher status or power, it will be infelicity for the former to issue an order to the latter. Thus, if a servant says to her mistress “Open the door”, there is infelicity in the act (of ordering) carried out, but if the mistress says “Open the door!” to the servant, there is no infelicity.

Further, they give suggested felicity condition of illocutionary act of accusing and promising. A felicity condition for one of accusing is that the deed or property attributed to the accused is wrong in some way. Thus one can

feliculously accuse someone of theft or murder, but normally only infeliculously of, say, being a nice guy, or of helping an old lady to cross the road. Whereas a felicity condition for the illocutionary act of promising are the speaker must intend to carry out the thing promised and such thing promised must be something that the hearer wants to happen.

II.2.2 Speech Acts in Literary Text

Speech acts theory provides a way of talking about utterance not only in terms of their surface grammatical properties but also in terms of the context in which they are made, the intentions, attitudes, and expectations of the participants, the relationship existing between participants, and generally, the unspoken rules and conventions that are understood to be in play when an utterance is made and received (Pratt, 1977:86).

Literature itself is a context, and as with any utterance, the way people produce and understand literary works depends enormously on unspoken, culturally-shared knowledge of the rules, conventions, and expectations, that are in play when a language is used in context. Just as a definition of explaining, thanking, or persuading must include the unspoken contextual information on which the participants are relying, so must a definition of literature, Pratt continues. Each aspect of an utterance's context can be formulated as a subset of appropriateness conditions interacting with all the others.

Pratt also says "The basic speaker/audience situation, which prevails in a literary work, is not fundamental or unique. It is not the result of a use of the

language different from all other uses. Far from suspending, transforming, or opposing the laws of non-literary discourse, literary, in this aspect at least, obeys them." She continues, "It is the speaker, not the text, who invites and attempts to control this focusing (by the reader), according to his own, not the text's intention" (Pratt, 1977:88). Petrey added that while words always perform in collaboration with their users, this collaboration can occur in many different ways (Petrey, 1990:76).

Speech acts approach to literature enables and indeed requires us to describe and define literature in the same terms used to describe and define all other kinds of discourse (Pratt, 1977:88). Similarities between literary and non-literary utterance type can be linked quite naturally to similarities in the linguistic context and the communicative purposes of the participants.

In short, Pratt says that a speech acts approach to literature offers the important possibility of integrating literary discourse into the same basic model of language as all our other communicative activities.

II.2.3 Indirect Speech Acts

According to Searle, how we do more than one thing at once with our words (i.e. the multiple functions of an utterance) are part of the important issue of indirect speech acts. The view of indirectness draws upon his analysis of the conditions underlying speech acts. He defines an indirect speech acts as an utterance in which one illocutionary acts is performed by way of the performance of another (a literal act). He is certainly sure that hearer is able to interpret indirect

speech acts by relying upon their knowledge of speech acts, along with general principle of cooperative conversation, mutually shared factual information, and a general ability to draw inferences; he continues (Schiffirin, 1994:59).

Furthermore, Schiffirin says that some utterances have multiple functions because one act is being performed by way of another: these are called “indirect” speech act. The conditions underlying speech acts provide an analytical resource for indirectness. That conditions can have this analytical function is possible because they have a critical role in our knowledge of speech act type. When more than one act is performed by a single utterance, the conditions for the two speech acts nevertheless have a systematic relationship to one another. Thus, it is relationship between underlying conditions that allow utterances to do more than one thing at a time (Schiffirin, 1994:60).

Heasley and Hurford (1983:257) say that there must be some such system of trying to discover some systematic way of telling from the form of an uttered sentence to what illocutionary acts are performed in uttering it, because language users are able to tell with great (though not total) reliability from the form of an uttered sentence what illocutionary act is performed. Moreover, since an utterance can have more than one illocutionary acts, then, they create the distinctions between direct and indirect illocutions. For them, direct illocution an utterance is the illocution most directly indicated by a literal reading of the grammatical form and vocabulary of the sentence uttered. Meanwhile, the indirect illocution of an utterance is any further illocution the utterance may have. An example that an utterance may also perform more than one act is illustrated below:

Speaker: "You'd better open it (letter) now"

Hearer /opens the letter/

Speaker's utterance can be understood as both suggestion (direct illocutionary act) and command for hearer to open the letter (indirect illocutionary act).

II.3. Related Studies

Ayu Saulina in her thesis *The Study of Illocutionary acts in An Ideal Husband by Oscar Wilde (A Discourse Analysis Approach)* uses speech act theory and focuses on the illocutionary acts. Based on the theory that illocutionary act is the basic element for speech act, the thesis is quite helpful to get some references for the writer. She found that language can both state and perform. She also found that an utterance can have more than one act.

Marriett Widhi Kurmiati, a Petra University student, also analyzed the same topic in her thesis *The Study of Speech Acts Used in Comic Strip of "Garfield" and "The Calvin and Hobbes"* and she focuses on the type of acts in illocutionary act.

The last study is done by Hermanto, a student of Airlangga University. *A study of Speech Act in Dialogues of Radio Advertisements in Surabaya (A Discourse Analysis Approach)* is the title of his thesis. He analyses dialogues in some radio advertisements. He uses J.L. Austin's and Searle's theory of speech acts as the main theory, which claims that by understanding the speaker's utterances which are performative, it will make the hearer easily understand the speech acts performed by the speakers through their utterances. He found that the

kinds of speech acts which are found make the hearers convinced about the products or services explained by the speakers and are eventually willing to buy or to make use of the products or services as informed or explained by the speakers in the advertisements.

CHAPTER III

PRESENTATION AND DATA ANALYSIS