


PENINGKATAN KAPABILITAS MILITER CINA TAHUN 2000-2006

SKRIPSI



**JURUSAN ILMU HUBUNGAN INTERNASIONAL
FAKULTAS ILMU SOSIAL DAN ILMU POLITIK
UNIVERSITAS AIRLANGGA
SURABAYA
SEMESTER GENAP 2007/2008**



**PENINGKATAN KAPABILITAS MILITER CINA
TAHUN 2000-2006**

SKRIPSI

**Diajukan Sebagai Salah Satu Syarat
Untuk Menyelesaikan Studi Pada
Fakultas Ilmu Sosial Dan Ilmu Politik
Universitas Airlangga**

Oleh :

**DINI PURWANING R.
070317079**

**JURUSAN ILMU HUBUNGAN INTERNASIONAL
FAKULTAS ILMU SOSIAL DAN ILMU POLITIK
UNIVERSITAS AIRLANGGA
SURABAYA
SEMESTER GENAP 2007/2008**

HALAMAN PERNYATAAN

SKRIPSI


PENINGKATAN KAPABILITAS MILITER CINA

TAHUN 2000-2006

Pernyataan Tidak Melakukan Plagiat

Bagian atau keseluruhan isi skripsi ini tidak pernah diajukan untuk mendapatkan gelar akademis pada bidang studi dan atau universitas lain dan tidak pernah dipublikasikan atau ditulis oleh individu selain penulis kecuali dituliskan dengan format kutipan dalam isi skripsi.

Surabaya, 31 Mei 2007


Penulis,

Dini Purwaning R.

HALAMAN PERSETUJUAN

Skripsi ini disetujui untuk diujikan

Surabaya, 2007


Dosen Pembimbing



Vinsento M. A. Dugis, Ph. D.

(NIP. 131 929 862)

Ketua Jurusan Ilmu Hubungan Internasional



B. L. S. Wahyu Wardhani, Ph. D.

(NIP. 131 801 409)

HALAMAN PENGESAHAN


Skripsi berjudul:

PENINGKATAN KAPABILITAS MILITER CINA TAHUN 2000-2006


telah dipertahankan di hadapan Komisi Penguji
pada 19 Juni 2007, pukul 08.00 WIB

Komisi Penguji


Ketua,


(I. Basis Susilo, MA.)
NIP. 130 937 977

Anggota I,


(Lilik Salamah, M.Si.)
NIP. 131 569 360

Anggota II,


(Siti Rokhmawati S., M.IR.)
NIP. 132 255 147

HALAMAN PERSEMBAHAN



HALAMAN MOTTO

**Bertahanlah di Tengah Perubahan
Tuhan Pasti Berikan Jalan**



KATA PENGANTAR

Sebuah fenomena selalu memunculkan berbagai reaksi berbeda, termasuk peningkatan kapabilitas militer Cina dimana nilainya mencapai rata-rata 12 persen mulai tahun 2000. Di tengah berbagai argumen yang cenderung menyatakan bahwa intensi tersebut dilatarbelakangi ambisi Cina untuk menjadi *superpower* baik dalam lingkup regional maupun global, penulis mencoba mencari alternatif lain yang kemudian memunculkan ketertarikan akan kemungkinan terdapatnya alasan lain dibalik kebijakan yang seringkali menuai protes keras tersebut.

Berangkat dari pertanyaan sederhana tersebut, penulis mencoba melihat signifikansi dari sebuah anggaran pertahanan dan kapabilitas militer sebuah negara. Dari elaborasi detil peningkatan kapabilitas militer yang disesuaikan dengan prinsip-prinsip dasar negara ditambah *security environment* yang telah ditetapkan akan terlihat dimana prioritas kebijakan pertahanan sebuah negara tersebut diletakkan. Penelitian ini memunculkan sebuah argumen yang berdasar pada analisa secara mendalam terhadap detil peningkatan kapabilitas militer secara keseluruhan, bukan pada nominal anggaran semata.

Tak dapat dipungkiri bahwa penelitian ini tak akan terlaksana tanpa dukungan berbagai pihak. Syukur selalu terucap pada Allah SWT dan Nabi Muhammad SAW atas berbagai kemudahan yang terbentang, ayahanda Sutaryono dan ibunda Titik Setyo Rahayu tercinta beserta seluruh keluarga besar. Terima kasih atas do'a dan segalanya.

Penghargaan yang tak kalah tingginya juga saya haturkan untuk:

1. Pak Dugis atas bimbingan dan motivasi “deadline 15 Juni” yang telah tercurahkan, dosen wali Mas Yunus atas berbagai masukannya, Mas Wahyu atas pinjaman bukunya, Pak Djoko atas wejangan kehidupannya, Pak Basis yang telah membuka inspirasi untuk bab satu, Bu Lilik yang membangkitkan keberanian berpendapat di kelas Asia Tenggara, Mas Joko atas diskusi yang tak terlupakan pada semester lima, Bu Ani yang membuka pemahaman atas dasar metodologi, Mbak Irma, Ibu Soehartati, Pak Muttaqien, Mbak Citra, dan Pak Soedjadino.
2. Mas Iwan sekeluarga yang membuatku bangun dan melihat kenyataan.
3. Sahabat-sahabat terbaik: Nurul, Nitra, Aiu, Yenni, Cece Olin, Zee, Nana, Silvy, DeRani, Mbim, Septi, Lita, Ketek, Santo “mamo”, Nita “tante”. Terima kasih atas segala dukungan dan kenangan indah yang tak terlupakan.
4. Para “babe-ers”, ayo semangat!, cowok-cowok “celibataire”, terima kasih atas ajakan jalan-jalannya, temen-temen “AV’s”, ayo bikin *pajamas party* lagi!, dan seluruh angkatan 2003 lainnya. *You're the best guys!*
5. Mas Fery yang membuatku melihat dunia dengan cara yang berbeda.
6. Seluruh staf BPPK Deplu atas berbagai kemudahan yang diberikan.
7. Dia yang tak terlupakan. Terima kasih telah mendewasakanku.
8. Penghargaan dan rasa terima kasih yang sebesar-besarnya akhirnya saya sampaikan pada pihak-pihak yang karena keterbatasan tempat tidak tersebut di halaman ini.

Surabaya, Mei 2007

DAFTAR ISI

| | |
|--|-----------|
| Halaman Judul Dalam | i |
| Halaman Pernyataan | ii |
| Halaman Persetujuan | iii |
| Halaman Pengesahan | iv |
| Halaman Persembahan | v |
| Halaman Motto | vi |
| Kata Pengantar | vii |
| Daftar Isi | ix |
| Daftar Tabel | xi |
| Abstrak | xii |
| | |
| BAB I PENDAHULUAN | 1 |
| I.1. Latar Belakang Masalah | 1 |
| I.2. Rumusan Masalah | 6 |
| I.3. Tujuan Penelitian | 6 |
| I.4. Kerangka Pemikiran | 6 |
| I.4.1. Peringkat Analisis..... | 6 |
| I.4.2. Landasan Teoritik..... | 8 |
| I.4.2.1. Teori Pengaruh | 8 |
| I.4.2.2. Konsep <i>Deterrence</i> | 13 |
| I.5. Argumen Penggambaran | 13 |
| I.6. Metodologi | 15 |
| I.6.1. Definisi Konseptual dan Operasional | 15 |
| I.6.2. Tipe Penelitian | 18 |
| I.6.3. Jangkauan Penelitian | 18 |
| I.6.4. Teknik Pengumpulan Data | 19 |
| I.6.5. Teknik Analisis Data | 19 |
| I.6.6. Sistematika Penulisan | 19 |
| | |
| BAB II PENINGKATAN KAPABILITAS MILITER CINA | |
| TAHUN 2000-2006 | 21 |
| II.1. Data Militer secara Umum | 21 |
| II.1.1. <i>Manpower</i> (pasukan) | 21 |
| II.1.2. Paramiliter | 22 |
| II.2. Angkatan Darat, Angkatan Laut, dan Angkatan Udara | 24 |
| II.2.1. Jumlah Pasukan | 24 |
| II.2.2. <i>Equipment</i> (peralatan) dan <i>Operational Deployments</i> .. | 27 |

| | |
|---|----------|
| BAB III ANALISA | 46 |
| III.1. Ekspektasi Cina atas Perilaku Taiwan..... | 46 |
| III.2. Perilaku Taiwan yang Teramati | 52 |
| III.2.1. Perubahan Perilaku Politik Taiwan sejak 1996: Analisis Opini Publik Taiwan atas isu Kemerdekaan Taiwan dan Identitas Taiwan (Taiwanese Identity) | 55 |
| III.2.2. Gerakan Rekonstruksi Budaya dan Identitas Taiwan ... | 59 |
| III.2.3. Referendum | 64 |
| III.2.4. Konsep Pertahanan “Offshore Engagement Strategy”... | 71 |
| BAB IV SIMPULAN | 78 |
| DAFTAR PUSTAKA | 81 |
| LAMPIRAN | xiii |



DAFTAR TABEL

| Tabel | Halaman |
|---|---------|
| 1.1 Tipe-tipe Situasi Pengaruh | 11 |
| 2.1 Jumlah Total Angkatan Bersenjata (People's Liberation Army) | 21 |
| 2.2 People's Armed Police | 23 |
| 2.3 Jumlah Personil People's Liberation Army (Angkatan Darat) | 24 |
| 2.4 Jumlah Personil People's Liberation Army (Angkatan Udara)..... | 24 |
| 2.5 Jumlah Personil People's Liberation Army (Angkatan Laut)..... | 25 |
| 2.6 Group Army dalam Angkatan Darat PLA | 26 |
| 2.7 Organisasi dan Jumlah <i>Fighter Ground Attack</i> PLAAF 2004-2006 | 33 |
| 2.8 Anggaran Pertahanan Cina Tahun 2000-2006 | 36 |
| 2.9 China Defence Budget, Official Breakdown White Paper | 37 |
| 2.10 Kekuatan <i>Short Range Ballistic Missiles</i> PLA 2000-2006 | 43 |
| 3.1 Attitude in the 1990's toward Ultimate Goal for Cross-Strait Relations (%) | 56 |
| 3.2 Summary of Referendum Law Passed on November 28, 2003..... | 66 |
| 3.3 Results of the Defensive Referendum..... | 69 |

Abstrak

Sejak tahun 2000, Cina tercatat sebagai satu negara yang terus meningkatkan anggaran pertahanan dan kapabilitas militernya tiap tahun hingga 2006. Beberapa pengamat menyatakan argumennya terkait dengan latar belakang kebijakan tersebut. Pavel Kamennov menyatakan bahwa kebijakan tersebut dilatarbelakangi oleh ambisi Cina menjadi salah satu *great power* pada pertengahan abad 21, sedangkan Jusuf Wanandi menyatakan bahwa kebijakan peningkatan kapabilitas militer Cina dilaksanakan dalam rangka memenuhi ambisinya sebagai kekuatan *status quo* di kawasan Asia Pasifik dan Asia Timur.

Dalam tulisan ini penulis beragumen bahwa Cina meningkatkan kapabilitas militernya sejak tahun 2000 karena meningkatnya kecenderungan Taiwan untuk memerdekakan diri. Peningkatan kapabilitas militer merupakan salah satu instrumen pengaruh terhadap perilaku negara lain dengan melancarkan *deterrence* untuk mencegah Taiwan agar tidak memerdekakan diri. Argumen ini dilandasi temuan fakta bahwa peningkatan kapabilitas militer Cina tersebut terfokus pada peningkatan *short-range ballistic missiles* (SRBM), baik secara kuantitas maupun kualitas, dan kekuatan angkatan laut (*navy*). Peningkatan kapabilitas militer Cina, baik dari segi personel maupun persenjataan tersebut lebih dipusatkan pada wilayah sekitar Selat Taiwan. Peningkatan kapabilitas militer yang ditandai dengan modernisasi persenjataan juga cenderung membentuk pola resiprokal terhadap modernisasi militer yang juga dilakukan Taiwan.

Penelitian ini bersifat eksplanatif dengan menggunakan peringkat analisis negara-bangsa untuk menjelaskan faktor-faktor yang melatarbelakangi intensi peningkatan kapabilitas militer Cina pada tahun 2000-2006. Penulis menggunakan teori pengaruh dan konsep *deterrence* yang dikombinasikan dengan detail peningkatan kapabilitas militer Cina tiap tahun dalam kurun waktu 2000-2006 hingga pada akhirnya merujuk pada sebuah simpulan bahwa argumen diatas lebih signifikan dibanding argumen-argumen yang lain.

Kata kunci: kapabilitas militer, perilaku Taiwan, *One China, policy failure*

BAB I

PENDAHULUAN

I.1. Latar Belakang Masalah

Sebuah survei yang diselenggarakan Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) dan dipublikasikan pada tahun 2006, menemukan adanya kecenderungan peningkatan anggaran pertahanan (military expenditure) sejumlah negara, India dan Cina termasuk yang cenderung meningkatkan kapasitas militernya dari tahun ke tahun. Salah satu aspek yang jelas terlihat yaitu adanya peningkatan anggaran pertahanan antara tahun 2000-2006: *“China and India, the world’s two emerging economic powers, are demonstrating a sustained increase in their military expenditure and contribute to the growth in world military spending.”*¹

Pada tahun 2000, anggaran resmi Cina mencapai sekitar 14,6 trilyun dolar atau 121 trilyun yuan. Cina meningkatkan anggaran pertahanannya pada tahun ini sekitar 17,7 persen. Setahun kemudian, Cina mengungkapkan kepada publik bahwa anggaran pertahanan Cina pada tahun 2001 melebihi 17 trilyun dolar, suatu jumlah yang lebih tinggi dibandingkan anggaran militer negara-negara tetangganya seperti India, Taiwan, dan Korea Selatan. Beijing menjelaskan bahwa peningkatan anggaran tersebut merupakan respon terhadap perubahan situasi

¹ “Recent Trends in Military Expenditures,” dalam http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_trends.html, diakses tanggal 17 November 2006

militer yang drastis di seluruh dunia, yang dimulai sejak perang di Kosovo yang dipimpin AS pada tahun 1999.²

Cina kembali meningkatkan anggaran militernya sebesar 17,6 persen atau sebesar tiga trilyun dolar pada tahun 2002, dengan total anggaran yang dipublikasikan sebesar 20 trilyun dolar. Pada tahun 2003, Cina kembali meningkatkan anggaran pertahanannya menjadi 22 trilyun dolar (sekitar 185,3 trilyun RMB).³

Intensi peningkatan anggaran pertahanan Cina kembali terlihat pada tahun 2004. Menteri Keuangan Cina, Jin Renging, mengajukan proposal peningkatan anggaran militer sebesar 11,6 persen atau 2,6 trilyun dolar. Pada 27 Desember 2004, *The Information Office of China's State Council* menerbitkan buku putih berjudul "China's National Defense in 2004" berdasar the National Defense Law sebagai pedomannya yang dikoordinasikan dengan pembangunan pertahanan dan perekonomian nasional. Setiap Maret, sebagai bagian dari anggaran negara tahunan, Cina mengeluarkan sebuah laporan yang mencakup *national military expenditures* secara keseluruhan.⁴ Pada tahun 2005, diumumkan bahwa anggaran militer Cina meningkat 12,6 persen menjadi 247,7 trilyun yuan (29,9 trilyun dolar). Cina telah mengumumkan *double-digit increases* dalam anggaran militer hampir tiap tahun selama lebih dari satu dekade.⁵

Intensi peningkatan anggaran pertahanan Cina yang cukup signifikan terjadi mulai akhir tahun 1999 sebesar 15,2 % dari tahun 1998, dan terus menerus

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ "China's Defense Budget", dalam www.globalsecurity.org, diakses tanggal 20 Januari 2006

⁵ *Ibid.*

terjadi sampai tahun 2006. Pada akhir tahun 2000, anggaran pertahanan Cina kembali meningkat dibandingkan tahun sebelumnya yaitu 12,6 %, begitu pula dengan pada akhir tahun 2001 (17,7 %), 2002 (17,6 %), 2003 (9,6 %), 2004 (11,6 %), dan 2005 (12,6 %).⁶

Disamping anggaran, intensi peningkatan kapabilitas juga terlihat dari meningkatnya persenjataan, baik dari segi kuantitas maupun kualitas. Pada bulan Juli 2006, Pentagon (Departemen Pertahanan AS) mengklaim bahwa Cina telah meningkatkan jumlah peluru kendali (rudal) jarak pendek yang diarahkan ke Taiwan. Disebutkan bahwa jumlah rudal tersebut mencapai 730 unit, padahal pada tahun sebelumnya hanya berjumlah 500 unit. *The Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China* yang dikirimkan ke AS pada bulan Juli 2003 mengklaim bahwa Cina memiliki 450 *short-range ballistic missiles* (lebih banyak daripada yang diperkirakan AS sebelumnya), dan diperkirakan akan terus meningkat sekitar 75 buah pertahun, padahal pada akumulasi tahunan yang diperkirakan sebelumnya Cina akan menambah sekitar 50 buah pertahun.⁷

Di sektor kekuatan laut, kekuatan laut Cina mencakup kekuatan 64 kapal perang permukaan, sekitar 55 kapal selam serbu, lebih dari 40 kapal angkut amfibi berukuran sedang dan besar, serta sekitar 50 kapal patroli pantai yang dilengkapi misil.⁸ Dua pertiganya ditempatkan di Armada Laut Timur dan Armada Laut Selatan. Pada tahun 2004, Cina memperoleh lebih banyak helikopter Mi-17/171

⁶ www.globalsecurity.org, diakses tanggal 24 Januari 2006.

⁷ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2003-2004* (London: Routledge, 2004), hal. 146

⁸ James Luhulima, "Militer China Kekuatan Pengimbang di Asia Pasifik," dalam *Cermin dari China: Geliat Sang Naga di Era Globalisasi* (Jakarta: Kompas Media Nusantara, 2006), hal. 203.

dari Rusia dan sedang mengembangkan Z-10, helikopter serangnya sendiri, yang akan mulai dioperasikan pada tahun 2014.⁹

Adanya intensi ini kemudian mengundang berbagai reaksi. Kekuatan militer Cina yang terus berkembang dianggap sebagai ancaman bagi dominasi AS di kawasan Asia Pasifik. Menteri Pertahanan AS, Donald Rumsfeld, menyatakan bahwa berdasar laporan tahunan Pentagon yang menyatakan bahwa *military expenditure* Cina meningkat tiga kali lipat dapat mempengaruhi stabilitas kawasan Asia Pasifik sekarang dan menimbulkan kekhawatiran baru di masa depan.¹⁰ Isu ini mengundang perdebatan di kalangan elit politik AS seperti yang dilansir *the Economist*:

Assessing how real a threat to America China's rise poses is said to have turned into a lively internal debate between a hawkish Pentagon and other government agencies, who are wary of upsetting relations with China.¹¹

Dalam kunjungannya ke Australia dan Indonesia, Condoleezza Rice secara terang-terangan menyatakan bahwa Cina bisa menjadi "kekuatan negatif" di kawasan Asia Pasifik. Karenanya, AS mengajak Jepang dan Australia dan sekutu-sekutunya mengawasi pembangunan kekuatan militer Cina¹²

Pihak lain yang tentunya merasa terancam dengan peningkatan kapabilitas militer Cina adalah Taiwan. Negara ini bisa saja diserang sewaktu-waktu oleh Cina. Jika Taiwan memutuskan untuk secara resmi memisahkan diri dengan mendeklarasikan kemerdekaannya, maka sangat mungkin Cina akan menyerang

⁹ James Lubulima, *Op. Cit.*, hal. 206.

¹⁰ "China's Armed Forces: Casus Belli," dalam *the Economist*, 11 Juni 2005, hal. 26.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² "AS Ingatkan China: Beijing Jangan Jadi 'Kekuatan Negatif' Kawasan", dalam *Kompas*, 12 Maret 2005.

Taiwan terutama setelah Parlemen Cina mengesahkan UU Antipemisahan yang membenarkan penggunaan cara-cara nondamai terhadap Taiwan jika semua cara damai menemui jalan buntu.¹³ Untuk menghadapi kemungkinan tersebut, AS dengan Jepang pada bulan Februari 2005 sudah menjalin kerjasama (19/2/2005) tentang kepentingan strategis bersama (*common strategic objective*) membela Taiwan bila diserang Cina. Dengan Uni Eropa, pada bulan Juni 2005, AS menentang dan berhasil menggagalkan upaya UE mencabut embargo persenjataannya atas Cina.

Selain reaksi dari berbagai negara, intensi ini juga ditanggapi oleh beberapa peneliti, salah satunya adalah I. Basis Susilo yang menyatakan bahwa Cina adalah ancaman serius bagi AS terkait dengan peningkatan kapabilitas militernya saat ini:

Dengan India, bulan Juli lalu AS menyepakati kerjasama militer AS-India selama 10 tahun, dengan harapan menjadikan India kekuatan global untuk mengimbangi kekuatan China. Bulan Juli itu juga Departemen Pertahanan AS menerbitkan laporannya bahwa pembangunan militer China telah menimbulkan ancaman bagi Taiwan, India, dan Jepang, serta bagi militer AS di Pasifik. Laporan itu menyebut anggaran militer China mencapai 90 miliar dollar AS pada 2005 atau tiga kali lipat dari angka resmi. RRC adalah ancaman serius bagi AS.¹⁴

¹³ James Luhulima, *Op. Cit.*, hal. 209.

¹⁴ I. Basis Susilo, "Strategi AS Mengepung China", dalam *Kompas*, 15 Maret 2006.

1.2. Rumusan Masalah

Pemaparan intensi peningkatan kapabilitas militer Cina, yang elaborasi selengkapnya dijelaskan pada bab II, memunculkan pertanyaan penelitian: Mengapa Cina cenderung meningkatkan kapabilitas militernya mulai tahun 2000?

1.3. Tujuan Penelitian

Penelitian ini memiliki dua tujuan. Pertama, mengetahui latar belakang peningkatan kapabilitas militer Cina tiap tahun selama kurun waktu tahun 2000-2006. Kedua, mengetahui perkembangan prioritas kebijakan pertahanan Cina selama kurun waktu tahun 2000-2006 dari elaborasi detil peningkatan kapabilitas militer Cina dalam kurun waktu yang sama.

1.4. Kerangka Pemikiran

1.4.1. Peringkat Analisis

Dalam proses memilih peringkat analisis, ada dua hal yang perlu dilakukan. Pertama, menentukan unit analisis, yaitu yang perilakunya hendak dideskripsikan, dijelaskan, dan diramalkan (karena itu disebut pula variabel dependen). Kedua, menentukan unit eksplanasi, yaitu yang dampaknya terhadap unit analisis hendak diamati (bisa juga disebut variabel independen).¹⁵ Dengan kata lain, unit eksplanasi merupakan faktor yang mempengaruhi unit analisis.

Terdapat lima peringkat analisis yang dikemukakan yaitu: 1. individu; 2. kelompok individu; 3. negara-bangsa; kelompok negara dalam satu kawasan; 5.

¹⁵ Mohtar Mas'ood, *Ilmu Hubungan Internasional: Disiplin dan Metodologi*, Edisi Revisi (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1990), hal. 39.

sistem global.¹⁶ Pertama, perilaku individu, analisa hubungan internasional pada tingkat ini beranggapan bahwa fenomena hubungan internasional pada akhirnya adalah akibat dari perilaku individu-individu yang berinteraksi di dalamnya. Untuk memahami hubungan internasional dapat ditelaah dari sikap dan perilaku tokoh-tokoh utama pembuat keputusan, seperti kepala pemerintahan, menteri luar negeri, dan sebagainya.

Kedua, perilaku kelompok, tingkat analisa ini berasumsi bahwa individu umumnya melakukan tindakan internasional dalam kelompok. Hubungan internasional sebetulnya adalah hubungan antarberbagai kelompok kecil di berbagai negara. Artinya, peristiwa internasional sebetulnya ditentukan oleh kelompok kecil (seperti kabinet, dewan penasihat keamanan, politbiro, dan sebagainya) dan oleh organisasi, birokrasi, departemen, badan pemerintahan, dan sebagainya.

Ketiga, negara-bangsa, pada tingkat ini analisa ditekankan pada perilaku unit negara-bangsa karena hubungan internasional pada dasarnya didominasi oleh perilaku negara-bangsa. Dalam hal ini perilaku individu, kelompok, dan organisasi hanya akan diperhatikan sejauh perilaku mereka itu berkaitan dengan tindakan internasional negara yang bersangkutan. Proses pembuatan keputusan luar negeri harus dilihat sebagai tindakan negara-bangsa sebagai suatu unit yang utuh.

Kecempat, kelompok negara-negara, analisis yang menekankan pada tingkat ini beranggapan bahwa seringkali negara-bangsa tidak bertindak secara

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, hal. 46.

sendiri-sendiri, tetapi sebagai suatu kelompok. Hubungan internasional pada dasarnya merupakan interaksi yang membentuk pola dan pengelompokan. Oleh karena itu unit analisa yang ditelaah adalah pengelompokan negara-negara seperti aliansi, persekutuan ekonomi dan perdagangan, blok ideologi, dan sebagainya.

Kelima, sistem internasional, analisa pada tingkat ini berasumsi bahwa interaksi bangsa-bangsa merupakan sebuah sistem. Struktur sistem tersebut dan perubahan-perubahan yang dialaminya selama ini telah menentukan perilaku aktor-aktor hubungan internasional yang terlibat di dalamnya. Sistem sebagai lingkungan menjadi penyebab terpenting terjadinya perilaku negara-bangsa.

Level analisa dalam sebuah penelitian digunakan untuk membatasi ruang lingkup analisa dan memilah-milah faktor mana yang harus paling banyak ditekankan.¹⁷ Dan secara teoretis, terdapat berbagai macam kemungkinan latar belakang peningkatan kapabilitas militer Cina, sehingga level analisa disini digunakan sebagai instrumen untuk memfokuskan analisa. Berdasar peringkat analisis yang dikemukakan diatas, penelitian ini menggunakan tingkat analisis negara-bangsa sebagai unit analisisnya dan tingkat analisis negara-bangsa sebagai unit eksplanasinya. Jadi, analisis yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah analisis korelasionalis, yang berarti unit analisis memiliki peringkat setara dengan unit eksplanasi.¹⁸

1.4.2. Landasan Teoritik


1.4.2.1. Teori Pengaruh

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, hal. 40.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, hal. 42.

Setiap kebijakan mengandung komponen tindakan, yakni hal yang dilakukan pemerintah kepada pihak lain untuk menghasilkan orientasi, memenuhi peran, atau mencapai dan mempertahankan tujuan tertentu. Tindakan pada dasarnya merupakan suatu bentuk komunikasi yang dimaksudkan untuk mengubah atau mendukung perilaku pemerintah negara lain yang sangat berperan untuk menentukan berhasil tidaknya pencapaian tujuan pemerintah yang bersangkutan. Dalam politik internasional, tindakan mengambil banyak bentuk yang berlainan seperti pemberian bantuan luar negeri, peragaan kekuatan militer, pernyataan perang, dan lain sebagainya.¹⁹

Dalam hubungan internasional, selalu terdapat interaksi antara dua negara atau lebih. Lebih lanjut, Holsti menyatakan bahwa proses politik internasional dimulai bila negara, katakanlah A, berusaha melalui berbagai tindakan atau isyarat untuk mengubah atau mendukung perilaku negara lain. Definisi ini dapat digambarkan sebagai berikut (tanda panah mengacu pada berbagai tindakan):



Untuk melakukan X

Pengaruh pada dasarnya merupakan suatu alat untuk mencapai tujuan. Para negarawan dan pengambil keputusan menggunakannya untuk mencapai atau

¹⁹ K. J. Holsti, *Politik Internasional Jilid 1*, (Jakarta: Erlangga, 1988), hal. 158.

mempertahankan tujuan lain yang mungkin mencakup gengsi, wilayah, jiwa, bahan mentah, keamanan atau persekutuan. Negara A, dalam tindakannya terhadap negara B, menggunakan atau *memobilisasi sumber daya tertentu*. Sumber daya adalah obyek fisik atau mental atau kualitas yang tersedia sebagai alat bujukan untuk membujuk, memberi imbalan, mengancam atau menghukum.

Dalam telaah usaha sebuah negara (A) yang mempengaruhi negara lain (B), J. David Singer mengidentifikasi tiga determinan perilaku²⁰:

1. Perilaku yang teramati (*perceived present behavior*)

Perilaku B yang di masa sekarang (*present*) teramati oleh A. Prasyarat yang harus dipenuhi adalah bahwa tingkat interdependensi A dan B harus tinggi, baik itu hubungan kerjasama maupun yang bersifat konfliktual. Dari perilaku B yang teramati sekarang dapat diperkirakan apakah perilaku B di masa depan akan membahayakan atau menguntungkan A.

2. Perilaku yang diperkirakan (*predicted future behavior*)

Perkiraan yang bisa dibuat oleh pembuat keputusan A terhadap kecenderungan perilaku B di masa depan apabila tidak ada kontrol A terhadap perilaku B.

3. Perilaku yang dikehendaki (*preferred future behavior*)

Adanya preferensi A agar B melakukan tindakan-tindakan tertentu di masa depan. Tanpa adanya suatu preferensi, persepsi mengenai perilaku B saat ini dan prediksi mengenai perilaku B di masa mendatang hanya menjadi

²⁰ J. David Singer, "Inter-Nation Influence: A Formal Model", dalam James N. Rosenau, ed., *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory* (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1969), hal.381

kepentingan terbatas bagi A dan akan mengurangi kecenderungan A untuk melakukan *influence attempt* (usaha mempengaruhi B).

Kombinasi ketiga determinan diatas dijadikan perhitungan/kalkulasi suatu negara dalam mengambil keputusan, dalam artian sebuah tindakan yang ditujukan terhadap target (negara B). Kombinasi ini disebut juga situasi pengaruh (*influence situation*), berupa berbagai kemungkinan untuk mempertimbangkan tindakan A terhadap B:

Tabel 1.1


Tipe-Tipe Situasi Pengaruh

| | Situasi persuasi (mendorong agar <i>influencee</i> berbuat sesuatu): A menghendaki x | | | | Situasi dissuasi (mencegah agar <i>influencer</i> tidak berbuat sesuatu): A tidak menghendaki x, melainkan o | | | |
|-----------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 |
| Perilaku yang dikehendaki | X | X | X | X | O | O | O | O |
| Perilaku yang diperkirakan | X | X | O | O | O | O | X | X |
| Perilaku sebenarnya | X | O | X | O | O | X | O | X |

Sumber: J.David Singer, *Inter-Nation Influence: A Formal Model*, dalam James N. Rosenau, *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory* (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1969), hal.385

Tabel diatas menunjukkan delapan kombinasi situasi pengaruh (*influence situations*). Empat yang pertama bisa disebut sebagai kasus persuasi (mendorong *influencee* berbuat sesuatu) dan empat yang lainnya disebut disuasi (mencegah *influencee* berbuat sesuatu). Pada kasus 1 sampai 4, A menghendaki B bersikap X, dan dalam kasus 5 sampai 8, A menghendaki agar B tidak melakukan X, tetapi melakukan O. Kasus 1 dan 5 adalah kasus yang sederhana dan biasanya tidak memerlukan *influence attempt* yang intensif; B tidak hanya sedang bertindak dan tidak sedang bertindak seperti yang diinginkan A, tetapi dapat diperkirakan bahwa perilaku tersebut diteruskan di masa depan. Kasus 2 dan 6 terjadi ketika perilaku B diprediksikan kongruen dengan kehendak A, tetapi A melihat bahwa momentum yang digunakan B berbeda dengan yang diharapkan dan diperkirakan. Dalam kasus 3 dan 7, perilaku B saat ini adalah yang diinginkan A, tetapi diperkirakan bahwa sikap tersebut bisa berubah tanpa campur tangan A. Dalam kasus 4 dan 8, A mengalami situasi yang paling sulit; A melihat B tidak melakukan tindakan yang dikehendaki, tetapi juga tidak ada kemungkinan melakukan tindakan tersebut di masa depan tanpa upaya yang dilakukan A.

Dalam korelasinya dengan penelitian ini, Cina dianalogikan sebagai pihak A dan Taiwan dianalogikan sebagai pihak B. Teori ini digunakan untuk menjelaskan kebijakan Cina (sebagai pihak A) yang memobilisasi sumber daya militernya dalam rangka mempengaruhi perilaku Taiwan (sebagai pihak B). Meningkatnya kecenderungan Taiwan untuk memerdekakan diri sejak tahun 2000 mengarah pada kasus persuasi nomor 4 dan kasus dissuasi nomor 8.



1.4.2.2. Deterrence

Konsep *deterrence* dapat didefinisikan sebagai kegiatan yang dilakukan oleh sebuah atau sekelompok negara untuk mencegah negara/pihak lain menjalankan kebijaksanaan yang tidak dikehendaki.²¹ *Deterrence* mencakup strategi ancaman hukuman atau penolakan untuk mempercayai pihak lain untuk mengantisipasi adanya sebuah resiko. Sarana yang dipergunakan untuk menjalankan kebijakan *deterrence* termasuk *peningkatan kapabilitas militer secara umum*, mengembangkan persenjataan super dengan daya hancur massal, membentuk aliansi, dan ancaman melakukan tindak balasan.

Konsep ini dipakai untuk menjelaskan perilaku Cina sehubungan dengan kebijakan peningkatan kapabilitas militernya, yaitu untuk mencegah negara atau pihak lain menjalankan kebijakan yang tidak dikehendaki. Adanya ancaman kemerdekaan Taiwan merupakan kebijakan yang tidak dikehendaki Cina yang menganut Paham Satu Cina. Beijing menolak untuk mengakui pemerintahan Taiwan sebagai pemerintah yang berdaulat yang dapat disandingkan dengan Cina. Ancaman kemerdekaan Taiwan semakin nyata setelah peringatan Beijing kepada rakyat Taiwan untuk tidak memilih Presiden Chen Sui-bian gagal.

1.5. Argumen Penggambaran

Secara teoretis, terdapat sejumlah kemungkinan latar belakang peningkatan kapabilitas militer Cina dalam kurun waktu 2000-2006. Pavel Kamennov menyatakan bahwa intensi peningkatan kapabilitas militer terjadi

²¹ Jack C. Plano dan Roy Olton, *Kamus Hubungan Internasional*, terj. Wawan Juanda, Edisi Ketiga (Bandung: Putra Abardin, 1999), hal. 145-146.

karena Cina ingin menjadi salah satu *great power* pada pertengahan abad 21 nanti.²²

China pursues its military policy today to create conditions for implementing its national development strategy, which is aimed at making China a great power by the middle of the 21st century that will occupy a dominant position in the Asia-Pacific Region, with a political weight and economic and military power in no way inferior to those of other world powers. China links achievement of this strategy to greater overall national power, which includes such key factors as internal political stability, dynamic and stable economic growth, rising standards of science and technologies, exploration and development of natural resource in the country, and assured access to world sources of natural resources and fuels.

Sedangkan Jusuf Wanandi menyatakan bahwa kebijakan peningkatan kapabilitas militer Cina dilaksanakan dalam rangka memenuhi ambisinya sebagai kekuatan *status quo* di kawasan Asia Pasifik dan Asia Timur.²³

Since Deng successfully laid the basis for China's modernization, its economy has grown 7 percent-8 percent for the last 30 years, and China has become a big economic power in its own right in the East Asian region. This is also true politically and, to some extent, militarily. China is again seen as a main challenge to the region. The region has the opportunity in the next decade or two to incorporate and constructively engage China, and to support its effort to become a status quo power.

Dalam tulisan ini, penulis berargumen bahwa Cina meningkatkan kapabilitas militernya sejak tahun 2000 karena meningkatnya kecenderungan Taiwan untuk memerdekakan diri. Peningkatan kapabilitas militer merupakan salah satu instrumen pengaruh terhadap perilaku negara lain dengan melancarkan (*exercise*) *deterrence* untuk mencegah Taiwan agar tidak memerdekakan diri.

²² Pavel Kamennov, "China's Military Policy: Where Taiwan Fits In", dalam <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb-index-2&djv=1045032531&SrchMode=1&sid=2&fmt=4&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&JS=1178266544&clientid=72459>, diakses tanggal 4 Mei 2007.

²³ Jusuf Wanandi, "China and Asia Pacific Regionalism", dalam Kokubun Ryosei dan Wang Jisi, *The Rise of China and a Changing East Asian Order* (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2004), hal. 42.

sebuah kebijakan yang tidak dikehendaki Cina sebagai negara yang menganut prinsip *One China Policy* sebagai dasar politik luar negerinya. Argumen ini dilandasi temuan fakta bahwa peningkatan kapabilitas militer Cina tersebut terfokus pada peningkatan *short-range ballistic missiles* (SRBM), baik secara kuantitas maupun kualitas, dan kekuatan angkatan laut (navy). Peningkatan kapabilitas militer Cina, baik dari segi personel maupun persenjataan tersebut lebih dipusatkan pada wilayah sekitar Selat Taiwan.

1.6. Metodologi Penelitian

1.6.1. Definisi Konseptual dan Operasional

Secara konseptual, Coplin menyatakan bahwa kapabilitas militer sebuah negara tersusun oleh tiga komponen, yaitu:²⁴

1. Jumlah pasukan
2. Tingkat keterampilan
3. Kualitas perlengkapan militer

Ketiga komponen tersebut saling berkaitan. Jumlah pasukan yang besar perlu disertai dengan kualitas perlengkapan militer yang tinggi. Namun, kombinasi kedua komponen tersebut tidak akan berpengaruh maksimal apabila tidak ditunjang dengan tingkat keterampilan yang tinggi pula.

Dalam mengoperasionalkan konsep kapabilitas militer, seringkali terdapat masalah dalam menentukan indikator pengukuran yang tepat. Dalam penelitian ini

²⁴ William D. Coplin, *Pengantar Politik Internasional (Suatu Telaah Teoretis)*, (Bandung: Sinar Baru, 1992), hal. 124

digunakan beberapa indikator pengukuran untuk menaksir kapabilitas militer suatu negara secara lebih terperinci.²⁵

1. Data Militer secara Umum

- 1.1. Pasukan (*Manpower*)

Jumlah total pasukan baik pria maupun wanita yang sedang bertugas penuh (*full-time duty*), termasuk wajib militer apabila diterapkan. Ketika seseorang masuk organisasi militer dengan sukarela (tidak terikat tugas) maka tidak dihitung. *Manpower* disini termasuk anggota *Reserve* yaitu formasi atau unit yang tidak sepenuhnya dioperasikan pada keadaan damai, tetapi dapat dimobilisasi pada saat-saat darurat. Estimasi kekuatan *Reserve* dihitung dari masa kerja lima tahun atau lebih.

- 1.2. Kekuatan lain (*Other Forces*)

Banyak negara yang membentuk kekuatan paramiliter dimana pelatihan, organisasi, perlengkapan, dan kontrolnya digunakan untuk mendukung atau bahkan menggantikan kekuatan militer yang umum. Jumlah pasukan dalam kekuatan para militer pada umumnya tidak dimasukkan dalam jumlah total angkatan bersenjata (*armed forces*).

2. Angkatan Darat, Angkatan Laut, dan Angkatan Udara

Kekuatan pasukan (*manpower*), perlengkapan yang dimiliki, dan organisasi formasinya seperti brigade dan divisi. Kekuatan Angkatan Darat, Laut, dan Udara juga meliputi aspek-aspek berikut ini:

- 2.1. Perlengkapan (*Equipment*)

²⁵ The International Institute for Strategic Studies. *The Military Balance 2006*. (London: Routledge, 2006). hal. 7

Kuantitas dihitung menurut fungsi dan tipe. Penghitungan termasuk persenjataan yang aktif secara operasional, aktif untuk pelatihan (training), dan jumlah stok di gudang.

2.2. *Operational Deployments*

Operasi militer jangka panjang dan basis militer di luar negeri. Perkecualian dikenakan pada operasi perdamaian (peacekeeping operations).

3. *Anggaran Pertahanan (Military Expenditure)*

Besar anggaran militer pertahun serta besar anggaran belanja negara atau sumber-sumber ekonomi yang dialokasikan untuk pertahanan, pada umumnya dinyatakan dalam persentase terhadap GDP. Apabila mungkin, anggaran pertahanan pada tahun yang dianalisis dapat disertai dengan informasi besar anggaran pertahanan dua tahun sebelumnya, sebagaimana estimasi anggaran militer dimana anggaran militer yang sebenarnya dapat lebih tinggi dari anggaran militer yang resmi dipublikasikan.

Permasalahan yang muncul adalah seringnya seseorang/pihak melihat besarnya anggaran sebagai nominal semata. Oleh karena itu, konsep *military expenditure* dalam penelitian ini dioperasionalisasikan lebih lanjut dengan melihat beberapa aspek di dalamnya. Richard A. Bitzinger menyatakan bahwa untuk melihat signifikansi anggaran militer sebuah negara dapat dilihat dari:²⁶

- Intensi dan komitmen: Adakah komitmen, prinsip, rencana jangka panjang sebuah negara untuk memodernisasi kekuatan militernya? Apakah intensi kenaikan terus berlanjut atau hanya dalam periode tertentu?

²⁶ Richard A. Bitzinger, "Just the Facts, Ma'am: The Challenge of Analysing and Assessing Chinese Military Expenditure", dalam *the China Quarterly* no. 173, Maret 2003, hal. 166.

- Beban/ proporsi terhadap perekonomian nasional: Apakah besarnya anggaran bersifat proporsional terhadap perekonomian nasional?
- Prioritas modernisasi: Teknologi pertahanan, sistem persenjataan yang mana yang menjadi prioritas pendanaan?
- Kapabilitas militer masa depan: satuan militer mana yang mendapat dana lebih banyak? Apakah dana lebih banyak dihabiskan untuk modernisasi angkatan laut dan udara untuk meningkatkan kapabilitas proyeksi kekuatan atau pada kekuatan darat dan pertahanan teritorial demi mengantisipasi pemberontakan?

1.6.2. Tipe Penelitian

Tipe penelitian ini adalah eksplanatif, yakni menganalisis dan menjelaskan hubungan kausal antara variabel-variabel.²⁷ Variabel yang dijelaskan adalah hubungan antara kebijakan Cina menaikkan kapabilitas militernya dengan perilaku Taiwan.

1.6.3. Jangkauan Penelitian

Pembahasan penelitian ini terbatas pada kebijakan Cina menaikkan kapabilitas militernya sejak tahun 2000 sampai tahun 2006. Tidak tertutup kemungkinan untuk menggunakan data dan fakta sebelum tahun 2000 sebagai unit eksplanasi yang memperkuat analisis.

²⁷ Masri Singarimbun, "Metode dalam Proses Penelitian," dalam Masri Singarimbun dan Sofian Effendi (ed.), *Metode Penelitian Survei*, Edisi Revisi (Jakarta: LP3LS, 1989), hal. 5.

I.6.4. Teknik Pengumpulan Data

Penelitian ini menggunakan pendekatan studi kepustakaan, dengan mengumpulkan data-data sekunder dari berbagai bahan, seperti: buku teks, terbitan berkala, jurnal, majalah, surat kabar, dokumen, makalah, dan bahan-bahan lainnya.²⁸

I.6.5. Teknik Analisis Data

Teknik analisis data yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah analisis kualitatif. Analisis kualitatif dilakukan terhadap data yang berupa informasi atau uraian dalam bentuk bahasa prosa kemudian dikaitkan dengan data lainnya untuk mendapatkan kejelasan terhadap suatu kebenaran atau sebaliknya, sehingga memperoleh gambaran baru atau menguatkan suatu gambaran yang telah ada dan sebaliknya.²⁹

I.6.6. Sistematika Penulisan

Penelitian ini terbagi dalam lima bab, dengan sistematika penulisan sebagai berikut:


- Bab I adalah bab pendahuluan yang meliputi latar belakang masalah, perumusan masalah, tujuan penelitian, kerangka pemikiran yang terdiri dari peringkat analisis serta landasan teoritik, dan metodologi penelitian yang terdiri dari definisi konseptual dan operasional, tipe dan jangkauan

²⁸ Gorys Keraf, *Komposisi* (Ende: Nusa Indah, 1984), hal.165.

²⁹ P. Joko Subagyo, *Metode Penelitian dalam Teori dan Praktek* (Jakarta: PT Rineka Cipta, 1997), hal. 106.

penelitian, teknik pengumpulan dan analisis data, serta sistematika penulisan.

- Bab II merupakan deskripsi kapabilitas militer Cina secara detil menurut definisi operasional yang telah tercantum selama kurun waktu tahun 2000-2006.
- Bab III berisi analisis yang menjelaskan latar belakang kebijakan peningkatan kapabilitas militer Cina sesuai dengan teori yang tercantum pada bab I.
- Bab IV merupakan bab simpulan.



BAB II

PENINGKATAN KAPABILITAS MILITER CINA TAHUN 2000-2006

Bab ini mendeskripsikan peningkatan kapabilitas militer Cina selama kurun waktu 2000-2006 secara detil dalam bentuk tabel perbandingan kapabilitas militer Cina pertahun untuk mempermudah pemahaman. Deskripsi peningkatan kapabilitas militer disini didasarkan pada definisi operasional yang telah tercantum pada bab sebelumnya, yaitu: (a) jumlah total pasukan yang sedang bertugas penuh termasuk wajib militer dan kekuatan para militer; (b) kekuatan Angkatan Darat, Angkatan Laut, dan Angkatan Udara yang meliputi kekuatan pasukan, perlengkapan, organisasi formasi, serta operasi dan basis militer; (c) jumlah total anggaran pertahanan pertahun dari jumlah anggaran belanja negara secara keseluruhan atau sumber-sumber ekonomi yang dialokasikan untuk pertahanan.

II.1. Data Militer secara Umum

II.1.1. *Manpower* (pasukan)

Tabel 2.1

Jumlah Total Angkatan Bersenjata (*People's Liberation Army*)

| Tahun | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000-2001 | 2001-2002 | 2002-2003 | 2003-2004 | 2004-2005 | 2005-2006 | 2006 |
| 2.470.000 (full-time duty) 500-600.000 (reserves) | 2.310.000 (full-time duty) 500-600.000 (reserves) | 2.270.000 (full-time duty) 500-600.000 (reserves) | 2.250.000 (full-time duty) 500-600.000 (reserves) | 2.225.000 (full-time duty) 800.000 (reserves) | 2.225.000 (full-time duty) 800.000 (reserves) | 2.225.000 (full-time duty) 800.000 (reserves) |

Sumber: *The Military Balance* 2000-2001, 2001-2002, 2002-2003, 2004-2005, 2005-2006, 2006.

Berdasar tabel diatas, pengurangan jumlah pasukan People's Liberation Army (PLA) terus dilakukan dari tahun ke tahun. Pada tahun 2000, jumlah total pasukan PLA berjumlah 2.740.000 orang ditambah 500.000-600.000 orang. Pada 1985, 1997, dan 2003, Cina mengumumkan pengurangan pasukan sejumlah satu juta, 500.000, dan 200.000 orang.¹ Pada akhir tahun 2005, Cina telah menyelesaikan tahap perampingan sejumlah 200.000 orang, dengan jumlah total pasukan 2,3 juta orang. Kebijakan perampingan ini dilaksanakan dalam rangka memenuhi tujuan PLA masa depan:² "The PLA has made new progress towards the goal of being proper in size, optimal in structure, streamlined in organization, swift and flexible in command, and powerful in fighting capacity."

Organisasi dirampingkan dan dibuat lebih efisien, termasuk pusat kontrol (*headquarters*) dan unit yang terafiliasi secara langsung, begitu pula dengan institusi pendidikannya. Lebih dari 3000 departemen dan 400 unit yang terafiliasi secara langsung terhadap setingkat pusat kontrol dan diatas tingkat resimen telah dihapus. Sejumlah unit produksi agrikultur, budaya dan olahraga, kantor perwakilan militer di stasiun kereta api, dan badan suplai material telah ditutup. PLA juga telah menutup 15 institusi pendidikan dan 31 organisasi pelatihan.³

II.1.2. Paramiliter

Berbeda dengan PLA, jumlah pasukan paramiliter Cina (*People's Armed Police*) cenderung konstan, seperti yang tergambar dalam tabel berikut:

¹ *White Papers of the Government: China's National Defense in 2006*. Lihat lampiran 1.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.*

Tabel 2.2
People's Armed Police

| Variabel | Tahun | | | |
|------------------------|---|---|---|---|
| | 2000-2001 | 2001-2002 | 2002-2003 | 2003-2004 |
| Jumlah Pasukan | 1.300.000 | 1.500.000 | 1.500.000 | 1.500.000 |
| Kelompok Divisi | 45 divisi (14 diantaranya terdiri dari masing-masing 4 resimen; 1-2 divisi tiap propinsi) termasuk Internal Security (800.000), Border Defence (100.000) Guards (69.000) | 45 divisi (14 diantaranya terdiri dari masing-masing 4 resimen; 1-2 divisi tiap propinsi) termasuk Internal Security (800.000), Border Defence (100.000) Guards (69.000) | 45 divisi (14 diantaranya terdiri dari masing-masing 4 resimen; 1-2 divisi tiap propinsi) termasuk Internal Security (800.000), Border Defence (100.000) Guards (69.000) | 45 divisi (14 diantaranya terdiri dari masing-masing 4 resimen; 1-2 divisi tiap propinsi) termasuk Internal Security (800.000), Border Defence (100.000) Guards (69.000) |

| Variabel | Tahun | | |
|------------------------|---|---|---|
| | 2004-2005 | 2005-2006 | 2006 |
| Jumlah Pasukan | 1.300.000 | 1.500.000 | 1.500.000 |
| Kelompok Divisi | 45 divisi (14 diantaranya terdiri dari masing-masing 4 resimen; 1-2 divisi tiap propinsi) termasuk Internal Security (800.000), Border Defence (100.000) Guards (69.000) | 45 divisi (14 diantaranya terdiri dari masing-masing 4 resimen; 1-2 divisi tiap propinsi) termasuk Internal Security (800.000), Border Defence (100.000) Guards (69.000) | 45 divisi (14 diantaranya terdiri dari masing-masing 4 resimen; 1-2 divisi tiap propinsi) termasuk Internal Security (800.000), Border Defence (100.000) Guards (69.000) |

Sumber: *The Military Balance* 2000-2001, 2001-2002, 2002-2003, 2004-2005, 2005-2006, 2006.



II.2. Angkatan Darat, Angkatan Laut, dan Angkatan Udara

II.2.1. Jumlah Pasukan

Jumlah pasukan *People's Liberation Army* secara total cenderung direduksi dari tahun ke tahun sebagaimana disebutkan dalam tabel 1, jumlah personil PLA berdasar satuannya dapat dilihat dalam tabel berikut:

Tabel 2.3

Jumlah Personil *People's Liberation Army* (Angkatan Darat)

| Tahun | | | | | | |
|---|---|--|--|--|--|--|
| 2000-2001 | 2001-2002 | 2002-2003 | 2003-2004 | 2004-2005 | 2005-2006 | 2006 |
| 1.700.000 (sekitar 800.000 wajib militer) | 1.600.000 (sekitar 800.000 wajib militer) | 1.600.000 (sekitar 800.000 wajib militer) | 1.700.000 (sekitar 800.000 wajib militer) | 1.600.000 (sekitar 800.000 wajib militer) | 1.600.000 (sekitar 800.000 wajib militer) | 1.600.000 (sekitar 800.000 wajib militer) |

Sumber: *The Military Balance* 2000-2001, 2001-2002, 2002-2003, 2004-2005, 2005-2006, 2006.

Berdasar tabel di atas, jumlah personil di satuan Angkatan Darat cenderung dikurangi tiap tahun, begitu pula dengan Angkatan Udara:

Tabel 2.4

Jumlah Personil *People's Liberation Army* (Angkatan Udara)

| Tahun | | | | | | |
|---|--|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000-2001 | 2001-2002 | 2002-2003 | 2003-2004 | 2004-2005 | 2005-2006 | 2006 |
| 420.000: (Termasuk kekuatan strategis, 220.000 personil Air Defense, dan 160.000 wajib militer) | 420.000: (Termasuk kekuatan strategis, 220.000 personil Air Defense, dan 160.000 wajib militer) | 420.000: (Termasuk kekuatan strategis, 220.000 personil Air Defense, dan 160.000 wajib militer) | 400.000: (Termasuk kekuatan strategis, 200.000 personil Air Defense, dan 160.000 wajib militer) | 400.000: (Termasuk kekuatan strategis, 200.000 personil Air Defense, dan 160.000 wajib militer) | 400.000: (Termasuk kekuatan strategis, 200.000 personil Air Defense, dan 160.000 wajib militer) | 400.000: (Termasuk kekuatan strategis, 200.000 personil Air Defense, dan 160.000 wajib militer) |

Sumber: *The Military Balance* 2000-2001, 2001-2002, 2002-2003, 2004-2005, 2005-2006, 2006.

Kecenderungan reduksi jumlah personil terlihat dari satuan Angkatan Darat dan Udara. Namun, penambahan jumlah personil justru terjadi di satuan Angkatan Laut:

Tabel 2.5

Jumlah Personil *People's Liberation Army* (Angkatan Laut)

| Tahun | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2000-2001 | 2001-2002 | 2002-2003 | 2003-2004 | 2004-2005 | 2005-2006 | 2006 |
| 220.000 (termasuk <i>Coastal</i> <i>Regional</i> <i>Defense</i> <i>Forces</i> , 26.000 penerbang, 5.000 <i>marines</i> , 40.000 wajib militer) | 250.000 (termasuk <i>Coastal</i> <i>Regional</i> <i>Defense</i> <i>Forces</i> , 26.000 penerbang, 10.000 <i>marines</i> , 40.000 wajib militer) | 250.000 (termasuk <i>Coastal</i> <i>Regional</i> <i>Defense</i> <i>Forces</i> , 26.000 penerbang, 10.000 <i>marines</i> , 40.000 wajib militer) | 250.000 (termasuk <i>Coastal</i> <i>Regional</i> <i>Defense</i> <i>Forces</i> , 26.000 penerbang, 10.000 <i>marines</i> , 40.000 wajib militer) | 255.000 (termasuk <i>Coastal</i> <i>Regional</i> <i>Defense</i> <i>Forces</i> , 26.000 penerbang, 10.000 <i>marines</i> , 40.000 wajib militer) | 255.000 (termasuk <i>Coastal</i> <i>Regional</i> <i>Defense</i> <i>Forces</i> , 26.000 penerbang, 10.000 <i>marines</i> , 40.000 wajib militer) | 255.000 (termasuk <i>Coastal</i> <i>Regional</i> <i>Defense</i> <i>Forces</i> , 26.000 penerbang, 10.000 <i>marines</i> , 40.000 wajib militer) |

Sumber: *The Military Balance* 2000-2001, 2001-2002, 2002-2003, 2004-2005, 2005-2006, 2006.

Mulai tahun 2000, PLA terus-menerus mengurangi jumlah pasukan, baik yang bersifat *full-time duty* maupun *reserves*, dan di sisi lain mobilitas serta pelatihan formasi terus disempurnakan. Reduksi pasukan difokuskan pada tubuh Angkatan Darat (Army), dari data resmi yang dikeluarkan pemerintah Cina, jumlah personilnya telah dikurangi hingga 130.000 orang. Lebih dari 60.000 personil militer telah dipindahkan dari pusat kontrol (*headquarters*) serta unit yang terafiliasi langsung pada komando militer propinsi. Melalui restrukturisasi, proporsi Angkatan Laut, Angkatan Udara, dan *Second Artillery Force* dalam PLA meningkat 3,8%, sedangkan proporsi Angkatan Darat turun 1,5%.⁴ Cina mulai

⁴ *White Papers of the Government: China's National Defense in 2006*. Lihat lampiran 1.

merubah sistem pertahanannya dari yang bersifat *territorial defence* menuju armada yang lebih kecil namun mobilitasnya tinggi dan cepat merespon ancaman internal dan eksternal.⁵ Proses reorganisasi terus dilakukan melalui konversi struktur-berbasis-divisi menuju struktur-berbasis-brigade yang lebih fleksibel. Hal tersebut dapat dilihat dari contoh berikut:⁶

Tabel 2.6
Group Army dalam Angkatan Darat PLA

| Tahun | | | |
|---|--|---|---|
| 2000-2001 | 2001-2002 | 2002-2003 | 2003-2004 |
| 44 div infant; 10 div tank, 12 brig tank, 13 brig infant, 5 div arty, 20 brig arty, 7 reg helikopter. | 44 div infant; 9 div tank, 12 brig tank, 13 brig infant, 6 div arty, 3 brig ATK, 20 brig arty, 12 brig penerbang | 44 div infant, 9 div tank, 12 brig tank, 1 infant mekanis, 22 brig infant motor, 6 div arty, 15 brig arty, 1 brig ATK, 8 brig SAM/AAA, 13 brig AAA, 3 reg penerbang | 44 div infant; 9 div tank, 12 brig tank, 1 infant mekanis, 22 brig infant motor, 7 div arty, 14 brig arty, 1 brig ATK, 4 reg ATK, 9 brig SAM/AAA, 12 brig AAA |
| Tahun | | | 2006 |
| 2004-2005 | 2005-2006 | 2006 | 2006 |
| 44 divisi infanteri; 9 div tank, 12 brig tank, 1 infant mekanis, 22 brig infant motor, 7 div arty, 14 brig arty, 1 brig ATK, 4 reg ATK, 9 brig SAM/AAA, 12 brig AAA | Organisasi bersifat variatif, pada umumnya tersusun dari 2-3 brig/div infanteri motor/mekanik, 1 div/brig tank, 1 div/brig arty, 1 brig SAM/AAA atau AAA | Organisasi bersifat variatif, pada umumnya tersusun dari 2-3 brig/div infanteri motor/mekanik, 1 div/brig tank, 1 div/brig arty, 1 brig SAM/AAA atau AAA | Organisasi bersifat variatif, pada umumnya tersusun dari 2-3 brig/div infanteri motor/mekanik, 1 div/brig tank, 1 div/brig arty, 1 brig SAM/AAA atau AAA |

Sumber: *The Military Balance* 2000-2001, 2001-2002, 2002-2003, 2004-2005, 2005-2006, 2006.

Keterangan:

| | |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| AAA : Anti-aircraft Artillery | Arty : Artileri |
| ATK : Anti-tank | Brig : Brigade |
| Div : Divisi | Infant : Infanteri |
| Reg : Resimen | SAM : Surface-to-Air Missile |

⁵The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2000-2001* (London: Routledge, 2001), hal. 179

⁶ Reorganisasi pada satuan lainnya dapat dilihat selengkapnya pada lampiran 2.

II.2.2. *Equipment (Peralatan) dan Operational Deployments*

Pada kurun waktu 2000-2001, peralatan yang diperbarui adalah *tank Type-88C* dan *Type-98*. Perkembangan lain yang terlihat adalah meningkatnya jumlah armada laut Cina yang ditempatkan di sekitar perairan Jepang, dari 2 buah pada tahun 1998 menjadi 28 buah. Secara keseluruhan, dibandingkan dengan kekuatan nuklir dunia yang lain, pada kurun waktu 2000-2001 kapabilitas militer strategik Cina terbilang terbatas. Cina memiliki 25 *land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM)* dan kapabilitas SSBN (*single nuclear-fuelled ballistic missile submarine*) kapal selamnya belum berfungsi sepenuhnya.⁷

Pada tahun 2001, Cina terus melakukan modernisasi angkatan bersenjataanya baik dari segi struktur maupun peralatan. hal ini sesuai dengan *China's National Defence in 2000*, yang diterbitkan pada Oktober 2000, yang menekankan pada kebijakan restrukturisasi sebagai prioritas dalam kurun waktu lima tahun ke depan.⁸ Perkembangan yang mencolok terlihat pada peningkatan kapabilitas kapal selamnya. Cina mulai mempersiapkan *The Type 093 SSN* (kapal selam penyerang bertenaga nuklir), sebuah versi modifikasi *Victor 3 SSN* yang dibeli dari Rusia. Cina juga mulai mempersiapkan *Type-94 SSBN* (*nuclear-fuelled ballistic-missile submarine*) sebagai pengganti *Xia-class SSBN* pada akhir dekade ini.⁹ Prioritas pendanaan lainnya terletak pada teknologi militer yang berbasis informasi. Cina juga mempersiapkan *CSS-5 Dong-feng 21 IRBM* (*intermediate-range ballistic missiles*) sebagai pengganti *CSS-2 Dong-feng 3*. Modernisasi misil

⁷ *Ibid.*, hal. 180

⁸ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2001-2002* (London: Routledge, 2002), hal. 172

⁹ *Ibid.*

Cina sebenarnya terbilang lamban. Namun, Cina kembali memesan armada penghancur *Sovremenny* yang dipersenjatai misil SS-N-22 *Sunburn* dari Rusia sebagai reaksi akuisisi US *Patriot Advanced Capability* (PAC) dengan sistem 3 misil, untuk pertahanan terhadap *short-range ballistic missiles* dan *cruise missiles*, yang dilakukan Taiwan pada awal tahun 2001. Dipesannya armada penghancur *Sovremenny* kemudian direspon dengan dikirimkannya empat armada penghancur *Kidd-class* untuk Angkatan Laut Taiwan sebagai kekuatan penangkal.¹⁰

Pada kongres bertema “The National Security Implications of the Economic Relationship” yang diselenggarakan oleh *the US-China Security Review Commission* tercatat bahwa Cina terus membangun kekuatan untuk melawan Taiwan, khususnya peningkatan *deployment* SRBM (Short-range ballistic Missiles) di seberang Taiwan hingga mencapai 300 buah.¹¹ Pada kurun waktu 2002 sampai awal 2003, Cina terus meningkatkan kapabilitas *Blue-water navy* pada satuan angkatan lautnya.¹² Setelah pemesanan *Sovremenny*, Cina mulai mempersiapkan dua *Luhai* DDGs (guided missile destroyers). Delapan SSK (kapal selam bertenaga diesel) *Kilo Type-36* dengan kapabilitas *anti-submarine warfare* kembali dipesan dari Rusia sebagai respon dikirimnya delapan SSK (kapal selam patroli dengan kapabilitas *anti-submarine warfare*) dari AS kepada Taiwan.¹³

Pada kurun waktu 2003-2004, Cina masih meneruskan program modernisasinya. Keputusan yang diambil *Central Military Commission* (CMC)

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, hal.173.

¹¹ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2002-2003* (London: Routledge, 2003), hal. 138

¹² *Ibid.*, hal. 139

¹³ *Ibid.*

pada bulan Juni 2003 menyatakan bahwa pengurangan personil akan terus dilakukan di tubuh PLA hingga mendekati angka 20%. Reduksi yang signifikan ini (kurang lebih 500.000 personil) memungkinkan akselerasi program modernisasi. Pelatihan di tubuh PLA terkonsentrasi pada operasi amfibi gabungan serta adopsi strategi “Three Attacks, Three Defences” yang didesain untuk memenuhi tuntutan perang berbasis teknologi.¹⁴

The Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China yang dikirimkan ke AS pada bulan Juli 2003 mengklaim bahwa Cina memiliki 450 *short-range ballistic missiles* (lebih banyak daripada yang diperkirakan AS sebelumnya), dan diperkirakan akan terus meningkat sekitar 75 buah pertahun, padahal pada akumulasi tahunan yang diperkirakan sebelumnya Cina akan menambah sekitar 50 buah pertahun. Kecanggihan dan akurasi misil Cina telah mengalami penyempurnaan dengan dikembangkannya CSS-6 milik PLA yang mampu menjangkau jarak 3.000 km (sampai Okinawa). Peningkatan jumlah dan kapabilitas misil juga terkonsentrasi di kawasan Selat Taiwan.¹⁵

Pada akhir tahun 2003, tercatat bahwa Cina menjadi negara ketiga yang mampu menyelenggarakan misi ke angkasa luar, Cina telah memiliki satelit komunikasi militer pada orbit *geosynchronous* dan dijadwalkan lebih banyak satelit akan diluncurkan kembali pada tahun 2004.

Pada tahun 2004, Cina memperkuat *military-industrial complex*-nya yang cenderung lemah dengan mengurangi ketergantungan luar negeri sebagai penyuplai teknologi pertahanan, terlebih setelah Uni Eropa menjatuhkan embargo

¹⁴ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2003-2004* (London: Routledge, 2004), hal. 146

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, hal. 147

atas ekspor persenjataan ke Cina terhitung April 2004.¹⁶ Walaupun Cina telah menetapkan prinsip *self-sufficiency*, negara ini tercatat masih melakukan pembelian senjata ke Rusia dalam skala besar dengan dikirimnya 24 buah pesawat tempur Su-27 dan Su-30 *Advanced* dengan biaya 1 trilyun dolar AS.


Cina juga meningkatkan kapabilitas angkatan lautnya melalui “Project 9935” dengan mengedepankan persiapan kapal pembawa pesawat untuk PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy). Konsep operasionalnya berbasis *fleet-defence* dan operasi amfibi ditambah bantuan logistik, dengan kapabilitas *secondary-offensive strike*. Proyek berbasis *fleet-defence* jangka panjang lainnya adalah penyempurnaan PLAN’s Type 052 *destroyer* dengan *anti-ship missile*.¹⁷

Postur militer Cina di seberang Selat Taiwan makin mengeras menyusul terpilihnya kembali Chen Shui-bian sebagai presiden Taiwan. Jumlah *short-range ballistic missiles* dengan daya jangkau Taiwan ditambah menjadi 500 buah, dan akan terus ditambah sekitar 75 buah pertahun. Akurasi dan daya hancur misil ditambah misil dengan tipe *liquid-fuelled* diganti dengan misil bertipe *solid-fuelled variants*. Kekuatan darat di daerah yang persis berhadapan dengan Taiwan, terdiri dari tiga *group army* di distrik militer Nanjing, ditambah termasuk unit operasi khusus.¹⁸

¹⁶ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2004-2005* (London: Routledge, 2005), hal. 161

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ *Ibid.*



Pada bulan Juni dan Juli 2004, militer Cina menyelenggarakan latihan di Pulau Dongshan di sebelah tenggara Propinsi Fujian dengan skenario kontrol terhadap Selat Taiwan dan pendaratan amfibi. Delapan belas ribu pasukan dari distrik militer Nanjing, Su-27 yang dilengkapi KN59M *air-to-surface missiles*, pasukan *air defence* tambahan, pemadam kebakaran, serta kapal perang dan kapal selam diikutsertakan dalam latihan ini.

Sebagai respon atas latihan militer Cina tersebut, Taiwan pada bulan Juli menyelenggarakan latihan militer yang diberi nama *Han Kuang (Han Glory)*, didesain sebagai evaluasi kapabilitas pertahanan Pulau Taiwan melawan ancaman

serangan dari Cina, sebagai pelaksanaan *joint operating procedures* angkatan bersenjata Taipei. Sebelumnya, pada tanggal 14-19 Juni diselenggarakan pelatihan berbasis *computer-stimulated* untuk menguji respon Taiwan terhadap sebuah invasi, di lain pihak AS pada bulan Juli menyelenggarakan simulasi, yang diberi nama *Dragon's Thunder*, di *National Defense University*. Kesemuanya merupakan usaha deteksi skenario yang mungkin terjadi serta respon terhadap aksi militer Cina melawan Taiwan.¹⁹

Memasuki periode pertengahan tahun 2005 sampai awal tahun 2006, CMC memfokuskan kebijakan pertahanan dengan menitikberatkan pada pernyataan "Taiwan are grim". Konsekuensi yang terjadi adalah adanya peningkatan superioritas misil yang ditempatkan di kawasan Selat Taiwan secara drastis. Sebagai tambahan atas misil DF-11 yang ditempatkan di Propinsi Jiangxi dan DF-15 di Fujian, Taiwan memperkirakan pada tahun 2006 terdapat total 1.000 misil yang akan ditempatkan Cina. Cina mengembangkan kapabilitas melawan segala sistem pertahanan misil balistik Taiwan dengan mengembangkan persenjataan "smart system" *Shashoujian*, yang menyempurnakan kemampuan PLA dalam teknologi misil. Sistem ini dikembangkan menyusul laporan bahwa Taiwan telah melakukan uji tembak *Hsiung Feng cruise missile* pada musim semi 2005 dan diadopsinya sistem PAC-3 sebagai basis pertahanan misil masa depan, sebagaimana dikeluarkan Kementerian Pertahanan Taiwan.²⁰

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, hal.162

²⁰ International Institute for The Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2005-2006* (London: Routledge, 2006), hal. 259

Kekuatan amfibi terus menjadi konsentrasi. PLAAF (People's Liberation Army Air Force) memesan lebih banyak pesawat tempur Su-30MKK dan Su-27:²¹

Tabel 2.7

Organisasi dan Jumlah *Fighter Ground Attack* PLAAF 2004-2006

| Jenis Pesawat | Tahun | | |
|------------------------------|--|---|---|
| | 2004-2005 | 2005-2006 | 2006 |
| Fighter Ground Attack | 24 resimen dengan 700 angkutan udara: 300 buah J-6 (10 resimen), 50 buah J-6A (2 resimen), 300 buah Q-5 C/D (9 resimen), 58 buah Su-30 MKK (3 resimen) | 12 resimen dengan 408 buah Q-5C <i>Fantan</i> / Q-5D <i>Fantan</i> ; 2 resimen masing-masing dengan 31 buah J-10; 25 resimen dengan 722 buah MiG-19 <i>Farmer</i> ; 4 resimen dengan 73 buah Su-30MKK <i>Flanker</i> ; 2 resimen masing-masing dengan 13 buah JH-7A | 12 resimen dengan 408 buah Q-5C <i>Fantan</i> / Q-5D <i>Fantan</i> ; 2 resimen masing-masing dengan 31 buah J-10; 25 resimen dengan 722 buah MiG-19 <i>Farmer</i> ; 4 resimen dengan 73 buah Su-30MKK <i>Flanker</i> ; 2 resimen masing-masing dengan 13 buah JH-7A |

Sumber: *The Military Balance* 2004-2005, 2005-2006, 2006.

PLAN (People's Liberation Army Navy) akan mendapat lebih banyak kapal berjenis amfibi *Assault*, kapal serang-cepat, dan dua *Project 965EM missile destroyers* yang dilengkapi dengan *Moskit anti-ship missile system* yang akan menambah kapabilitas *anti-ship* yang dimiliki *Sovremenny*, yang dipersenjatai misil SS-N-22 *Sunburn*. Terdapat indikasi ke depan diberikannya prioritas pada armada kapal selam (submarine). *Rear Admiral* Sun Jianguo, seorang awak kapal

²¹ Data selengkapnya dapat dilihat di lampiran 2.

selam nuklir, ditunjuk sebagai *Chief of Naval Staff* pada Januari 2005. Komandan PLAN juga diduduki oleh *Admiral Zhang Dingfa*, yang juga seorang awak kapal selam.²²

Pada kurun waktu pertengahan sampai akhir tahun 2006, ekspansi PLAN menuju kapabilitas “blue-water” terus berjalan. Kapal selam *Type-093* bersenjata nuklir yang dibuat di dalam negeri sudah dapat dioperasikan. Di sisi lain, PLAAF, yang memiliki sekitar 60 pesawat tempur *Chengdu J-10 multi-role single-engine*, dilaporkan akan memperoleh tambahan lebih dari 300 *J-10* lagi. Tetapi jumlah tersebut masih mungkin berkurang menyusul diperkenalkannya pesawat tempur *Su-30MKK multi-role* buatan Rusia yang lebih kapabel.²³

Program peningkatan kapabilitas yang direncanakan selanjutnya adalah akuisisi *3M14E land attack cruise missile* dari Rusia. Misil *SSN-27*, yang digunakan pada kapal selam *Kilo-class*, bisa digunakan pula pada *3M14E*.²⁴

II.3. Anggaran Pertahanan

Salah satu indikator yang penting dalam pengukuran kapabilitas militer sebuah negara adalah anggaran pertahanan. Salah satu permasalahan yang sering terjadi adalah instrumen apa yang dipakai untuk menghitung dana yang dihabiskan untuk keperluan militer tiap tahunnya. Banyak pihak yang menggunakan beberapa instrumen berbeda, menggunakan *exchange rate* (nilai Tukar) secara umum, atau menggunakan formula PPP (*Purchasing Power Parity*).

²² *Ibid.*, hal.260

²³ *Ibid.*, hal. 261

²⁴ *Ibid.*

Hal ini yang membuat bervariasinya estimasi anggaran pertahanan yang dikeluarkan oleh berbagai lembaga yang berbeda.

Formula PPP, yang lebih sering disebut sebagai perbandingan “common basket of goods and services in one country with its cost in another”, bagi beberapa pihak dirasa perlu untuk digunakan untuk menghasilkan refleksi yang lebih akurat mengenai “nilai” yang sebenarnya dalam artian kemampuan konsumsi relatif (relative spending power). Banyak barang/produk (goods) di Cina yang harganya jauh lebih murah dibanding di Barat: gaji dan standar tentara PLA yang lebih rendah merupakan penghematan anggaran yang dibebankan pada tiap personil, di sisi lain rendahnya gaji di pabrik-pabrik pembuatan senjata (defence factories) menekan biaya produksi senjata. Disparitas ini diharap dapat dikoreksi dengan instrumen PPP.²⁵

Namun, instrumen PPP masih dianggap kurang relevan untuk digunakan sebagai pendekatan pengukuran anggaran militer secara keseluruhan. Anggaran militer tersusun oleh berbagai *item* pendanaan dalam skala luas, yang tidak kesemuanya sesuai dengan konversi sederhana *a la* PPP.²⁶ Dalam kasus Cina, konversi PPP tidak menghitung kualitas produk Cina (misal: sistem persenjataan) yang inferior maupun servis/jasa (misal: efektivitas masing-masing personil tentara) relatif terhadap Barat, dan bahkan penghitungan dengan konversi ini mungkin terlalu melebihi berapa dana yang dihabiskan militer Cina yang

²⁵ Richard A. Bitzinger, “Just the Facts, Ma’am: The Challenge of Analysing and Assessing Chinese Military Expenditure”, dalam *the China Quarterly* no. 173, Maret 2003, hal.170.

²⁶ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2006* (London: Routledge, 2006), hal. 250

sebenarnya.²⁷ Selain itu, konversi PPP juga tidak mencakup pembelian *item* dan komponen di pasar dunia, aspek ini justru tercakup oleh *international market exchange rates*.²⁸ Oleh karena itu, penelitian ini menggunakan data anggaran pertahanan Cina yang diperoleh dari *The Military Balance*, yang mengadopsi *the World Bank rate (exchange rate)*.²⁹

Peningkatan anggaran pertahanan Cina selama kurun waktu tahun 2000-2006 dapat dideskripsikan dalam tabel berikut:

Tabel 2.8
Anggaran Pertahanan Cina Tahun 2000-2006

| 2000 | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 |
|-------|------|--------|-------|------|------|------|
| 120,5 | 141 | 169,44 | 190,7 | 207 | 244 | 280 |
| 14,5 | 17 | 20,24 | 23 | 25 | 29,5 | 34,9 |

Sumber: *The Military Balance* 2000-2001, 2001-2002, 2002-2003, 2004-2005, 2005-2006, 2006.

Keterangan:

- baris kedua menunjukkan anggaran pertahanan dalam trilyun Yuan
- baris ketiga menunjukkan anggaran pertahanan dalam trilyun US\$
- nilai tukar pada tahun 2000-2005 → 1 US\$ = 8,28 Yuan
- nilai tukar pada tahun 2006 → 1 US\$ = 8,05 Yuan

Dari tabel 2 terlihat bahwa anggaran pertahanan Cina selalu meningkat setiap tahunnya, dan selama kurun waktu 2000-2006 anggaran pertahanan Cina menunjukkan peningkatan lebih dari dua kali lipat. Anggaran pertahanan ini kembali meningkat pada awal tahun 2007. Banyak pihak terutama AS yang

²⁷ Wang Shaogang, "The Military expenditure of China: 1989-1998", dalam Richard A. Bitzinger, *Op. Cit.*, hal. 171.

²⁸ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2006*, *Op. Cit.*, hal. 251

²⁹ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2006*, *Loc. Cit.*

menyebut peningkatan tersebut sebagai ketidakkonsistenan Cina terhadap perdamaian dan mengisyaratkan para pejabat Cina agar tidak menerapkan anggaran tersebut.³⁰ Di lain pihak, Taiwan merasa penambahan anggaran militer Cina yang terus terjadi sampai tahun 2007 merupakan ancaman langsung terhadap keamanan Asia Timur. Taiwan sangat khawatir Cina menambah kekuatan militernya untuk menyerang Taiwan. Sebelumnya, Cina telah beberapa kali mengancam akan menyerang Taiwan jika pulau itu berani mendeklarasikan kemerdekaannya secara resmi.³¹

Menanggapi berbagai reaksi tersebut, Jiang Enzhu, juru bicara Parlemen Nasional Cina, menyatakan bahwa kenaikan anggaran militer Cina termasuk “sedang-sedang saja” karena hanya mengambil 7,5 persen anggaran pengeluaran tahunan Cina.³²

Sejak penerbitan *White Paper* pada tahun 2000-2004, terdapat tiga aspek yang mengkategorisasikan anggaran pertahanan Cina secara sederhana, yaitu: *Personnel, Operations, dan Equipment*:

Tabel 2.9
China Defence Budget

Official Breakdown White Paper, 2002&2004 (RMBm)

| Year | Personnel | Operations | Equipment | Total |
|-------------|------------------|-------------------|------------------|--------------|
| 2000 | 40.550 | 41.274 | 38.930 | 120.754 |
| 2001 | 46.163 | 48.581 | 49.460 | 144.204 |
| 2002 | 54.043 | 58.123 | 57.278 | 169.444 |
| 2003 | 62.005 | 64.104 | 64.486 | 190.787 |

Sumber: *The Military Balance 2006*, hal. 249.

³⁰ “AS Prihatinkan Anggaran Militer Cina”, dalam *Media Indonesia*, 7 Maret 2007, hal. 32.

³¹ “China Tambah Anggaran Militer”, dalam *Kompas*, 5 Maret 2007.

³² Myrna Ratna, “Menuju Kekuatan Adidaya”, dalam *Kompas*, 6 Maret 2007.

White Paper 2004 menekankan pada 5 alasan mengapa terdapat tren peningkatan *Official Defence Budget* pada tahun-tahun terakhir:³³

1. Peningkatan pendapatan dan standar hidup personil militer yang bertujuan untuk menyesuaikan dengan perkembangan kondisi sosio-ekonomi serta meningkatnya pendapatan perkapita di daerah urban maupun pedesaan. Menurut kebijakan *unified wage adjustment for all personnel of state bodies*, pendapatan dan biaya hidup personil militer telah meningkat beberapa kali
2. Pengenalan sistem keamanan sosial (*social security system*) untuk personil militer, termasuk asuransi jiwa, subsidi perumahan, asuransi kesehatan bagi pasukan yang dimobilisasi, dan beberapa fasilitas untuk suami/istri personil
3. Dana untuk reformasi struktural dan organisasional, termasuk biaya yang harus dikeluarkan selama proses penyusutan jumlah personil PLA
4. Peningkatan investasi pada “high-calibre talent” yang terdapat di dalam angkatan bersenjata, termasuk penyempurnaan fasilitas edukasi militer yang sejalan dengan “Strategic Project for Talented People” PLA
5. Memoderatkan peningkatan pemenuhan kebutuhan akan peralatan yang bertujuan pada “promoting the leapfrog development of weaponry”

Dipublikasikannya *White Paper* sedikit banyak membantu mempermudah penghitungan anggaran militer Cina pertahun dan sebagai wujud komitmen Cina terhadap asas transparansi, tetapi terdapat beberapa *item* yang tidak tercantum,

³³ “White Paper of the Government: Chinese National Defense in 2004”, dalam The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2006*. hal. 249.

sebagaimana laporan anggaran pertahanan negara-negara Barat pada umumnya, yaitu:³⁴

1. Pembelian persenjataan dari luar negeri
2. Subsidi negara untuk industri pertahanan
3. Program penelitian dan pengembangan (research and development)
4. Pembiayaan paramiliter

Keempat *item* tersebut dapat diuraikan secara singkat sebagai berikut:³⁵

1. Pembelian persenjataan dari luar negeri

Sebagian besar kebutuhan persenjataan Cina dipenuhi produksi dalam negeri. Namun, dalam sepuluh tahun terakhir, PLA terus meningkatkan jumlah peralatan yang dibeli dari luar negeri, kebanyakan dari Rusia. Berdasarkan laporan *Congressional Research Service (CRS)* dalam Kongres “Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations” 2004, Cina mengimpor sistem persenjataan bernilai 1 triliun dolar AS pada tahun 2004, jumlah totalnya adalah 13 triliun dolar AS dalam kurun waktu 1997-2004, dengan rata-rata pembelian 1,6 triliun dolar AS pertahun. Dalam tahun-tahun terakhir, Rusia menjadi negara penyuplai sistem persenjataan baru PLA yang utama, mengirimkan pesawat tempur Su-27 dan Su-30 MKK kepada angkatan udara, serta kapal selam penghancur *Sovremeny-class* dan *Kilo-class* kepada angkatan laut. Walaupun jumlah pembayaran pasti dan jadwal pengiriman tidak dipublikasikan, terdapat indikasi bahwa sebagian besar pembelian persenjataan ke luar negeri dibiayai oleh dana ekstra-budgeter yang dilaporkan

³⁴ The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2006*, *Op. Cit.*, hal. 252

³⁵ *Ibid.* hal 252-253

ditarik dari *specially arranged hard-currency accounts* yang dikontrol *State Council* dibandingkan militer Cina sendiri.

2. Subsidi negara untuk industri pertahanan

Sejak awal 1980-an, sektor pertahanan Cina mengalami penurunan serius terkait dengan sepihnya permintaan pembelian senjata. Sebagai konsekuensinya, industri pertahanan mengalami proses konversi besar-besaran hingga 70% pabrik pembuat senjata (*military factories*) beralih ke produksi kebutuhan umum. Anggaran Negara (*China's State Budget*) mencantumkan subsidi yang dialokasikan untuk "loss-making enterprises" (LME), dimana pada tahun 2003 dinyatakan berjumlah 22,6 triliun RMB. Setelah proses konversi ini menuai kesuksesan, banyak pabrik tersebut yang masih menerima subsidi, sekitar 25% dari total alokasi subsidi LME.

Sebagai tambahan terhadap subsidi LME, analisis percaya bahwa *State Council* memberikan subsidi yang besar kepada pabrik-pabrik pembuat senjata atau pabrik-pabrik yang memproduksi barang-barang secara terpisah untuk militer dimana administrasinya berada dibawah sepuluh perusahaan korporasi *State Council*. David Shambaugh menyatakan bahwa alokasi langsung kemungkinan sebesar 500 juta dolar AS tiap korporasi, atau lima triliun dolar AS untuk kesepuluh korporasi yang eksis saat ini.

3. Ekspor persenjataan Cina

Walaupun ekspor persenjataan Cina telah mengalami penurunan sejak berakhirnya Perang Iran-Irak, CRS mengkalkulasi bahwa ekspor Cina mencapai 5,5 triliun dolar AS dalam kurun waktu 1997-2004, dengan rata-rata

700 juta dolar AS pertahun. Dalam tahun-tahun terakhir, mayoritas nilai ekspor persenjataan Cina pertahun terkoneksi dengan korporasi industri pertahanan dan setengahnya lagi diterima PLA.

4. Penelitian dan Pengembangan

Jumlah dana yang disalurkan untuk proyek penelitian dan pengembangan merupakan salah satu aspek pendanaan militer Cina yang sulit untuk diperkirakan, karena adanya beberapa sumber pendanaan yang berbeda: *the General Armaments Division; the Commission of Science Technology and Industry for National Defence (COSTIND); the Ministry of State Science and Technology*; dan industri pertahanan itu sendiri. Sebuah perkiraan level *State Funding of Defence RDT&E* bisa didapatkan. Berdasarkan Shaoguang Wang, RDT&E dibiayai dari dua sumber: dana penelitian dan pengembangan secara umum dan *the "new product promotion fund"*, data yang bisa diperoleh dari *the Annual China Statistical Yearbook*. Pada tahun 2003, dana penelitian dan pengembangan secara umum, termasuk penelitian dasar dan aplikatif serta perkembangan eksperimen, berjumlah 154 triliun RMB disamping dana pemerintah untuk ilmu pengetahuan dan teknologi (S&T), termasuk "new product development, expenditure for intermediate trial and subsidies for important scientific research". mencapai 84 triliun RMB. Wang menyatakan bahwa mayoritas pendanaan ini ditujukan untuk kepentingan sipil sebesar 15% dari dana penelitian dan pengembangan (R&D) secara umum dan 35% dari anggaran S&T seharusnya dimasukkan dalam anggaran nasional *Chinese military-related spending* secara keseluruhan.

5. People's Armed Police (PAP)

Pendanaan untuk PAP sebagian besar bersumber pada *Ministry of Finance* dengan tambahan kontribusi dari pemerintah lokal. Pada tahun 2003, pembiayaan pemerintah pusat untuk PAP mencapai 23,9 triliun RMB dengan alokasi dari pemerintah lokal sebesar 2,4 triliun RMB.

6. Local Militia

Militia adalah pasukan yang mem-*backup* PLA dan PAP, yang diharapkan membantu untuk menjaga tatanan sosial, berpartisipasi pada usaha penyelamatan darurat dan pemulihan dari bencana alam, serta membentuk pasukan pendukung PLA ketika sebuah perang pecah. Pemenuhan anggaran militia tercakup dalam *Official Defence Budget*, walaupun pendanaan operasionalnya dibiayai oleh pemerintah lokal, yang mencapai 2,2 triliun RMB.

Anggaran militer sebuah negara dapat menjadi indikator penting untuk melihat prioritas, kebijakan, strategi dan kapabilitas pertahanan nasional sebuah negara. Anggaran pertahanan juga dapat menjadi sebuah indikator penting untuk melihat intensi strategis, prioritas modernisasi militer, dan kemungkinan kapabilitas militer sebuah negara di masa yang akan datang.³⁶ Oleh karena itu, tidaklah mengherankan apabila banyak pihak yang menaruh perhatian terhadap intensi peningkatan anggaran militer Cina.

Berdasar operasionalisasi konsep *military expenditure* Bitzinger, yang telah dikemukakan pada bab I, dan setelah dikorelasikan dengan tabel peningkatan

³⁶ Richard A. Bitzinger, *Op. Cit.*, hal.164.

kapabilitas militer Cina dengan perbandingan tiap tahunnya³⁷, dapat dilihat bahwa modernisasi difokuskan pada kekuatan laut dengan program kapabilitas *blue-water navy* dan pengembangan *short-range ballistic missiles* yang sebagian besar ditempatkan di seberang Selat Taiwan:

Tabel 2.10
Kekuatan *Short-range Ballistic Missiles* (SRBM) PLA 2000-2006³⁸

| Tahun | | | | | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|--|---|
| 2000-2001 | 2001-2002 | 2002-2003 | 2003-2004 | 2004-2005 | 2005-2006 | 2006 |
| SRBM: Sekitar 20 DF-15 dengan lebih dari 200 misil (CSS-6 / M-9 dengan jarak tembak 600 km) 40 DF-11 (CSS-7 / M-11 dengan jarak tembak 120-300 km) | SRBM: Sekitar 25 DF-15 dengan lebih dari 160 misil (CSS-6 / M-9 dengan jarak tembak 600 km) 25 DF-11 dengan 175 misil (CSS-7 / M-11 dengan jarak tembak 120-300 km) | SRBM: Sekitar 25 DF-15 dengan lebih dari 160 misil (CSS-6 / M-9 dengan jarak tembak 600 km) 25 DF-11 dengan 175 misil (CSS-7 / M-11 dengan jarak tembak 120-300 km) | SRBM: Sekitar 25 DF-15 dengan lebih dari 160 misil (CSS-6 / M-9 dengan jarak tembak 600 km) 25 DF-11A dengan 175 misil (CSS-7 / M-11 dengan jarak tembak 120-300 km) 30 DF-7 (CSS-8) dengan 450 misil | SRBM: Sekitar 25 DF-15 dengan lebih dari 160 misil (CSS-6 / M-9 dengan jarak tembak 600 km) 25 DF-11A dengan 175 misil (CSS-7 / M-11 dengan jarak tembak 120-300 km) 30 DF-7 (CSS-8) dengan 450 misil | SRBM: 725 buah: Sekitar 225 buah DF-15 dengan lebih dari 160 misil (CSS-6 / M-9 dengan jarak tembak 600 km) 500 buah DF-11A dengan 175 misil (CSS-7 / M-11 dengan jarak tembak 120-300 km) 30 DF-7 (CSS-8) dengan 450 misil | SRBM: 725 buah: Sekitar 225 buah DF-15 dengan lebih dari 160 misil (CSS-6 / M-9 dengan jarak tembak 600 km) 500 buah DF-11A dengan 175 misil (CSS-7 / M-11 dengan jarak tembak 120-300 km) 30 DF-7 (CSS-8) dengan 450 misil |

Sumber: *The Military Balance* 2000-2001, 2001-2002, 2002-2003, 2004-2005, 2005-2006, 2006.

Keterangan:

ICBM : Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles

IRBM : Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles

SLBM : Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles

³⁷ Data selengkapnya dapat dibaca di lampiran 2.

³⁸ Data selengkapnya dapat dibaca di lampiran 2.

SRBM : Short-Range Ballistic Missiles

Sejak tahun 2000, PLA menempatkan prioritas pendanaan pada persenjataan yang mampu menandingi kemampuan pertahanan Taiwan.³⁹ Hal ini ditunjukkan dengan data pembelian persenjataan Taiwan:

PLA had developed two such land-attack missiles: *Chang Feng* and *Chang Feng-1*. When the PLA fields these cruise missiles and more advanced *Hong Niao* LACM, Taiwan's military advantage will be harder to preserve... The PLA has increased its inventory of M-9 and M-11 ballistic missiles and started deploying another 200 to 300 state-of-the-art missiles targeted at Taiwan. According to a recent Pentagon report, China could amass more than 650 of such missiles targeting Taiwan by the year 2005, thereby neutralizing Taiwan's air superiority within forty-five minutes.⁴⁰

Cina juga mengembangkan akurasi AWACS⁴¹, yang terintegrasi dengan sistem luncur misilnya, yang terarah ke Taiwan. Selain itu, Cina juga terus mengembangkan kapabilitas persenjataan berbasis teknologi informasi yang bertujuan untuk mematikan kontrol sistem pertahanan Taiwan dalam hitungan detik.⁴²

The PLA is further developing information and electronic warfare capabilities, such as computer hacking (by introducing misleading information, altering data, shutting down vital operations in an opponent's computerized control and command systems, or planting computer viruses),... These weapons can greatly enhance the PLA's edge over Taiwan and complicate US intervention. The PLA has acquired the technology to make Electronic Magnetic Pulse miniature warheads, which could shut down all electronic systems on Taiwan,

³⁹ Edward Cody, "China Builds a Smaller, Stronger Military", dalam http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A45056-2005Apr11_2.html
Diakses tanggal 4 Mei 2007

⁴⁰ Holmes S. Liao, "What Taiwan's Military Needs for Its Survival", dalam *Taipei Times*, 19 April 2000, dalam Sheng Lijun, "China Responds", dalam *China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations under Chen Shui-bian* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), hal.91.

⁴¹ *Airborne Warning and Control System*

⁴² Anne Gruettner, "Taipei 'Ready to Buy US Missile Defence'", dalam *South China Morning Post*, 22 April 1999, dalam Sheng Lijun, *Op. Cit.*, hal.92.

from communication systems to cars or petrol stations, before an invasion, without casualties and without affecting neighbouring regions.

Prioritas modernisasi tersebut sejalan dengan tujuan utama keamanan nasional Cina pada tahun 2004 yaitu untuk mencegah separatisme dan mencapai reunifikasi negara, melawan agresi, menyelamatkan kedaulatan nasional, integritas teritorial, dan hak serta kepentingan di wilayah perairan.⁴³



⁴³ "China National Defense White Book 2004". dalam <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=2&did=1045032531&SrchMode=1&sid=2&Fmt=4&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1178266544&clientId=72459.htm>, diakses tanggal 4 Mei 2007.

BAB III

ANALISA

Bab ini menjelaskan latar belakang peningkatan kapabilitas militer Cina dalam kurun waktu tahun 2000-2006.

III.1. Ekspektasi Cina atas Perilaku Taiwan

Pada saat Taiwan berada dibawah pemerintahan junta militer (martial law), kebijakan negara terhadap Cina sebagaimana digariskan partai ortodoks, Kuomintang (KMT), didasarkan pada prinsip "Three No's" yaitu; *no contact, no negotiations, and no compromises* dengan rezim komunis Cina.¹ Pada masa pemerintahan Mao Zedong, Cina cenderung menggunakan ancaman dengan kekerasan untuk mencegah kemerdekaan Taiwan. Pandangan ini berubah dengan ditawarkannya model "One State, Two systems" dengan dikedepankannya opsi damai menuju reunifikasi sejak era Deng Xiaoping. Beijing menyatakan bahwa sekali Taiwan menerima prinsip "One China", segala hal bisa didiskusikan, termasuk nama negara, lagu kebangsaan, status legal dan politik Taiwan, dan kepemilikan angkatan bersenjata.² Prinsip "One China" beberapa kali mengalami modifikasi sampai definisi terakhirnya pada tahun 2000:³

¹ Yu-Shan Wu, "Taiwan's Domestic Politics and Cross-Strait Relations", dalam *The China Journal* no.53, Januari 2005, hal. 35.

² Sheng Iijun, "China Responds", dalam *China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations under Chen Shui-bian*, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), hal.72.

³ Todd Crowell, "Beijing Redefines Dogma in Overture to Taiwan", dalam *Reuters Newslines*, 27 Agustus 2000, dalam *ibid.*, hal. 73.

(a) There is only one China in the world, (b) Taiwan and the mainland are both part of China, (c) China's sovereignty and territorial integrity is not to be separated.

Cina mengelola permasalahan Taiwan sejalan dengan prinsip "pinning hope on the people of Taiwan", dimana cara-cara yang digunakan cenderung persuasif untuk memenangkan hati rakyat Taiwan, yang telah dikonfirmasi pada tahun 1998.⁴ Kebijakan ini merupakan bagian dari "the struggle against 'Taiwan independence' forces and their activities", dan kebijakan ini didesain untuk menghambat gerakan kemerdekaan Taiwan yang dipimpin oleh presiden Lee Teng-hui dan Chen Shui-bian, yang dianggap sebagai pemimpin faksi pro-kemerdekaan oleh Beijing. Hal ini sesuai dengan prioritas kebijakan pertahanan Cina, yaitu untuk mempertahankan keamanan nasional (*national security*) dan kesatuan bangsa (*unity*).⁵ Segala usaha yang tidak sejalan dengan prinsip politik luar negeri Cina merupakan ancaman, termasuk usaha pemisahan diri Taiwan yang dianggap sebagai penghinaan bagi kedaulatan nasional Cina.⁶

Dalam pelaksanaannya, Cina berusaha mengedepankan jalan damai terlebih dahulu, atau dengan kata lain: mempertahankan komitmen atas kondisi

⁴ Masayuki Masuda, "China-Achievements and Challenges of 'Neighboring Diplomacy'", dalam *The National Institute for Defense Studies: East Asian Strategic Review 2006* (Tokyo: The Japan Times, 2006), hal. 112

⁵ *White Paper of the Government: China's National Defense in 2006*, bagian *preface*, lihat lampiran I.

⁶ Robert G. Sutter, *Politik Luar Negeri RRC* (Bandung: Abardin, 1991), hal.9.

status quo di kawasan.⁷ Di bawah pemerintahan Jiang Zemin, diletakkan garis dasar kebijakan terkait dengan agenda reunifikasi:⁸

(a) Renzhen Guancha (observe closely), (b) Naixin Dengdai (wait with patience), (c) Buji Buzao (guard against impetuosity), (d) Baochi Gaoya (maintain high pressure).

Hal ini diperkuat setelah Presiden Hu Jintao menyampaikan “empat garis haluan” dalam kaitan dengan Taiwan, yang intinya adalah “empat hal yang tak akan pernah dilakukan Cina”. Empat hal tersebut adalah Cina tak akan pernah bergeser dari prinsip Satu Cina, tak akan pernah lelah mencari upaya bagi reunifikasi damai, tak akan mengubah harapan rakyat Taiwan, dan tak akan berkompromi dalam menghadapi isu kemerdekaan Taiwan.⁹

Namun, prinsip “pinning hope on the people of Taiwan” ternodai setelah Chen Shui-bian kembali terpilih pada pemilihan presiden Taiwan tahun 2004. Padahal sejak sebelum pemilu presiden 2000, dimana Chen terpilih untuk pertama kalinya, Cina berusaha keras untuk mencapai apa yang disebut “Three Not’s”:¹⁰

Lee Teng-hui should not stay for another term; the “two states theory”¹¹ should not be incorporated into the Taiwan Constitution; and Chen Shui-bian should not be elected.

⁷ Yueh-Tsan Lai, “China’s Strategy toward the Asia-Pacific Multilateral Mechanism”, dalam Nicholas Taylor, “China as a Status Quo or Revisionist Power? Implications for Australia”, dalam *Security Challenges* Vol. 3 No.1, hal. 30.

⁸ Pan Xitang, “Xuanhe Lian’an Guangxi De Weiji Yu Zhuanji (Crises and Opportunities in Cross-Strait Relations after the Presidential Election)”, dalam Sheng Lijun, dalam *Taiwan under President Chen Shui-bian*, *Op. Cit.*, hal. 49.

⁹ Dikutip dari pernyataan Hu Jintao pada tanggal 4 Maret 2007, dalam *Kompas*, 6 Maret 2007.

¹⁰ Sheng Lijun, *Taiwan under President Chen Shui-bian*, *Log.Cit.*

¹¹ Bahwa hubungan antara Cina dan Taiwan adalah hubungan di antara dua Negara yang berbeda.

Bagi para pembuat kebijakan Cina, terutama kelompok Nasionalis, hal ini merupakan indikasi adanya “policy failure” seperti yang terjadi pada masa Jiang Zemin. Pada Januari 1995, Jiang Zemin mengumumkan “Eight Points”:¹²

Adhere to the principle of one China; oppose “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan”; negotiate on an equal footing to reach an agreement on officially ending cross-strait hostility; Chinese should not fight fellow Chinese; promote cross-strait economic exchanges and co-operation, as well as the three direct links; promote the fine traditions of the Chinese culture; all parties and personages of all circles in Taiwan are welcome to exchange views with the mainland on cross-strait relations; visits by leaders of the two sides should take place. The affairs of Chinese people should be handled by the Chinese themselves.

Delapan poin tersebut merepresentasikan perubahan radikal terhadap kebijakan Cina menghadapi Taiwan, dan sebagai respon terhadap “eight points”, Lee Teng-hui menyatakan bahwa kebijakan tersebut merupakan pernyataan kembali (renounce) Beijing atas “hak menggunakan kekerasan” sebelum memulai negosiasi.¹³ Hal ini dipandang Beijing sebagai penolakan terang-terangan dan “tamparan di muka”.¹⁴ Keputusan Washington untuk memberi *tourist visa* kepada Lee Teng-hui pada tahun 1995¹⁵ dianggap sebagai kelalaian Jiang sebagai pemimpin dan hal ini dianggap memermalukan pemerintah Cina ketika itu. Adanya “policy failure” terhadap “eight points” yang telah dicanangkan membuat

¹²James Manicom, “Near-term Instability in the Taiwan Strait? Nationalist Constituencies in the PRC and Cross-Strait Stability”, dalam *Security Challenges* Vol. 3 No.1. *Op. Cit.*, hal. 69.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ M. Swaine, “Chinese Decision Making Regarding Taiwan, 1979-2000”, dalam James Manicom, *ibid.*

¹⁵ Dalam kunjungannya ke Cornell University, Chen berpidato dengan mengedepankan agenda: *popular sovereignty* dan *ROC in Taiwan*, serta mendeklarasikan bahwa dirinya akan melawan kemustahilan (challenge the impossible).

Jiang tidak dapat menghindari dari dipakainya penyelesaian secara militer yang menjadi penyebab *the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis*.¹⁶

Tekanan untuk menggunakan opsi militerisasi yang dialami Jiang Zemin bisa kembali terjadi pada masa Hu Jintao apabila “policy failure” muncul untuk yang kedua kalinya. Beijing memperkirakan bahwa Chen mungkin mengikuti gagasan Lee. Dapat dipastikan bahwa kenangan buruk atas perilaku Lee sangat mempengaruhi pengamatan Beijing atas Chen.¹⁷ Pada bulan Maret 2005, “four points” (empat garis haluan) dicanangkan sebagai penyempurna “eight points”. “Four points” ini pada dasarnya merupakan pandangan jangka panjang pemimpin Cina terhadap kebijakan reunifikasi termasuk keputusan untuk memenangkan opini publik Taiwan melalui pendekatan-pendekatan damai, seperti reduksi tarif terhadap impor buah Taiwan dan diberikannya dua panda sebagai hadiah.¹⁸

Namun, pada bulan yang sama, Cina mengeluarkan *Anti-Secession Law* (ASL) yang menjadi basis legal tujuan nasional Cina menuju unifikasi dan formalisasi digunakannya opsi militer terkait dengan *cross-Strait relationship*. Walaupun dalam ASL digunakan istilah “non-peaceful means”, daripada istilah “the use of force”, secara keseluruhan substansi dari undang-undang ini merupakan legalisasi penggunaan kekuatan militer dalam menghadapi pembangkangan Taiwan.¹⁹

Dalam lingkup yang lebih luas, ASL merupakan sebuah perpanjangan kebijakan yang didesain untuk mempertegas hubungan Cina dengan Taiwan.

¹⁶ Diarahkannya 30-50 buah misil balistik ke Taiwan segera setelah Lee kembali dari AS.

¹⁷ Sheng Lijun, *Op. Cit.*, hal. 60.

¹⁸ “Peaceful Pandas vs. Bellicose Chen”, dalam *People's Daily*, 7 Januari 2006, dalam James Manicom, *Op. Cit.*, hal. 70.

¹⁹ Masayuki Masuda, *Op. Cit.*, hal. 116.

Artikel 6 dalam ASL menyatakan intensi pemerintah Cina untuk menjaga perdamaian dan stabilitas di Selat Taiwan dan mendukung *cross-Strait relations*, dan menspesifikasi lima poin untuk dilaksanakan:²⁰

(a) to encourage and facilitate personnel exchanges across the strait, (b) to encourage and facilitate economic exchanges and cooperation, to realize “three direct links”²¹, and to bring about closer economic ties between the two sides of the strait, (c) to encourage and facilitate cross-strait exchanges in education, science, technology, culture, health, and sports, (d) to encourage and facilitate cross-strait cooperation in combating crime, and (e) to encourage and facilitate other activities that are conducive to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait and stronger cross-strait relations.

Artikel 7 dalam ASL menyatakan bahwa Cina berpegang pada pencapaian reunifikasi damai melalui konsultasi dan negosiasi pada posisi yang seimbang di antara kedua belah pihak, dan siap untuk berkonsultasi dengan Taiwan terkait dengan permasalahan-permasalahan berikut:²²

(a) officially ending the state of hostility between the two sides, (b) mapping out the development of cross-strait relations, (c) steps and arrangements for peaceful national reunification, (d) the political status of the Taiwan authorities, (e) a Taiwanese sphere of international operation commensurate with its status, and (f) all other matters concerning the achievement of peaceful national unification.

Jika ditelaah dari dua artikel dalam ASL diatas, itikad baik untuk menyatukan Taiwan secara damai sebagaimana tercakup dalam prinsip “pinning hope on the people of Taiwan” tidak berubah. Namun, terdapat pernyataan bahwa “non-peaceful means” tidak akan diberlakukan sepanjang situasi yang tercantum dalam artikel 8 tidak muncul:²³

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Perdagangan langsung, transportasi, dan layanan pos di antara Cina dan Taiwan.

²² Masayuki Masuda, *Op. Cit.*, hal. 116.

²³ Masayuki Masuda, *Op. Cit.*, hal. 118.

(a) if secessionist forces in Taiwan should act to cause Taiwan's de facto secession from China, (b) if a major incident entailing Taiwan's secession from China should occur, or (c) when the possibilities for a peaceful reunification are completely exhausted.

Pernyataan tersebut dapat diartikan sebagai pendirian Beijing pada penggunaan kekuatan militer melawan Taiwan. Hal ini merupakan indikasi bahwa tidak semua kebijakan Cina berjalan pada *track* yang lebih lunak. ASL dapat dipahami sebagai sebuah demonstrasi condongnya klaim *the Fourth Generation*²⁴ pada kebijakan yang cenderung keras.²⁵

Secara keseluruhan, terdapat empat pilar yang menjadi dasar kekuatan kebijakan Cina terhadap Taiwan dengan prioritas relatif terhadap kebijakan "pinning hope on the people of Taiwan":²⁶

(a) to deter Taiwan independence with the international community, (b) to check Taiwan's independence by force, (c) to check Taiwan's independence by law (the Anti-Secession Law passed in March 2005) and (d) to win over Taiwanese public opinion.

III.2. Perilaku Taiwan yang Teramati

Bagaimanapun, ekspektasi Cina yang berjalan diatas kebijakan "pinning hope on the people of Taiwan" hancur ketika Chen Shui-bian, pemimpin kelompok pro-independen, kembali terpilih dalam pemilu presiden tahun 2004. Hal ini memunculkan dilema tersendiri, dimana KMT sebagai saluran politik utama Cina selama lebih dari lima dekade semakin tidak dapat diandalkan.²⁷ Terpilihnya Chen untuk kedua kalinya kembali mempermalukan Cina setelah sederet perilaku Chen yang dianggap sangat membangkang.

²⁴ Pemimpin Cina generasi keempat setelah era Jiang Zemin.

²⁵ James Manicom, *Op. Cit.*

²⁶ Analisis Yu Xintian, presiden *the Shanghai Institute for International Studies*, dalam Masayuki Masuda, *Op. Cit.*, hal. 115.

²⁷ Sheng Lijun, *China's Dilemma: Taiwan Issue*, (Singapore: Stamford Press, 2001), hal.217.

Dalam pidato pengukuhan pada bulan Mei 2000, Chen Shui-bian menyatakan bahwa dirinya akan melanjutkan prinsip “five no’s”:²⁸

(a) not declare independence, (b) not change its formal name from the Republic of China, (c) not enshrine the words “state-to-state” in the constitution, (d) not to endorse a referendum on formal independence, and (e) not abolish the National Reunification Council or the National Reunification Guidelines.

Namun, fakta mengatakan bahwa prinsip “five no’s” kemudian tidak lagi dipegang. Pada bulan Agustus 2002, Chen menggunakan frase “one country on each side of the strait” yang notabene memiliki makna yang sama dengan frase “state-to-state”, dan menekankan bahwa “Taiwan and the nation on the other side of the strait are two nations”, dan bahwa “we have to be very clear about the distinction”. Menanggapi pertanyaan tentang status politik Taiwan di masa depan, Chen mengatakan bahwa rakyat Taiwan harus memberi perhatian serius terhadap pembentukan dan ratifikasi pembentukan referendum.²⁹

Terpilihnya kembali Chen Shui-bian sebagai presiden membuat Cina berada dalam posisi yang sulit apabila hanya mengandalkan kebijakan berbasis “pinning hope on the people of Taiwan” semata. Faktor kunci yang membuat gerakan pro-kemerdekaan kembali memimpin adalah kemampuan kelompok ini dalam memenangkan simpati rakyat Taiwan, yang dapat diukur dari instrumen opini publik. Apabila Cina dapat merebut simpati rakyat Taiwan, maka kebijakan “pinning hope on the people of Taiwan” akan menuai hasil yang diinginkan yaitu reunifikasi dengan jalan damai.

²⁸ Masayuki Masuda, *Op. Cit.*, hal. 114.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

Masalah kembali muncul ketika Cina memutuskan untuk meratifikasi ASL. Pada Maret 2005, lebih dari satu juta penduduk Taiwan turun ke jalan dan menggelar protes menentang ASL dimana presiden Chen juga bergabung di dalamnya. Pada kesempatan tersebut, *Xinhua News Agency* milik Cina mendistribusikan koran yang berisi komentar bahwa Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), partai pro-kemerdekaan yang berkuasa, dan gerakan pro-kemerdekaan Taiwan yang ekstrim telah benar-benar mengancam prinsip-prinsip yang terkandung dalam ASL untuk mempengaruhi publik Taiwan agar berubah pikiran. Namun, berdasarkan poling yang diselenggarakan salah satu surat kabar ternama Taiwan, hanya enam persen (*United Daily News*) atau tiga persen (*China Times*) dari keseluruhan responden yang mendukung ASL. Hal ini menunjukkan kegagalan Cina merebut simpati rakyat Taiwan, dimana Cina menggantungkan harapannya.³⁰

Pada pembahasan berikutnya dipaparkan bagaimana strategi Chen Shui-bian menggerakkan opini publik di Taiwan terkait dengan isu kemerdekaan dan identitas Taiwan serta langkah-langkahnya menjalankan gerakan rekonstruksi identitas dan budaya Taiwan sejak tahun 2000, menguatnya gagasan untuk menyelenggarakan referendum, strategi Taiwan untuk lepas dari ketergantungan ekonomi terhadap Cina, dan upaya peningkatan kapasitas pertahanan negara terhadap kekuatan militer Cina. Upaya-upaya ini mengindikasikan berbagai perlawanan terhadap *one China policy* yang terus menguat setelah terpilihnya Chen sebagai presiden untuk kedua kalinya pada tahun 2004.

³⁰ Masayuki Masuda, *Op. Cit.*, hal. 117.


III.2.1. Perubahan Perilaku Politik Taiwan sejak 1996: Analisis Opini Publik Taiwan atas Isu Kemerdekaan Taiwan dan Identitas Taiwan (Taiwanese Identity)

Pada tahun 1996, terdapat 3 isu utama yang membentuk opini publik di Taiwan:³¹

- Apakah Taiwan seharusnya benar-benar menjadi sebuah bangsa dan negara yang merdeka?
- Apakah Taiwan seharusnya bersatu dengan Cina?
- Apakah Taiwan seharusnya menjaga *status quo* (dengan tidak menaikkan tensi konflik dengan Cina melalui isu kemerdekaan maupun bersatu dengan Cina secara keseluruhan)?

Survei opini publik di Taiwan pada saat itu menunjukkan 53,5% memilih *status quo*, sedangkan sekitar 22% memilih pro-independen maupun unifikasi.³²

Secara sederhana, gambaran tersebut dapat dideskripsikan sebagai berikut:



³¹ John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, "Whither the Kuomintang?" dalam Dickson dan Chao, *Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy*, 111-29, dalam Cal Clark, *The Paradox of the National Identity Issue in Chen Shui-bian's 2004 Presidential Campaign: Base Constituencies vs. the Moderate Middle*, dalam *Issue and Studies* 41 no. 1, Maret 2005, hal.59.

³² *Ibid.*

Menurut Anthony Down, distribusi opini publik seperti yang tergambar diatas termasuk dalam tipe *Normal Moderate*, dimana distribusi opini bersifat normal dengan sebagian besar masyarakat berada di tengah spektrum ideologi.³³ Situasi ini berimplikasi terhadap kompetisi partai dimana suara *median voter* (masyarakat yang berada di tengah spektrum ideologi) akan cenderung diperebutkan, sehingga masing-masing partai yang bertarung tidak dapat mengambil posisi seekstrim mungkin dalam spektrum ideologi.³⁴ Hal inilah yang tergambar pada situasi politik pada pemilu Taiwan 1996, sehingga DPP maupun KMT tidak dapat mempertahankan ekstrimisme unifikasi maupun merdeka untuk memenangkan pemilu tahun 2000 berdasarkan opini publik yang tergambar dalam tabel berikut:

Tabel 3.1

Attitude in the 1990's toward Ultimate Goal for Cross-Strait Relations (%)

| | December 1992 | January 1995 | March 1996 | January 1999 | June 2000 |
|----------------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|
| Extreme independence | 6.2 | 6.6 | 9.1 | 12.9 | 6.2 |
| Moderate independence | 6.3 | 8.6 | 12.4 | 14.8 | 15.3 |
| Status quo | 30.6 | 51.1 | 53.5 | 43.5 | 46.0 |
| Moderate unification | 30.1 | 20.7 | 15.4 | 17.4 | 22.4 |
| Extreme unification | 26.9 | 12.9 | 9.7 | 11.4 | 10.1 |

Sumber: John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, "Whither the Kuomintang?" dalam Dickson dan Chao, "Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy", 111-29, dalam Cal Clark, "The Paradox of the National Identity Issue in Chen Shui-bian's 2004 Presidential Campaign: Base Constituencies vs. the Moderate Middle", dalam *Issue and*

³³ Anthony Downs, "An Economic Theory of Democracy", dalam Cal Clark, *Loc. Cit.*

³⁴ *Ibid.*

Studies 41 no. 1, Maret 2005, (Taipei: Institute of International Relations, 2005), hal.64.

Isu-isu *national identity* dan *cross-Strait relation* menjadi lebih moderat. Posisi partai DPP maupun KMT “bergerak ke tengah”. Perbedaan diantara kedua partai tersebut tidak lagi bersifat substansi.³⁵ Semakin menyempitnya jurang antara DPP dan KMT mengarah pada konsensus pada akhir 1990-an yaitu:

- Konsep identitas “*New Taiwanese*” yang lebih terbuka bagi penduduk asli Taiwan (islanders) maupun penduduk asli Cina yang menetap di Taiwan (mainlanders).
- Adanya konsensus antara tiga partai (DPP, KMT, dan NP) mengenai hubungan dengan Cina (*cross-Strait relation*) yang melihat Taiwan sebagai negara yang berdaulat dan memiliki tujuan ke depan untuk secara aktif menyempurnakan status internasional Taiwan dan bersikap kooperatif terhadap isu unifikasi.
- Memoderatkan isu *cross-Strait Relation* dan identitas nasional yang dibawa dalam kampanye pemilu presiden tahun 2000.

Pada akhir tahun 1990-an sampai awal tahun 2000, isu kemerdekaan Taiwan menjadi lebih moderat. Namun, pada tahun 2004, isu tersebut kembali diusung bersamaan dengan kampanye presiden. Chen Shui-bian mengkampanyekan: “Taiwan, yes! China, no!”, sangat berbeda dengan awal tahun 2000-an dimana isu kemerdekaan Taiwan menjadi jauh lebih moderat. Chen merubah strategi kampanyenya dimana *median voter* tidak lagi diperebutkan,

³⁵ Clark, *Asia Update*, 14-17, dalam *ibid.* hal. 108.

melainkan memperkuat basis DPP yang sudah ada.³⁶ Strategi ini diambil setelah Chen kalah dalam polling calon presiden pada musim gugur tahun 2003. Salah satu kampanye utamanya yaitu “2-28 Hand-in Hand” untuk mengenang “Tragedi 28 Februari 1947” dimana diperkirakan lebih dari 10.000 orang dibunuh pada masa pemerintahan militer Cina dibawah Chiang Kai-shek. Kampanye ini merupakan simbol perlawanan rakyat Taiwan (*islander*) terhadap dominasi Cina (*mainlander*). Kampanye ini terasa sangat simbolis dengan diselenggarakan tepat pada tanggal 28 Februari 2004 jam 02.28 siang.³⁷ Kampanye ini mampu mendongkrak popularitas Chen dan mengantarkannya menjadi pemenang pemilu presiden tahun 2004. Sikap negatif Cina yang terus menekan Taiwan pada masa-masa menjelang pemilu presiden menimbulkan frustrasi tersendiri bagi rakyat Taiwan akan ketidakjelasan status internasional Taiwan, sehingga *median voter* menjadi tergerak untuk mendukung gerakan “Taiwan, yes!”. Faktor yang juga berperan adalah gagalnya percobaan pembunuhan terhadap Chen Shui-bian dan Lu Hsiu-lien sehari sebelum pemilu dilaksanakan menaikkan simpati rakyat Taiwan terhadap Chen dan gerakan “Taiwan, yes!”.³⁸

Permasalahan yang kemudian dihadapi Chen adalah bagaimana mempertahankan dukungan publik terhadap kelompok pro-independen dan gagasan kemerdekaannya, karena demokrasi Taiwan masih rapuh dalam tiga area pokok: *civil society*, *core values of the society*, dan *state building*.³⁹ DPP perlu mengupayakan sebuah konsensus bersama, dan hal ini akan sangat sulit terwujud

³⁶ Cal Clark, *Op. Cit.*, hal 53-86.

³⁷ Yun-ping Chang, “Two Million Rally for Peace”, dalam *Taipei Times*, 29 Februari 2004, dalam *ibid.*

³⁸ Rigger, “Taiwan in 2003”, dalam Cal Clark, *Op. Cit.*

³⁹ Sheng Lijun, *Taiwan under President Chen Shui-bian, Op. Cit.*, hal. 61.

apabila kesadaran dan kepercayaan diri (*consciousness and confidence*) pada bangsanya sendiri belum kuat.⁴⁰ Untuk tujuan ini, *nation-building* harus diterapkan dengan membentuk identitas rakyat Taiwan yang sebenarnya, sebagaimana tercantum dalam poin ketiga “three acknowledgements” yang disusun dalam *Supra-Party Panel on Mainland Affairs* di Taipei pada November 2000.⁴¹

Any change to the current cross-strait situation should be approved by the people of Taiwan through democratic measures. People are the pillar of a nation and the purpose of a nation is to guarantee their security and benefits. Seeing the languages on both sides of the Strait are similar and the physical distance between the two is small, the people on both sides of the Strait should work to uphold and enhance this.

III. 2. 2. Gerakan Rekonstruksi Budaya dan Identitas Taiwan

Disamping pernyataan-pernyataan langsung di depan publik dalam usaha menggalang dukungan rakyat Taiwan dalam isu kemerdekaan, Chen juga menjalankan strategi rekonstruksi budaya dan identitas rakyat Taiwan sejak tahun 2000. Berbeda dengan Revolusi Kebudayaan yang diterapkan pada era Mao, rekonstruksi budaya yang dilakukan Chen lebih bersifat gradual serta bertujuan pada pembentukan identitas baru yang digerakkan oleh aksi kolektif rakyat Taiwan itu sendiri. Etnisitas dan budaya disini digunakan sebagai alat untuk indigenisasi “identitas Taiwan”, dimana identitas Taiwan sebagai sebuah negara (*state identity*) dengan sendirinya akan terbentuk setelah identitas Taiwan sebagai

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, hal. 56.

⁴¹ Lin Chieh-yu, “President’s Advisors Make Suggestion”, dalam *Taipei Times*, 27 November 2000, dalam *ibid.*, hal.55.

sebuah bangsa (*nation identity*) telah terbentuk.⁴² Permasalahan yang dihadapi adalah bagaimana membentuk karakter “kami” dalam seluruh lapisan rakyat Taiwan untuk membangun solidaritas dan kesadaran berbangsa di tengah nilai-nilai dasar Cina yang telah mengakar dan cenderung dominan. Bagaimana seseorang sebagai seorang “aku” bersedia secara sukarela menjadi “kami” dengan berpartisipasi dalam reformulasi identitas negara.

Chen mendefinisikan lawan politisnya (KMT) sebagai “antireformasi”, “kelompok konservatif”, “pembela rezim lama”, dan berbagai sebutan lainnya sebagai propaganda untuk partai politik yang tidak sejalan dengan gagasan kemerdekaan Taiwan.⁴³ Untuk memperlancar indigenisasi, Chen mendeklarasikan “Taiwan stands up” dimana dalam propagandanya selalu diwarnai dengan isu etnisitas yang membawa minoritas etnis Cina (*mainlanders*) sebagai pembawa “dosa asal”.⁴⁴ Hal ini secara tidak langsung membawa ingatan penduduk asli Taiwan (*islanders*) kepada berbagai penindasan yang dilakukan oleh Cina sepanjang Revolusi Budaya. Rekonstruksi budaya ini ditujukan untuk memutus rantai masa lalu dan membuka lembaran masyarakat baru, membentuk keyakinan rakyat asli Taiwan (*islanders*) dan merubah pandangan etnis Cina di Taiwan (*mainlanders*).

Pada tahun 2004 Chen juga meluncurkan wacana yang membawa dikotomi Cina vs Taiwan dengan mengedepankan *oceanic-orientation/ maritime*

⁴² Daniel C. Lynch, “Taiwan’s Self-conscious Nation-Building Project”, dalam *Asian Survey* vol.44, hal. 514.

⁴³ Wei-chin Lee, “Taiwan’s Cultural Reconstruction Movement: Identity Politics and Collective Action since 2000”, dalam *Issue and Studies* 41 no. 1 Maret 2005.

⁴⁴ Jennifer M. Wei, “Politeness and Politics: A Study of President Chen Shui-bian’s Rhetorical Strategies”, dalam *National Chengchi University Journal* no. 83 Desember 2001

state dibandingkan dengan pemikiran Cina yang bersifat *continental/ mainland state*.⁴⁵ Dengan kata lain Taiwan diasosiasikan dengan demokrasi dan Cina diasosiasikan dengan infleksibilitas (skeptis terhadap perubahan dan menolak demokrasi). Lebih frontal lagi, Chen bahkan merubah wacana “one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait” menjadi “two sides, three nations” dengan tiga negara (Taiwan, Cina, dan Mongolia) pada sisi Selat Taiwan yang berseberangan.⁴⁶

Gagasan “New Taiwanese” Chen membawa konsekuensi terhadap tendensi peminggiran *mainlanders*. Cina dan apapun yang berkaitan dengannya perlahan dihapuskan bersamaan dengan konsolidasi *Taiwanese Identity*.⁴⁷ Indigenisasi dilakukan dalam berbagai aspek sosial. Dalam jalur pendidikan, terbentuk beberapa kebijakan yang penitikberatannya terletak pada adopsi dialek asli Taiwan sebagai bahasa resmi negara dan bahasa yang digunakan sehari-hari bagi generasi mendatang. Adopsi dialek Taiwan dalam sistem pendidikan diharapkan dapat menumbuhkan loyalitas dan berperan sebagai simbol identitas individu yang menggunakannya. Dalam waktu yang bersamaan, dengan bahasa Mandarin sebagai bahasa hegemon di masa lalu, bahasa Taiwan merupakan batasan yang membedakan “kami” dan “mereka” dalam diskursus politik.⁴⁸ Lebih

⁴⁵ Wei-chin Lee, *Op. Cit.*

⁴⁶ “Chen Rejects Claim that Taiwan and China are Same Country”, dalam *China Post (Taipei)*, 22 Desember 2002, dalam *ibid.*

⁴⁷ Maukuei Chang, “Understanding Contending National Identities: Reading Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson from Taiwan”, dalam Wei-chin Lee, *ibid.*

⁴⁸ Jennifer M. Y. Wei, “Codeswitching in Campaigning Discourse: The Case of Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian”, dalam *Languages and Linguistics* 4 no. 1.

jauh lagi, ujian bahasa Taiwan juga disertakan dalam rekrutmen pegawai negeri tahun 2002 dan 2003.⁴⁹

Indigenisasi kemudian menyentuh usaha perubahan sejarah, teks-teks sejarah yang dinilai *China-centered* perlahan diubah. Taiwan harusnya menjadi subjek dalam sejarah nasionalnya sendiri, bukan sebagai bayang-bayang keagungan bangsa Cina atau sebagai korban arogansi Jepang, sebagaimana dinyatakan Daniel C. Lynch:⁵⁰

For the nationalists, then, the first and most fundamental task in the struggle is to cultivate a sense of Taiwanese subjectivity: the conviction that Taiwan is every bit as much a Subject in History as other nation-states are and enjoys the right to determine its own future autonomously, free of Chinese pressure.

Tokoh yang ditunjuk Chen dalam rangka merombak sejarah Taiwan adalah Chang Yen-hsien, seorang kurator di *National Museum of History*. Chang percaya bahwa generasi muda Taiwan harus diingatkan kembali akan kampanye *Sinicization* pada kurun waktu 1945-1952 dimana lebih dari satu juta rakyat Cina dimigrasikan ke Taiwan. Mereka mempropagandakan bahwa enam juta rakyat Taiwan telah diperbudak secara mental oleh Jepang, dan bahwa esensi rakyat Taiwan adalah seorang "Cina". Kondisi ini diperparah dengan doktrinasi prinsip-prinsip Sun Yat-sen dan spirit keagungan Cina oleh KMT melalui simbol dan slogan-slogan seperti: "Zhongshan", "Jianguo", "Minsheng", dan "Xinhai"⁵¹

⁴⁹ Lianhe Bao, "Examination Yuan Officials Questioned: Chinese Language Exams Unexpectedly Include Japanese Answer in Multiple Choices", dalam www.udn.com, dalam Wei-chin Lee, *Op. Cit.*

⁵⁰ Daniel C. Lynch, *Op. it.*, hal. 517.

⁵¹ "Zhongshan" adalah nama resmi Sun Yat-sen; "Jianguo" berarti "membangun negara"; "Minsheng" berarti "people's livelihood"; dan "Xinhai" adalah nama Cina untuk tahun 1911 untuk memperingati Revolusi Republik yang mengakhiri dinasti terakhir, Qing.

Pada tahun 2002, pemerintahan Chen bahkan merubah hari libur nasional “guangfujie”, sebagai peringatan kembalinya Taiwan ke tangan RRC dari Jepang, menjadi “zhongzhanri” (hari berakhirnya perang).⁵² Sebuah pamflet “Taiwan Decides 2004” diterbitkan menjelang pemilu presiden 2004 yang berisi konfirmasi bahwa Taiwan tidak pernah berada dibawah kedaulatan Cina. Dalam pandangan DPP, KMT mengambil pemerintahan Taiwan tanpa persetujuan dari rakyat Taiwan itu sendiri.

Untuk benar-benar membedakan “Taiwan” dengan “Cina”, pemerintahan Chen juga menghapus nama Cina di berbagai perusahaan, media, sampai kapal perang. Pada tahun 2003, suku kata “China” dihilangkan dari the *China Central Bank*, *China Printing Plan*, *China Central Trust*, dan *China Central Mint*.⁵³ *Republic of China Yearbook* diganti *Taiwan Yearbook* pada tahun 2003. Majalah bulanan yang diterbitkan kantor informasi pemerintah, *Free China Review*, diganti menjadi *Taiwan Review* pada tahun 2003.

Bagi banyak pengamat politik, kebijakan Chen tersebut bisa diartikan menantang Cina secara terang-terangan, dan bukan tidak mungkin nantinya akan membahayakan Taiwan sendiri terkait dengan *Anti-Secession Law* yang diterapkan Cina. “Five no’s” yang diterapkan Chen pada tahun 2000 dengan terang-terangan dilanggarnya sendiri. Namun, strategi ini justru berhasil meraih simpati rakyat Taiwan, terbukti dengan meningkatnya jumlah pemilih Chen dalam pemilu 2004 sebesar 10% dibandingkan tahun 2000.

⁵² “Guangfuri gai Zhngzhanri? (Changing the Retrocession Day to War-ending Day)”, 25 Oktober 2002, dalam *ettoday.com*, dalam Wei-chin Lee, *Op. Cit.*

⁵³ Shicjie Ribao, “English Names of Taiwan’s Agencies Completely de-Sinicized” dalam *ibid*

III. 2. 3. Referendum

Gagasan penyelenggaraan referendum sebenarnya telah tercatat dalam *the Constitution of the Republic of China*, tetapi hal ini belum pernah benar-benar terwujud. Namun, pada tahun 2003, isu ini terangkat karena dipicu ketidakjelasan status Taiwan sebagai sebuah negara yang membuatnya tidak memiliki keanggotaan di WHO sehingga menyulitkan Taiwan memberantas virus SARS yang telah tersebar luas.⁵⁴ Chen kemudian berniat menyelenggarakan referendum pada tahun 2004 dalam upayanya menjadikan Taiwan sebagai anggota WHO.

Berdasarkan polling yang diselenggarakan *the Pro-independence National Association of University Professors*, sekitar 60% dari responden berpendapat bahwa referendum merupakan instrumen yang tepat untuk memecahkan beberapa isu kontroversial.⁵⁵ Pihak oposisi yang dimotori KMT menyatakan bahwa gagasan diselenggarakannya referendum adalah bentuk ketidaksetiaan Chen pada “Five No’s” dan ketidakpeduliannya pada kemungkinan meningkatnya tensi di antara Cina dan Taiwan.

Dua kubu mengajukan rancangan *draft* referendum yang berbeda. Perbandingan dua *draft* yang diajukan tersebut adalah:⁵⁶

- Pada lingkup *eligibility*: KMT dan PFP secara spesifik tidak memasukkan pertanyaan berkaitan dengan kedaulatan nasional dan wilayah teritorial. Sedangkan DPP berusaha untuk memfokuskan pada perubahan apapun yang

⁵⁴ Shelley Rigger, “Taiwan in 2003: Plenty of Clouds, Few Silver Linings”, dalam *Asian Survey* vol. 44, hal. 182.

⁵⁵ Lianhe Xinwen Wang (United Daily News Online), Taipei, 5 Juli 2003, dalam Mily Ming dan Tzu Kao, “The Referendum Phenomenon in Taiwan: Solidification of Taiwan Consciousness?”, dalam *Asian Survey*, vol. 44, no.4, hal. 594.

⁵⁶ Mily Ming dan Tzu Kao, *ibid*, hal. 595. Tabel perbandingan kedua *draft* yang diajukan dapat dilihat di lampiran 3.

terjadi dalam hubungan Cina-Taiwan yang jelas berhubungan dengan usaha untuk memerdekakan diri.

- Versi KMT-PFP berusaha untuk mencegah agen pemerintah sebagai pelaksana referendum. Bagi DPP, sebuah undang-undang referendum yang melarang agen pemerintah untuk melaksanakan referendum bukanlah sebuah undang-undang referendum yang sebenarnya.
- Pada lingkup *threshold*: KMT-PFP meminta dibentuk *Referendum Supervisory Committee* (RSC) yang beranggotakan 21 orang, dimana proporsinya disesuaikan dengan proporsi representatif partai pada *Legislative Yuan*, untuk menguji *draft* referendum yang diajukan dan membuat peraturan bagi implementasi referendum setelah ditandatangani nanti.
- KMT-PFP menekankan bahwa waktu penyelenggaraan referendum tidak bertepatan dengan pemilihan umum nasional, baik pemilu presiden maupun legislatif. Hal ini ditekankan untuk menghindari penggunaan referendum sebagai instrumen Chen untuk kembali menduduki kursi presiden pada tahun 2004 mendatang.

Kedua kubu kemudian sepakat untuk melaksanakan pemungutan suara secara klausa demi klausa (*clause by clause*), karena negosiasi tidak berjalan lancar. Hal ini mengakibatkan *draft* KMT-PFP yang kemudian mendominasi versi akhir dari referendum karena DPP pada dasarnya telah kalah secara kuantitas di parlemen:

Tabel 3.2

Summary of the Referendum Law Passed on November 28, 2003

| | |
|------------------------|--|
| Eligible Topics | <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Law passed by the legislature 2. Proposed new laws 3. Controversies concerning major national policies 4. Constitutional amendments <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Excluded from referendums are issues involving national sovereignty, a new constitution, country appellation, flag, anthem, territory, budgets, taxation, investmen, salaries, and personal matters • The ad hoc Referendum Supervisory Committee has the final say in waht is put before voters • The president is entitled to initiate a referendum on national security issues when the country faces an external threat that could interfere with national sovereignty (the "defensive referendum") |
| Administration | The Executive Yuan ⁵⁷ is responsible for nationwide referendums, while local governments are to manage regional referendums |
| Initiative | The government is prohibited from proposing or commissioning a referendum except on statutory grounds stipulated in the Referendum Law (the right to call an advisory referendum was vetoed). The Legislative Yuan ⁵⁸ is able to initiate a referendum on topics that lawmakers feel should be referred to the people |
| Threshold | A successful referendum petition needs the signatures of 0.5% of the electorate joining in the latest presidential election (approximately 63,000 signatures) before it can be screened by the Referendum Supervisory Committee |
| Date | A referendum should take place within six months of the Central Election's Committee's announcement of a successful petition. Referendums can be held on the same date as national elections, including presidential elections |
| Punishment | Government officials violating the Referendum Law by proposing or commissioning a referendum would face legal punishment with sentences ranging from six months to three years' imprisonment and be required to reimburse any public expenditure incurred by the referendum |

Sumber: *Taipei Times*, 28 November 2003 dalam Mily Ming dan Tzu Kao, "The Referendum Phenomenon in Taiwan: Solidification of Taiwan Consciousness?", dalam *Asian Survey*, vol. 44, no.4, hal. 600.

⁵⁷ Badan eksekutif Taiwan

⁵⁸ Badan legislatif Taiwan

Meskipun isu kemerdekaan gagal dimasukkan dalam *draft* akhir referendum, hal ini mengindikasikan bahwa Chen dan DPP telah menggagas langkah-langkah perubahan yang bersifat legal formal, dan bukan tidak mungkin agenda diselenggarakannya referendum akan berlanjut pada agenda perubahan konstitusi. Satu hal yang dapat dilakukan Chen adalah dengan menyelenggarakan *defensive referendum*, yaitu referendum yang menjadi hak prerogatif presiden yang melegalkan presiden untuk berkonsultasi dengan warga negara pada saat negara menghadapi ancaman dari luar (*external threats*) yang dapat membawa perubahan pada kedaulatan nasional.⁵⁹ Dalam wawancara dengan *New York Times*, Chen menyatakan bahwa Taiwan menghadapi sebuah ancaman besar dengan diarahkannya 496 buah misil balistik ke Taiwan di sepanjang pantai, dengan jarak sekitar 600 km dari Taiwan.⁶⁰ *Defensive referendum* disini sangat menentukan nasib politik Chen karena, atas nama demokrasi langsung, dapat memberinya empat kekuatan yaitu redistribusi kekuasaan, relegitimisasi pemerintahannya, penguatan kembali kampanye presidennya, dan justifikasi hak atas *self-determination* dan/atau kemerdekaan.⁶¹

Pada tanggal 16 Januari 2004, Chen mengumumkan dua pertanyaan pokok referendum:⁶²

1. If China refuses to withdraw the missiles it has targeted at Taiwan and to openly renounce the use of force against us, would you agree that the government should acquire more advanced anti-missile weapons to strengthen Taiwan's self-defense capabilities?

⁵⁹ *Exchange*, vol. 73, Februari 2003, dalam Mily Ming dan Tzu Kao, *Op.Cit.*, hal. 601.

⁶⁰ "Republic of China GIO, President Chen's Interview by New York Times", dalam *ibid.*

⁶¹ Mily Ming dan Tzu Kao, *ibid.*, hal. 602.

⁶² Lin Chieh-yu, "Chen Announces Referendum Questions", dalam *Taipei Times*, 17 Januari 2004, dalam *ibid.*, hal. 603.

2. **Would you agree that our government should engage in negotiations with China about the establishment of a 'peace and stability' framework for cross-Strait interactions in order to build consensus and for the welfare of the peoples on both sides?**

Dalam Bahasa Inggris, kedua pertanyaan tersebut terlihat tidak tendensius. Namun, Andrew Nathan dari *Columbia University* menyatakan bahwa dua pertanyaan tersebut dinilai lebih provokatif dalam bahasa Cina (*original text*) dilihat dari dua hal:⁶³

1. Chen lebih memilih menggunakan kata "Taiwan", daripada nama resmi negara yaitu "Republic of China", sebagai entitas politik yang berdiri sendiri.
2. Chen lebih memilih menggunakan kata "Zhonggong" (*Chinese communist*) sebagai representasi RRC daripada kedua istilah lain yang biasa digunakan untuk menyebut RRC yaitu "Zhongguo" (*China*) atau "dalu" (*mainland*). Kata "gong" yang berarti "komunis" memiliki konotasi negatif di Taiwan.

Lebih jauh lagi, pertanyaan kedua dalam referendum tersebut dipahami sebagai *equal negotiation referendum* dengan penitikberatan pada status kedua belah pihak yang bernegosiasi adalah sama (*equal*) atau dengan kata lain negosiasi antardua negara yang berbeda (*country-to-country*).

Hasil yang dicapai ternyata tidak menggembirakan bagi Chen. Dalam referendum yang diselenggarakan bersamaan dengan pemilihan presiden ini, hanya sekitar 45% dari total populasi yang menggunakan hak pilihnya (*ballots*) sehingga hasil dari referendum ini dinyatakan tidak valid.⁶⁴

⁶³ Andrew J. Nathan, "Roundtable Discussion on Cross-Strait Tensions and the Taiwanese Presidential Election", dalam *ibid*

⁶⁴ Mily Ming dan Tzu Kao, *ibid*, hal. 610.

Tabel 3.3

Results of the Defensive Referendum

| Referendum Question | Eligible Voting Population | Participating Voters | Valid Ballots | | Invalid Ballots | Voting Rate | Result |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|---------------------|-----------------|-------------|-------------|
| | | | Agree | Disagree | | | |
| Strengthening national defense | 16.497.746 | 7.452.340 | 6.511.216 (91,80 %) | 581.413 (8,20 %) | 359.711 | 45,17 % | Void |
| Equal negotiation | 16.497.746 | 7.444.148 | 6.319.663 (92,05 %) | 545.911 (7,95 %) | 578.547 | 45,12 % | Void |

Sumber: *Central Election Commission, Taiwan, Republic of China*

Chen menyatakan bahwa hasil tersebut sangat dipengaruhi oleh tekanan Cina sepanjang pemilu presiden, sehingga rakyat Taiwan takut untuk berkata “ya”. Namun, bagi Chen dan DPP, jumlah partisipan referendum yang menggunakan hak pilihnya ini meningkat sekitar satu juta orang dari jumlah yang diperkirakan sebelumnya. *Platform* kampanye Chen yang berbunyi “Pick Up the Referendum Ballots Even If You Do Not Wish to Vote for A-Bian” jelas telah menguatkan basis konstituennya dan menarik perhatian beberapa elemen pendukung *pan-blue*⁶⁵.

Chen dan DPP membaca *surplus* dalam referendum tersebut sebagai sebuah indikator solidifikasi “kebangkitan Taiwan” (*Taiwan consciousness*). Pada bulan April 2004, sebuah artikel dalam majalah *Exchange* berargumen bahwa

⁶⁵ Koalisi KMT (Kuomintang) dengan PFP (People First Party)

esensi dari referendum tersebut adalah adanya intensi untuk memberi batasan yang terlihat jelas untuk memisahkan Taiwan dengan Cina (*mainland*).

Fakta menyatakan bahwa meskipun Chen gagal mencapai suara “ya” secara bulat pada referendum, ia tetap memenangkan pemilu presiden tahun 2004, sebuah *policy failure* ketiga bagi Cina. Referendum, yang dapat dikatakan sebagai formalisasi usaha pemisahan diri, dikhawatirkan akan mengarah pada usaha perubahan konstitusi. Terpilihnya Chen untuk kedua kalinya membuat Cina khawatir bahwa referendum yang sebenarnya akan benar-benar terjadi, dan hal inilah yang menjadi pemicu dikeluarkannya *Anti-Secession Law*.

Ancaman tersebut semakin nyata setelah Pidato Tahun Baru 2006 Chen yang menyatakan bahwa *National Unification Council* dan *Guidelines for National Unification* akan segera dihapus. Chen juga mengungkapkan keinginannya agar *draft* konstitusi baru akan segera terbentuk, yang nantinya akan disahkan melalui *popular referendum*. Hal ini mengindikasikan keinginan Chen untuk bergabung dengan PBB dibawah bendera Taiwan.⁶⁶ Pada peringatan “Tragedi 28 Februari” tahun 2006, Chen benar-benar mewujudkan rencananya dengan mengumumkan bahwa *National Unification Council* dan *Guidelines for National Unification* tidak lagi difungsikan sebagaimana mestinya.⁶⁷

Kekhawatiran Cina akan ancaman kemerdekaan Taiwan ini bukan hanya direspon dengan dikeluarkannya *Anti-Secession Law*. Hal ini diperkuat dengan dinyatakannya referendum tersebut sebagai usaha untuk melegalisasi

⁶⁶ Shu-ling Ko, “Scrap Unification Guidelines, Chen Says”, dalam *Taipei Times*, 30 Januari 2006, dalam Cal Clark, *The US Balancing Role in Cross-Strait Relations*, dalam *Issues and Studies*, vol. 42 no. 3, hal. 153.

⁶⁷ Tim Culp dan Edward Cody, “Taiwan Scraps Council on Unity with China”, dalam *Washington Post*, 28 Februari 2006, dalam Cal Clark, *ibid*.

kemerdekaan Taiwan secara *de jure* melalui reformasi konstitusional, yang kemudian dianggap sebagai ancaman serius terhadap integritas dan kedaulatan Cina, yang kemudian dituangkan dalam *White Paper of the Government: China's National Defense in 2006*:⁶⁸

By pursuing a radical policy for "Taiwan independence", the Taiwan authorities aim at creating "*de jure* Taiwan independence" through "constitutional reform", thus still posing a grave threat to China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as to peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits and in the Asia-Pacific Region as a whole.

III. 2. 4. Konsep Pertahanan "Offshore Engagement Strategy"

Ketika Lee Teng-hui berkuasa, strategi militer Taiwan terfokus pada "strong defence at home". Namun, sesaat sebelum digantikan oleh Chen, Lee menyatakan keinginannya untuk meningkatkan kapabilitas serang (*offensive*) Taiwan. Inisiatif ini kemudian diteruskan oleh Chen dengan diperkenalkannya konsep pertahanan "Offshore Engagement Strategy" dalam pidatonya di perayaan ulang tahun *The Army Academy* ke 76 pada bulan Juni 2006.⁶⁹ Strategi ini ditujukan sebagai *deterrence* atas kebijakan anti-pemisahan diri Cina:⁷⁰

In the face of opposition to the term 'offshore engagement', the military choose not to openly announce its adoption as a strategy but nevertheless put the concept into practice. The military prefers to use the term 'offensive capability', the substance of which is identical to Chen's conception of 'offshore engagement'. The new strategy abandons the old idea of 'fighting the enemy on the beaches'. It aims at 'winning a decisive battle outside Taiwan' and emphasizes having the necessary offensive capability to strike deep into the Chinese mainland as deterrence.

⁶⁸ *White Papers of The Government: China's National Defense in 2006*, lihat lampiran I.

⁶⁹ Sheng Lijun, *Taiwan under President Chen Shui-bian, Op. Cit.*, hal. 99.

⁷⁰ Brian Hsu, "One Year On: National Security-Military Quietly Putting Offshore Engagement Policy into Practice", dalam *Taipei Times*, 20 Mei 2001, dalam *ibid*.

Kebijakan ini ditempuh setelah Taiwan menyadari bahwa strategi *deterrence*-nya semakin lama semakin tidak efektif dibandingkan dengan Cina. Oleh karena itu, Taiwan berusaha mempersiapkan diri akan terjadinya perang asimetris melalui strategi ini.⁷¹ Untuk mencapai tujuan tersebut, Taiwan meningkatkan kapabilitas *pre-emptive attack* dengan mengupayakan pemenuhan kebutuhan atas persenjataan dengan jarak tembak yang lebih jauh serta memiliki daya hancur *massive* dan kapabilitas teknologi informasi. Sebagai implementasi strategi ini, Taiwan telah membuat sebuah program untuk meningkatkan kemampuan militernya dari *Indigenous Defence Fighter* (IDF) menjadi *Joint Counter-offensive Platform* (JCP) senilai tujuh trilyun dolar NT.⁷² Jangkauan daya serang udara yang diperluas memberi Taiwan kemampuan lebih untuk menyerang Cina. Taiwan telah membeli pesawat KC-135 sebagai kekuatan penyempurna F-16 yang telah ada, serta memperkenalkan proyek *Hsiang Sheng* yang berfungsi untuk merestorasi fungsi *refuelling* pesawat *Mirage 2000-5*. Taiwan telah membeli misil *Harpoon AGM-84A air-launched anti-ship missiles* dari AS yang dapat ditembakkan dari F-16 yang telah ada. Misil ini mampu menjangkau Cina dari jarak jauh dengan tingkat akurasi tinggi. Taiwan menempatkan pengembangan misil balistiknya sebagai prioritas utama program kapabilitas *deterrence*-nya terhadap Cina. Misil *Tien Kung-IIA air defence* telah disimplifikasi menjadi *Tien Chi*. Beberapa ahli menyatakan bahwa Taiwan telah

⁷¹ Sheng Lijun, *Op. Cit.*, hal.100.

⁷² Ching Chong, "Taiwan Ready for War Off Homefront", dalam *Straits Times (Singapore)*, 4 Agustus 2000, dalam *ibid*.

berhasil mengembangkan *medium-range missile* dengan radius 2.000 km, yang mampu meningkatkan kapabilitas *deterrence*-nya.⁷³

Militer Taiwan mengklaim bahwa peningkatan kapabilitas militernya semata-mata dilaksanakan sebagai alat tawar politik terhadap *mainland* Cina setelah reunifikasi.⁷⁴ Namun, pembelian persenjataan yang dilakukan Taiwan beberapa tahun sebelumnya tidak mengkhawatirkan Beijing seperti sekarang dimana angkatan bersenjata Taiwan dan AS makin terintegrasi, indikasi sebuah kesengajaan Taiwan menuju pemisahan permanen dari *mainland* Cina.⁷⁵

A de facto US-Taiwan military alliance is actually slowly taking shape, with the United States taking the initiative most of the time. The US military has volunteered to provide its Taiwan counterpart with technical assistance. A pattern of interoperability is being established between the two militaries. Both have begun to standardize military terms and rules used by the two sides as well as co-operation on combat simulation and strategic planning.

Data penjualan persenjataan AS, yang diumumkan pada bulan April 2001⁷⁶, menyebutkan dukungan peningkatan kapabilitas militer Taiwan, tetapi AS tidak memenuhi permintaan Taiwan atas *Arleigh Burke-class destroyers*, PAC-3, dan helikopter *Apache*, karena persenjataan tersebut tergolong persenjataan untuk menyerang (*offensive*), bukan untuk bertahan (*defensive*).⁷⁷ Namun, memasuki

⁷³ Brian Hsu, "Missile Developed to Face Up to China", dalam *Taipei Times*, 13 Maret 2001, dalam *Op. Cit.*, hal. 101.

⁷⁴ Diambil dari wawancara Menteri Pertahanan Taiwan, Tang Fci, dengan *Chung Kuo Shih Pao*, 3 Mei 2001, dalam *Op. Cit.*, hal. 103.

⁷⁵ Brian Hsu, "US Reluctantly Seeks Alliance with Taiwan", dalam *Taipei Times*, 12 April 2001, dalam Sheng Lijun, "China Responds", dalam *Op. Cit.*, hal. 104.

⁷⁶ Rincian penjualan persenjataan dapat dilihat di lampiran 4.

⁷⁷ Sheng Lijun, "China Responds", dalam *Op. Cit.*, hal. 102.

tahun 2005, kementerian Pertahanan Taiwan mengumumkan telah diadopsinya sistem PAC-3 sebagai langkah modernisasi pertahanan Taiwan.⁷⁸

Pada April 2001, Angkatan Laut AS mengirim delegasi ke Taiwan untuk memberi *wireless communication codes* yang memfasilitasi komunikasi di antara dua kekuatan militer. Kode tersebut memungkinkan pesawat tempur dan kapal perang milik Taiwan untuk berkomunikasi dengan militer AS kapan saja. Kode tersebut merupakan sinyal integrasi kekuatan militer kedua pihak tanpa adanya hubungan diplomatik.⁷⁹ Setelah tahun 2000, lebih dari seratus kunjungan dilaksanakan oleh petinggi militer AS ke Taiwan, hampir sepuluh kali lebih banyak dibanding tahun 1994. Ratusan personel militer Taiwan juga telah dilatih di AS pada tahun yang sama.⁸⁰ Kerjasama ini bahkan dilegalisasi dengan memberi Taiwan status "major non-NATO ally" (MNNA):⁸¹

The bill was passed in the House of Representatives in the late May as one of the amendments in the Foreign Relations Authorisation Act for FY 2002 and 2003. Few countries enjoy MNA status, and among them are Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, and South Korea. Privileges that such allies enjoy include priority delivery of excess US national defence articles and participation in joint research and development projects. In addition, countries designated as MNA members in 1995 could take part in national defence export-loan guarantee plans.

⁷⁸ International Institute for The Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2005-2006* (London: Routledge, 2006). hal. 259

⁷⁹ Brian Hsu, "Taiwan Gets US Military Communication Codes", dalam *Straits Times (Singapore)*, 11 April 2001, dalam Sheng Lijun, *Loc. Cit.*

⁸⁰ Nadia Tsao, "US Strikes a Balance with Taiwan Arms Sales", dalam *Taipei Times*, 7 November 2000, dalam Sheng Lijun, *Loc. Cit.*

⁸¹ "Taiwan may Get 'Ally Status'", dalam *Straits Times (Singapore)*, 5 Mei 2001, dalam Sheng Lijun, *Loc. Cit.*

Pembangkangan Taiwan ini membuat pemerintah Cina hampir kehilangan kesabaran. Pada Konferensi Beidaihe yang diselenggarakan tanggal 12 Agustus 2000, kecenderungan ini terlihat dari pernyataan berikut:⁸²

The Mainland proposes its latest guiding principles on Taiwan and decides to end the phase wherein the statements and actions of Taiwan's newly-elected president Chen Shui-bian will be closely monitored, and start the phase of waging a tit-for-tat struggle wherein goodwill intentions are exchanged with evil ones

Intensi mengerasnya postur kebijakan Cina terhadap Taiwan kemudian terlihat pada pola resiprokal dalam peningkatan kapabilitas militer Cina yang selengkapnya telah dijelaskan pada bab II. Dipesannya armada penghancur *Sovremenny* yang dipersenjatai misil SS-N-22 *Sunburn* dari Rusia merupakan reaksi akuisisi US *Patriot Advanced Capability* (PAC) dengan sistem 3 misil, untuk pertahanan terhadap *short-range ballistic missiles* dan *cruise missiles*, yang dilakukan Taiwan pada awal tahun 2001. Dipesannya armada penghancur *Sovremenny* kemudian direspon dengan dikirimkannya empat armada penghancur *Kidd-class* untuk angkatan laut Taiwan sebagai kekuatan penangkal.⁸³ Begitu pula setelah *Sovremenny*, Cina kembali memesan delapan SSK (kapal selam bertenaga diesel) *Kilo Type-36* dengan kapabilitas *anti-submarine warfare* dari Rusia sebagai respon dikirimnya delapan SSK (kapal selam patroli dengan kapabilitas *anti-submarine warfare*) dari AS kepada Taiwan.⁸⁴ Dikembangkannya persenjataan "smart system" *Shashoujian*, dilakukan menyusul laporan bahwa Taiwan telah melakukan uji tembak *Hsiung Feng cruise missile* pada musim semi

⁸² <http://english.www.gov.tw/e-Gov/index.jsp?catid=82&recordid=78446>, diakses tanggal 6 April 2007.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, hal.173.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

2005 dan diadopsinya sistem PAC-3 sebagai basis pertahanan misil masa depan Taiwan.⁸⁵ Pola ini juga terlihat pada meningkatnya jumlah SRBM, yang ditempatkan pada distrik militer Nanjing di seberang Selat Taiwan, secara drastis sesaat setelah Chen terpilih untuk kedua kalinya.

Meningkatnya intensi ketidakpatuhan Taiwan terhadap Cina dengan terus meningkatkan kapabilitas *deterrence* beserta integrasi kekuatan militernya dengan AS memunculkan sebuah gejala kemungkinan terjadinya *policy failure* yang keempat, dan bukan tidak mungkin akan menjadi *policy failure* yang terbesar yaitu kemerdekaan Taiwan. Gejala ini semakin terlihat setelah referendum tahun 2004 memenuhi prasyarat situasi dalam artikel 8 *Anti-Secession Law* dimana Cina dapat memberlakukan “non-peaceful means”, sebagaimana telah dijelaskan sebelumnya.

Hal ini diperkuat dengan ditetapkannya prinsip dan kondisi keamanan (security environment) yang ditetapkan dalam *White Paper of the Government: China's National Defense in 2006*:⁸⁶


However, China's security still faces challenges that must not be neglected..... The struggle to oppose and contain the separatist forces for "Taiwan independence" and their activities remains a hard one. By pursuing a radical policy for "Taiwan independence", the Taiwan authorities aim at creating "de jure Taiwan independence" through "constitutional reform", thus still posing a grave threat to China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as to peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits and in the Asia-Pacific Region as a whole. The US has reiterated many times that it will adhere to the "one China" policy and honor the three joint communiqués between China and the United States. But, it continues to sell advanced weapons to Taiwan, and has strengthened its military ties with Taiwan.

⁸⁵ International Institute for The Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2005-2006* (London: Routledge, 2006), hal. 259

⁸⁶ *White Papers of The Government: China's National Defense in 2006*, lihat lampiran 1.

Dari pernyataan tersebut sangat jelas terlihat bahwa prioritas modernisasi Cina terletak pada pencapaian keamanan dan kesatuan nasional. Hal ini diperkuat dengan dinyatakannya usaha pemisahan diri “Taiwan independence”, yang difasilitasi AS, sebagai tantangan terbesar terhadap keamanan nasional dan prinsip politik luar negerinya, *One China*.

Adanya peningkatan kapabilitas dengan melakukan modernisasi di sektor kelautan ditambah dengan terus meningkatnya jumlah *short-range ballistic missiles* tiap tahun, yang cenderung membentuk pola resiprokal, sejalan dengan tantangan terbesar terhadap keamanan nasional Cina sebagaimana telah disebutkan diatas.



BAB IV

SIMPULAN


Berdasar detail peningkatan kapabilitas militer yang telah dijelaskan pada bab II, terlihat bahwa peningkatan kapabilitas militer Cina selama kurun waktu 2000-2006 terfokus pada peningkatan *short-range ballistic missiles* baik dari segi kuantitas yang rata-rata bertambah 75 buah pertahun, maupun dari segi kualitas yaitu akurasinya. Diantara ketiga satuan dalam PLA (Angkatan Darat, Laut, dan Udara), modernisasi lebih difokuskan pada satuan angkatan laut. Modernisasi perlengkapan diprioritaskan pada peningkatan kapabilitas kapal selam dan pesawat amfibi yang lebih banyak ditempatkan di perairan sekitar Selat Taiwan. Peningkatan jumlah dan kapabilitas misil juga terkonsentrasi di kawasan ini.

Peningkatan kapabilitas militer yang ditandai dengan modernisasi persenjataan juga cenderung membentuk pola resiprokal terhadap modernisasi militer yang juga dilakukan Taiwan, seperti dipesannya *Sovremenny* sebagai reaksi akuisisi sistem pertahanan PAC₃ yang dilakukan Taiwan. Begitu pula dengan dipesannya delapan SSK delapan SSK (kapal selam bertenaga diesel) *Kilo Type-36* dengan kapabilitas *anti-submarine warfare* kembali dari Rusia sebagai respon dikirimnya delapan SSK (kapal selam patroli dengan kapabilitas *anti-submarine warfare*) dari AS kepada Taiwan.

Mengerasnya postur militer Cina tersebut jelas sangat ditentukan oleh perilaku Taiwan. Berawal dari diarahkannya 30-50 misil balistik segera setelah kedatangan Lee dari AS yang dianggap memalukan pemerintah Cina (1995-1996

Taiwan Strait Crisis), pola ini terus berulang setelah diperkuatnya pertahanan di Selat Taiwan sejak terpilihnya Chen pada tahun 2000 dan ditambahnya jumlah SRBM dari 50 buah pertahun menjadi 75 buah pertahun setelah Chen kembali terpilih menjadi presiden Taiwan pada tahun 2004.

Semakin membangkangnya Taiwan dengan usaha pemisahan diri yang meliputi sektor budaya, legal konstitusional, hingga integrasi kekuatan militer dengan AS semakin memperbesar kekhawatiran Cina akan kemungkinan Taiwan memerdekakan diri. Hal ini diperjelas dengan dinyatakan Taiwan sebagai tantangan keamanan Cina yang terberat saat ini dalam *White Paper of the Government: China's National Defense in 2006* dimana Cina telah mengalami tiga kali *policy failure*:



Policy failure pertama terjadi pada tahun 1995 pada saat Washington memberi *tourist visa* kepada Lee Teng-hui pada tahun 1995 yang dianggap sebagai kelalaian Jiang sebagai pemimpin dan hal ini dianggap memermalukan pemerintah Cina ketika itu sehingga dipakainya penyelesaian secara militer tidak dapat dihindari. *Policy failure* kedua terjadi pada tahun 2000 ketika Chen terpilih sebagai presiden yang menunjukkan bahwa KMT sudah tidak dapat dipercaya sepenuhnya sebagai instrumen penghambat gerakan kemerdekaan Taiwan. Terpilihnya Chen untuk kedua kalinya yang disertai dengan penyelenggaraan referendum merupakan *policy failure* ketiga dan mengindikasikan bahwa pendekatan yang lunak cenderung tidak membawa hasil yang memuaskan dan digunakannya opsi militerisasi patut dipertimbangkan sebagaimana dinyatakan dalam *Anti-Secession Law*.

Oleh karena itu dapat disimpulkan bahwa peningkatan kapabilitas militer Cina dalam kurun waktu 2000-2006 merupakan *deterrence* yang dilancarkan Cina untuk mempengaruhi perilaku Taiwan. Kebijakan ini diambil untuk mencegah terjadinya *policy failure* keempat atau bisa jadi yang terbesar, yaitu kemerdekaan Taiwan. Argumen ini lebih signifikan dibanding beberapa argumen lainnya berdasar pada prioritas peningkatan kapabilitas militer Cina dan analisa perubahan perilaku Taiwan yang telah dibahas sebelumnya.

DAFTAR PUSTAKA

BUKU DAN ARTIKEL DALAM BUKU

- Coplin, William D, *Pengantar Politik Internasional, Suatu Telaah Teoretis* (Bandung: Sinar Baru, 1992).
- Holsti, K. J., *Politik Internasional*, Jilid 1, (Jakarta: Erlangga, 1988).
- Keraf, Gorys, *Komposisi* (Ende: Nusa Indah, 1984).
- Lijun, Sheng, *China's Dilemma: Taiwan Issue* (Singapore: Stamford Press, 2001).
- Lijun, Sheng, *China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations under Chen Shui-bian* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002).
- Luhulima, James, *Cermin dari China: Geliat Sang Naga di Era Globalisasi* (Jakarta: Kompas Media Nusantara, 2006).
- Mas' oed, Mohtar, *Ilmu Hubungan Internasional: Disiplin dan Metodologi*, Edisi Revisi, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1990).
- Masuda, Masayuki, "China-Achievements and Challenges of 'Neighboring Diplomacy'", dalam The National Institute for Defense Studies, *East Asian Strategic Review 2006* (Tokyo: The Japan Times, 2006), hal. 79-114.
- Piano, Jack C. dan Olton, Roy, *Kamus Hubungan Internasional*, terj. Wawan Juanda, (Bandung: Putra Abardin, 1999).
- Ryosei, Kokubun dan Jisi, Wang, *The Rise of China and a Changing East Asian Order* (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2004).
- Singarimbun, Masri dan Effendi, Sofian, *Metode Penelitian Survei*, Edisi Revisi, (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1989).
- Singer, J. David, "Inter-Nation Influence: A Formal Model", dalam James N. Rosenau, *International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory* (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1969), hal. 380-394.
- Subagyo, P. Joko, *Metode Penelitian dalam Teori dan Praktek* (Jakarta: PT Rineka Cipta, 1997).
- Sutter, Robert G, *Politik Luar Negeri RRC* (Bandung: Abardin, 1991).

- The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2000-2001* (London: Routledge, 2001).
- The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2001-2002* (London: Routledge, 2002).
- The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2002-2003* (London: Routledge, 2003).
- The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2003-2004* (London: Routledge, 2004).
- The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2004-2005* (London: Routledge, 2005).
- The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2005-2006* (London: Routledge, 2006).
- The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance 2006* (London: Routledge, 2006).

JURNAL DAN TERBITAN BERKALA

- Bitzinger, Richard A., "Just the Facts, Ma'am: The Challenge of Analysing and Assessing Chinese Military Expenditure", dalam *the China Quarterly*, No. 173, Maret 2003, hal. 165-179.
- Clark, Cal, "The Paradox of the National Identity Issue in Chen Shui-bian's 2004 Presidential Campaign: Base Constituencies vs. the Moderate Middle", dalam *Issue and Studies*, Vol. 41, no.1, Maret 2005, hal. 53-86.
- Clark, Cal, "The US Balancing Role in Cross-Strait Relations", dalam *Issues and Studies*, Vol. 42, no. 3, 2006, hal. 129-164.
- Lee, Wei-chin, "Taiwan's Cultural Reconstruction Movement: Identity Politics and Collective Action since 2000", dalam *Issue and Studies*, Vol. 41, no. 1, Maret 2005, hal. 1-54.
- Lynch, Daniel C., "Taiwan's Self-conscious Nation-Building Project", dalam *Asian Survey*, Vol. 44, no.4, 2004, hal. 513-533.

- Manicom, James, "Near-term Instability in the Taiwan Strait? Nationalist Constituencies in the PRC and Cross-Strait Stability", dalam *Security Challenges*, Vol. 3, no.1, 2007, hal. 65-77.
- Ming, Mily dan Kao, Tzu, "The Referendum Phenomenon in Taiwan: Solidification of Taiwan Consciousness?", dalam *Asian Survey*, Vol. 44, no. 4, 2004, hal. 591-613.
- Rigger, Shelley, "Taiwan in 2003: Plenty of Clouds, Few Silver Linings", dalam *Asian Survey*, Vol. 44, no. 1, 2004, hal. 182-187.
- Taylor, Nicholas, "China as a Status Quo or Revisionist Power? Implications for Australia", dalam *Security Challenges*, Vol. 3, no.1, 2007, hal. 29-46.
- Wei, Jennifer M., "Politeness and Politics: A Study of President Chen Shui-bian's Rhetorical Strategies", dalam *National Chengchi University Journal*, No. 83, Desember 2001, hal. 46-69.
- Wei, Jennifer M. Y., "Codeswitching in Campaigning Discourse: The Case of Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian", dalam *Languages and Linguistics*, Vol. 4, no.1, hal. 87-107.
- Wu, Yu-Shan, "Taiwan's Domestic Politics and Cross-Strait Relations", dalam *The China Journal*, No.53, Januari 2005, hal. 35-59.

SURAT KABAR DAN ARTIKEL DALAM SURAT KABAR

- "AS Ingatkan China: Beijing Jangan Jadi 'Kekuatan Negatif' Kawasan", *Kompas*, 12 Maret 2005.
- "AS Prihatinkan Anggaran Militer Cina", *Media Indonesia*, 7 Maret 2007.
- "China Tambah Anggaran Militer", *Kompas*, 5 Maret 2007.
- "China's Armed Forces: Casus Belli," dalam *the Economist*, 11 Juni 2005, hal. 26.
- Ratna, Myrna, "Menuju Kekuatan Adidaya", *Kompas*, 6 Maret 2007.
- Susilo, I. Basis, "Strategi AS Mengepung China", *Jawa Pos*, 15 Maret 2006.

INTERNET

“China's Defense Budget”, dalam www.globalsecurity.org, diakses tanggal 20 Januari 2006

“China National Defense White Book 2004”, dalam <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=2&did=1045032531&SrchMode=1&sid=2&Fmt=4&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1178266544&clientId=72459.htm>, diakses tanggal 4 Mei 2007.

Cody, Edward, “China Builds a Smaller, Stronger Military”, dalam http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A45056-2005Apr11_2.html

Diakses tanggal 4 Mei 2007

<http://english.www.gov.tw/e-Gov/index.jsp?categid=82&recordid=78446>, diakses tanggal 6 April 2007.

Kamennov, Pavel , “China's Military Policy: Where Taiwan Fits In”, dalam <http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb+index=2&did=1045032531&SrchMode=1&sid=2&Fmt=4&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1178266544&clientId=72459>, diakses tanggal 4 Mei 2007.

“Recent Trends in Military Expenditures,” dalam http://www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_trends.html, tanggal 17 November 2006

LAMPIRAN I

China's National Defense in 2006

Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China

December 2006, Beijing

Preface

To uphold world peace, promote common development and seek cooperation and win-win is the common wish of the people around the world and an irresistible trend of our times. Committed to peace, development and cooperation, China pursues a road of peaceful development, and endeavors to build, together with other countries, a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity.

Never before has China been so closely bound up with the rest of the world as it is today. The Chinese government works to advance both the fundamental interests of the Chinese people and the common interests of the peoples of the rest of the world, and pursues a defense policy which is purely defensive in nature. China's national defense, in keeping with and contributing to the country's development and security strategies, aims at maintaining national security and unity, and ensuring the realization of the goal of building a moderately prosperous society in an all-round way. China is determined to remain a staunch force for global peace, security and stability.

China's national defense and military modernization, conducted on the basis of steady economic development, is the requirement of keeping up with new trends in the global revolution and development in military affairs, and of maintaining China's national security and development. China will not engage in any arms race or pose a military threat to any other country. At the new stage in the new century, we will take the scientific development outlook as an important guiding principle for the building of national defense and military affairs, vigorously advance the revolution in military affairs with Chinese features, and strive to realize an all-round, coordinated and sustainable development in our country's national defense and military capabilities.

I. The Security Environment

Peace and development remain the principal themes in today's world, and the overall international security environment remains stable. But, uncertainties and destabilizing factors are on the increase, and new challenges and threats are continuously emerging.

World peace and security face more opportunities than challenges. The world is at a critical stage, moving toward multi-polarity. Progress is expected in addressing the serious imbalances in the international strategic alignment. The major international forces compete with and hold each other in check. But, they also maintain coordination and practical cooperation in their mutual relationships, and draw on each other's strengths. Some major developing countries and regional groupings have grown in power, and the developing world as a whole is becoming stronger. Economic globalization accelerates and science and technology make rapid progress; there are profound changes in the international division of labor, global and regional economic cooperation is being vigorously promoted, leading to increasing interdependence among countries. More dialogues are being conducted on traditional security issues, and cooperation in non-traditional security is developing in depth. To address development and security issues through coordination, cooperation and multilateral mechanism is the preferred approach of the international community. The United Nations' status and role in world affairs are being upheld and strengthened. World wars or all-out confrontation between major countries are avoidable for the foreseeable future.

The international community is increasingly facing comprehensive, diverse and complex security threats. The world is not yet peaceful. Political, economic and security problems and geographical, ethnic and religious contradictions are interconnected and complex. Hegemonism and power politics remain key factors undermining international security. Non-traditional security threats present greater danger, and local turmoil

caused by war is on and off, and some hotspots cannot be removed in a short time. The impact of economic globalization is spreading into the political, security and social fields. Global economic development is uneven, and the gap between the North and the South is widening. Security issues related to energy, resources, finance, information and international shipping routes are mounting. International terrorist forces remain active, shocking terrorist acts keep occurring. Natural disasters, serious communicable diseases, environmental degradation, international crime and other transnational problems are becoming more damaging in nature.

A revolution in military affairs is developing in depth worldwide. Military competition based on informationization is intensifying. There has not been major change in the imbalances in relative military strength. Some developed countries have increased their input into the military and speeded up R&D of high-tech weaponry to gain military superiority. Many developing countries are also upgrading their armaments and modernizing their military forces. The situation regarding the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remains grave and complex. The international non-proliferation regime faces major challenges. The practice of a small number of countries that have intensified their military alliances and resorted to force or threats of force in international affairs has shown new developments, which hinder efforts to improve international security.

The overall security environment in the Asia-Pacific region remains stable. The regional economy maintains an unprecedented strong momentum of growth, and a framework of open and mutually beneficial cooperation based on equality and in diversified forms is taking shape in the region. Multilateral security dialogue and cooperation are being enhanced. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has entered a new stage of substantive growth, contributing to the establishment of a new mode of state-to-state relations. ASEAN has made steady progress in community-building and in talks on establishing free trade areas with other countries. East Asian cooperation, which is conducted mainly through the ASEAN plus China, Japan and the ROK (10+3) channel, has expanded in scope and its institutional building is improving constantly, continuing to play a major role in promoting peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. The East Asia Summit has provided a new platform for East Asian cooperation. Moreover, significant progress has been made in South Asian regional cooperation. There is improvement in the relations between India and Pakistan.

There are growing complexities in the Asia-Pacific security environment. There is a new adjustment going on in the strategic alignment and relations among major countries in the region, and new changes have occurred in the hotspots in the region. The United States is accelerating its realignment of military deployment to enhance its military capability in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States and Japan are strengthening their military alliance in pursuit of operational integration. Japan seeks to revise its constitution and exercise collective self-defense. Its military posture is becoming more external-oriented. The DPRK has launched missile tests and conducted a nuclear test. Thus, the situation on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia has become more complex and challenging. Iraq and Afghanistan continue to face turbulence. The Middle East has become more volatile. A settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue is not yet in sight. Territorial disputes, conflicting claims over maritime rights and interests, and ethnic and religious discords undermine trust and cooperation among states. The threat of terrorism, separatism and extremism remains serious. In addition, some countries face growing internal problems caused by social and economic transition.

China's overall security environment remains sound. China is committed to building a moderately prosperous society in an all-round way and a socialist harmonious society, and it enjoys steady economic growth, political stability, ethnic harmony and social progress. Its overall national strength has considerably increased, as has its international standing and influence. China's practical cooperation with major countries continues to grow, its friendly relations with its neighboring countries have developed steadily, and it is forging strong ties with other developing countries. This has given rise to a new relationship of mutual benefit and win-win between China and other countries. The Chinese government has taken a number of significant measures to improve relations across the Taiwan Straits, thus promoting cross-Straits relations toward peace and stability.

However, China's security still faces challenges that must not be neglected. The growing interconnections between domestic and international factors and interconnected traditional and non-traditional factors have made maintaining national security a more challenging task. The struggle to oppose and contain the separatist forces for "Taiwan independence" and their activities remains a hard one. By pursuing a radical policy for "Taiwan independence," the Taiwan authorities aim at creating "de jure Taiwan independence" through "constitutional reform," thus still posing a grave threat to China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as to peace and stability across the Taiwan Straits and in the Asia-Pacific region as a whole. The United States has reiterated many times that it will adhere to the "one China" policy and honor the three joint communiqués between China and the United States. But, it continues to sell advanced weapons to Taiwan, and has strengthened its military ties with Taiwan. A small number of countries have stirred up a racket about a "China threat," and intensified their preventive strategy against China and strove to hold its progress in check. Complex and sensitive historical and current issues in China's surrounding areas still affect its security environment.

China persists in continuing its peaceful development road. Balancing developments in both domestic and international situations, it is well prepared to respond to complexities in the international security environment. Guided by a security strategy of promoting both development and security, China strives to build a socialist harmonious society at home and a harmonious world to ensure both its overall national security and enduring peace in the world. It endeavors to enhance both development and security, both internal security and external security and both traditional security and non-traditional security; works to uphold its sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity and promote national development; and strives to sustain the important period of strategic opportunity for national development. China is committed to fostering a cooperative relationship of mutual benefit and win-win with other countries and working with them to promote common security.

II. National Defense Policy

China pursues a national defense policy which is purely defensive in nature. China's national defense provides the guarantee for maintaining China's security and unity, and realizing the goal of building a moderately prosperous society in an all-round way. To build a powerful and fortified national defense is a strategic task of China's modernization drive.

China pursues a three-step development strategy in modernizing its national defense and armed forces, in accordance with the state's overall plan to realize modernization. The first step is to lay a solid foundation by 2010, the second is to make major progress around 2020, and the third is to basically reach the strategic goal of building informationized armed forces and being capable of winning informationized wars by the mid-21st century.

China's national defense policy for the new stage in the new century is defined as follows:

▪ Upholding national security and unity, and ensure the interests of national development. This includes guarding against and resisting aggression, defending against violation of China's territorial sea and air space, and borders; opposing and containing the separatist forces for "Taiwan independence" and their activities, taking precautions against and cracking down on terrorism, separatism and extremism in all forms. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is dedicated to performing its historical missions for the new stage in the new century, namely, providing an important source of strength for consolidating the ruling position of the Communist Party of China (CPC), providing a solid security guarantee for sustaining the important period of strategic opportunity for national development, providing a strong strategic support for safeguarding national interests, and playing a major role in maintaining world peace and promoting common development. It improves its capabilities of countering various security threats, accomplishes diversified military tasks, and ensures that it can effectively respond to crises, maintain peace, deter and win wars under complex circumstances.

▪ Achieving the all-round, coordinated and sustainable development of China's national defense and armed forces. China pursues a policy of coordinated development of national defense and economy. It keeps the modernization of China's national defense and armed forces as an integral part of its social and economic development, so as to ensure that the modernization of its national defense and armed forces advance in step with the national modernization drive. China works in a comprehensive way to ensure that its armed forces are revolutionary in nature, modernized and regularized. It strives to ensure coordination between the revolution in military affairs with Chinese features and preparations for military struggle, mechanization and informationization, combat force building of services and arms, current and long-term development, and efforts devoted to the main and secondary strategic directions. China works to deepen the adjustment and reform of its military organizations and structures, as well as policies and systems, address deep-seated impediments and problems in its military structures and mechanisms which hinder the development of its armed forces, boost innovation in its military organizational structure and military management, and improve efficiency in its military modernization drive.

▪ Enhancing the performance of the armed forces with informationization as the major measuring criterion. The PLA, taking mechanization as the foundation and informationization as the driving force, promotes the composite development of informationization and mechanization to achieve overall capability improvement in the fields of firepower, assault, mobility, protection and information. The PLA pursues a strategy of strengthening itself by means of science and technology, and works to accelerate change in the generating mode of war fighting capabilities by drawing on scientific and technological advances. The PLA seeks to raise its capabilities of independent innovation in weaponry and equipment, as well as defense-related science and technology, and strives to make major breakthroughs in some basic, pioneering and technological fields of strategic importance. It is stepping up its efforts to build a joint operational command system, training system and support system for fighting informationized wars and enhance the building of systems integration of

services and arms. The PLA is carrying out a strategic project for training a large contingent of new-type and high-caliber military personnel suited to the task of informationization of the armed forces and competent for operational tasks under conditions of informationization. The PLA is also working to make its training more technology-intensive and innovative in training programs, means and methods.

▪ Implementing the military strategy of active defense. The PLA ensures that it is well prepared for military struggle, with winning local wars under conditions of informationization and enhancing national sovereignty, security, and interests of development as its objective. It will upgrade and develop the strategic concept of people's war, and work for close coordination between military struggle and political, economic, diplomatic, cultural and legal endeavors, uses strategies and tactics in a comprehensive way, and takes the initiative to prevent and defuse crises and deter conflicts and wars. The PLA will establish step by step a modern national defense mobilization system that is centralized and unified, well structured, rapid in reaction, and authoritative and efficient. Taking joint operations as the basic form, the PLA aims to bring the operational strengths of different services and arms into full play. The Army aims at moving from regional defense to trans-regional mobility, and improving its capabilities in air-ground integrated operations, long-distance maneuvers, rapid assaults and special operations. The Navy aims at gradual extension of the strategic depth for offshore defensive operations and enhancing its capabilities in integrated maritime operations and nuclear counterattacks. The Air Force aims at speeding up its transition from territorial air defense to both offensive and defensive operations, and increasing its capabilities in the areas of air strike, air and missile defense, early warning and reconnaissance, and strategic projection. The Second Artillery Force aims at progressively improving its force structure of having both nuclear and conventional missiles, and raising its capabilities in strategic deterrence and conventional strike under conditions of informationization.

▪ Pursuing a self-defensive nuclear strategy. China's nuclear strategy is subject to the state's nuclear policy and military strategy. Its fundamental goal is to deter other countries from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against China. China remains firmly committed to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. It unconditionally undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and stands for the comprehensive prohibition and complete elimination of nuclear weapons. China upholds the principles of counterattack in self-defense and limited development of nuclear weapons, and aims at building a lean and effective nuclear force capable of meeting national security needs. It endeavors to ensure the security and reliability of its nuclear weapons and maintains a credible nuclear deterrent force. China's nuclear force is under the direct command of the Central Military Commission (CMC). China exercises great restraint in developing its nuclear force. It has never entered into and will never enter into a nuclear arms race with any other country.

▪ Fostering a security environment conducive to China's peaceful development. China maintains military contacts with other countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and develops cooperative military relations that are non-aligned, non-confrontational and not directed against any third party. China takes part in international security cooperation, strengthens strategic coordination and consultation with major powers and neighboring countries, and conducts bilateral or multilateral joint military exercises. It promotes the establishment of just and effective collective security mechanisms and military confidence-building mechanisms, and works with other countries to prevent conflicts and wars. China stands for effective disarmament and arms control that are just, reasonable, comprehensive and balanced in nature. China opposes nuclear proliferation, and endeavors to advance the process of international nuclear disarmament. China observes the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, honors its international obligations, and participates in UN peacekeeping operations, international counter-terrorism cooperation and international disaster relief operations. It plays an active part in maintaining global and regional peace and stability.

III. China's Leadership and Administration System for National Defense

China has established and keeps improving a leadership and administration system for national defense in accordance with the Constitution, the National Defense Law and other relevant laws. The state exercises unified leadership over national defense activities. China's armed forces are under the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC). The Central Military Commission (CMC) of the CPC and that of the People's Republic of China (PRC) are completely the same in their composition and in their function of exercising leadership over the armed forces. The CMC chairman has overall responsibility for its work.

The National People's Congress (NPC) elects the chairman of the CMC of the PRC and, upon nomination by the chairman, decides on the choice of all other members of the CMC. The NPC decides on war and peace and exercises other functions and powers relating to national defense as prescribed by the Constitution. When the NPC is in recess, its Standing Committee decides on the proclamation of a state of war, decides on the general or partial mobilization of the country, and exercises other functions and powers relating to national defense as prescribed by the Constitution. The president of the PRC, in pursuance of the decisions of the NPC

and its Standing Committee, may proclaim a state of war, issue mobilization orders, and exercise other functions and powers relating to national defense as prescribed by the Constitution.

The State Council directs and administers national defense building in the following areas: making national defense development programs and plans, formulating principles, policies and administrative regulations for defense building, administering defense expenditure and assets, directing and administering national defense scientific research and production, directing and administering work related to mobilization of the national economy, mobilization of people's armed forces, people's air defense and national defense traffic, directing and administering the work of supporting the military and giving preferential treatment to families of servicemen and martyrs, as well as the resettlement of servicemen discharged from active service. It also directs national defense education and, jointly with the CMC, the building of the Chinese People's Armed Police Force (PAPF) and the militia, the work concerning enlistment and reserve service, and the administration of border, coastal and air defenses, and exercises other functions and powers relating to national defense building as prescribed by law. Under the State Council are the Ministry of National Defense (MND) and other departments concerning national defense building.

The CMC directs and exercises unified command of China's armed forces. It has the following functions and powers: deciding on the military strategy and operational guidelines of the armed forces, directing and administering the building of the PLA, submitting proposals related to national defense to the NPC or its Standing Committee, formulating military regulations, issuing decisions and orders, deciding on the structure and organization of the PLA, appointing and removing, training, evaluating, and rewarding and punishing members of the armed forces, approving systems and development programs and plans for weaponry and equipment, and exercising other functions and powers as prescribed by law.

The PLA's General Staff Headquarters, General Political Department, General Logistics Department and General Armaments Department are departments of the CMC respectively responsible for military, political, logistical and equipment work. The General Staff Headquarters organizes and directs the development of China's armed forces, and organizes and commands their military operations. Under it are departments in charge of operations, intelligence, communications, military training and arms, adjutant and force structure, mobilization, electronic countermeasures, Army aviation, foreign affairs, etc. Its main functions and powers are to put forward proposals on major issues of military building and operations, organize and exercise strategic command, formulate programs, rules and regulations for military work, and organize and direct war preparations, as well as military training and mobilization. The General Political Department administers the armed forces' Party work, and organizes their political work. Under it are departments in charge of Party affairs, personnel, publicity, security, discipline inspection, civil-military affairs, etc. Its main responsibilities are to ensure the armed forces' compliance with and implementation of the lines, principles and policies of the Party and the Constitution and laws of the state, draw up general and specific policies for political work, formulate rules and regulations for political work, and make arrangements for, supervise and provide guidance to the political work of the armed forces. The General Logistics Department administers the logistical work of the armed forces. Under it are departments in charge of financial matters, quartermaster materials and petroleum, oils and lubricants, health administration, military transportation, capital construction and barracks, auditing, etc. Its main responsibilities are to formulate programs, rules and regulations for logistical construction, deploy logistical forces, organize logistical mobilization and provide logistical support, carry out the application, allocation, budgeting and final accounting of military expenditure, and conduct material procurement. The General Armaments Department administers the provision of equipment for the armed forces. Under it are departments in charge of overall planning, equipment for all services and arms, procurement for Army's military equipment R&D, general-purpose equipment support, electronic information infrastructure, etc. Its main responsibilities are to formulate strategies, programs and plans, policies, and rules and regulations for equipment development, organize equipment R&D, experimentation, procurement, combat service, maintenance and support, and administer the PLA's funds for equipment buildup.

The Army has no independent leading body, and the leadership of it is exercised by the four general headquarters/departments. A military area command exercises direct leadership over the Army units under it. The Army has 18 combined corps, which are mobile combat troops. The Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force, each of which has a leading body consisting of the headquarters, the political department, the logistics department and the armaments department, direct the military, political, logistical and equipment work of their respective troops, and take part in the command of joint operations. The Navy organizes and commands maritime operations conducted independently by its troops or in support of maritime operations. There are three fleets under the Navy, namely, the Beihai Fleet, Donghai Fleet and Nanhai Fleet. Each fleet has flotillas, aviation divisions, etc. under its command. The Air Force organizes and commands air operations conducted independently by itself or with Air Force personnel as the main fighting force, as well as air defense operations in the capital area. It has an air command in each of the seven military area commands of Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Chengdu, respectively. Under an air command are aviation

divisions, ground-to-air missile divisions (brigades and regiments), antiaircraft artillery brigades (regiments), radar brigades (regiments) and other support troops. In major directions and key target areas there are also corps- or division-level command posts. The Second Artillery Force organizes and commands its own troops in case of launching nuclear counterattacks with strategic missiles and conducting operations with conventional missiles. Under it are missile and training bases, and relevant support troops.

Military area commands (theaters of war) are military organizations set up according to the administrative divisions of the state, geographical locations, strategic and operational directions, and operational tasks. They are CMC-appointed organs for commanding joint theater operations. They direct the military, political, logistical and equipment work of the troops under them. Under a military area command are the headquarters, the political department, the joint logistics department and the armaments department. A military area command is mainly in charge of formulating programs and plans for combat readiness and operations of troops in the theater and for the reserve force buildup of the theater, organizing and commanding joint theater operations involving different services and arms, and providing joint theater support. At present, the PLA has seven military area commands, namely, Shenyang, Beijing, Lanzhou, Jinan, Nanjing, Guangzhou and Chengdu. Under a military area command are combined Army corps, units of various Army arms, logistical support units and provincial military commands (garrison commands at the same level).

Provincial military commands (garrison commands at the same level) are organizations set up by the PLA in province-level administrative areas, and are under military area commands. They also serve as departments of Party committees for military work and organs of government for military service at the level of province (autonomous prefecture, directly under the central government, or autonomous region). So, they are under the dual leadership of the military area commands and local Party committees and governments at the same level. The leading body of a provincial military command consists of the headquarters, the political department and the logistics department. A provincial military command directs the military, political, logistical and equipment work of the units under it, and oversees reserve force building, peacetime enlistment and wartime strength mobilization in its area of responsibility.

Prefectural military commands (garrison commands at the same level) are organizations set up by the PLA in prefectures (prefecture-level cities, autonomous prefectures or leagues). They are under provincial military commands, but also serve as departments of Party committees for military work and organs of government for military service at the level of the prefecture (prefecture-level city, autonomous prefecture or league). So, they are under the dual leadership of the provincial military commands and local Party committees and governments at the same level. The leading body of a prefectural military command consists of the headquarters, the political department and the logistics department. The main tasks of a prefectural military command are to oversee the military training, political work and equipment management of the militia and reserve force, organize and conduct wartime mobilization, and undertake military service registration and enlistment. Prefectural military commands in border areas are also in charge of the military, political, logistical and equipment work of border defense troops as well as border defense duties, talks and meetings, and border management, protection and control.

People's armed forces departments are organizations set up by the PLA in counties (banners, county-level cities, district-level cities, etc.). They are under prefectural military commands, but also serve as departments of Party committees for military work and organs of government for military service work at the level of the county (autonomous county, directly under the central government). So, they are under the dual leadership of the prefectural military commands and local Party committees and governments at the same level. A people's armed forces department consists typically of a military affairs section, a political work section and a logistics section. Its main tasks are to oversee reserve force buildup, combat readiness, military service and mobilization, and command militia operations. The grass-roots people's armed forces departments established by the state at the level of township (town) or sub-district are non-active-duty organizations. They are manned by full-time staff that are under the dual leadership of the local Party committees and governments at the same level and military organs at higher levels.

In addition, local people's congresses at all levels and the standing committees of local people's congresses at and above the county level ensure the compliance with and implementation of the national defense law and national defense in their respective administrative areas. Local people's governments at all levels, within the authority they enjoy as prescribed by law, are responsible for national defense education, mobilization of the economy, civil air defense, national defense traffic, protection of defense installations, resettlement of servicemen discharged from active service, supporting the PLA and giving preferential treatment to families of servicemen and martyrs and other related matters in their respective administrative areas. Local people's governments at various levels and the military organs stationed there hold joint civil-military meetings as called for to handle matters concerning national defense in their respective administrative areas.

IV. The People's Liberation Army

To effectively fulfill its historic mission in the new stage of the new century, the PLA is speeding up the revolution in military affairs with Chinese features and enhancing in an all-round way its capabilities of defensive operations under conditions of informationization.

Completing the Reduction of 200,000 Troops

In 1985, 1997 and 2003, China announced that it would cut the size of the PLA by one million, 500,000 and 200,000 persons, respectively. By the end of 2005, China had completed reducing the PLA by 200,000 troops, and the PLA currently has 2.3 million troops. The PLA has made new progress towards the goal of being proper in size, optimal in structure, streamlined in organization, swift and flexible in command, and powerful in fighting capacity.

Downsizing the PLA. The Army was the focus of force reduction, and its authorized number of personnel has been reduced by more than 130,000. Over 60,000 military personnel have been removed from the headquarters and directly affiliated units of military area commands and provincial military commands. Through restructuring, the proportion of the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force in the PLA has been raised by 3.8 percent while that of the Army has been lowered by 1.5 percent.

Streamlining the headquarters and directly affiliated units as well as educational institutions. More than 3,000 departments of and over 400 units directly affiliated to the headquarters at and above the regimental level have been cut. A considerable number of agricultural and sideline production units, cultural and sports units, military representative offices at railway stations and material supply organs have been closed. The PLA has also closed 15 educational institutions and 31 training organizations.

Improving the structure of services and arms. The Army has cut a number of combined corps, divisions and regiments, increased the number of combined corps whose order of battle is corps, brigade and battalion, and set up units with new and high-tech weaponry and equipment. The Navy and Air Force have cut some ship groups and aviation divisions, regiments and stations, and set up some high-tech surface ship, aviation and ground-to-air missile units. A number of reserve infantry divisions have been dismantled, but the number of divisions (brigades) of other arms has increased.

Reforming the leadership and command system. The leadership and command system of the general headquarters/departments has been enhanced through adjusting the functions of relevant departments and improving joint operational command. The Navy has cut the naval aviation department and converted naval bases into support ones. The Air Force has closed corps (base) headquarters and set up regional command posts. Following these adjustments, the combat troops of the Navy and Air Force are now directly under the fleets and the air commands of the military areas, respectively.

Deepening the reform of the joint logistical support system. The joint logistical support system, based on military area commands, has been expanded, and overlapping support organizations reduced. Apart from special-purpose depots and general hospitals under the general headquarters/departments, the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force, all the other rear depots, hospitals and recuperation centers have been integrated and reorganized into the joint logistical support system. A total of eight joint logistical sub-departments (offices), 94 rear depots, and 47 hospitals and recuperation centers have been closed.

Improving the ratio between officers and men. The PLA has reduced the number of its officers by 170,000. More than 150 officer posts at or above the corps level have been eliminated, nearly 70,000 posts formerly taken by officers are now filled with non-commissioned officers (NCOs), and over 20,000 posts formerly taken by NCOs are now filled with contract civilians.

Development of the Services and Arms

The Army is speeding up the upgrading and informationization of its active main battle equipment to build a new type of ground combat force which is lean, combined, agile and multi-functional. Priority is given to building Army aviation, light mechanized and information countermeasures units. The share of the armored component in the Army combined combat forces has been further raised. The artillery and air defense component has fielded new types of cannons, field antiaircraft missiles, reconnaissance early warning radars, fire-control systems, and intelligence and command systems, and increased the proportion of ground-to-air missiles to antiaircraft guns. The engineering component has grown in step with the main combat arms, and

improved its capabilities of accompanying support and precision support. The anti-chemical component has established a preliminary nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) protection system tailored to joint operations, and greatly increased its capabilities of rapid NBC protection, NBC emergency rescue and operations against NBC terrorism. The communications component has enhanced the building of platforms for general-purpose information transmission and processing, C2 systems and spectrum management systems, and raised communications and information support capabilities.

Founded in 1986, the Army aviation arm has a three-level (general headquarters/departments, theaters of war and first-line task groups) administration system. Equipped mainly with armed helicopters, transport helicopters and service helicopters, it carries out air strike, air landing, airlifting and battlefield service support operations. The Army aviation arm works to strengthen its capabilities of rapid power projection, precision strike, long-range assault and support.

The Navy is working to build itself into a modern maritime force of operation consisting of combined arms with both nuclear and conventional means of operations. Taking informationization as the goal and strategic focus in its modernization drive, the Navy gives high priority to the development of maritime information systems, and new-generation weaponry and equipment. Efforts are being made to improve maritime battlefield capabilities, with emphasis on the construction of relevant facilities for new equipment and the development of combat support capabilities. The Navy is endeavoring to build mobile maritime troops capable of conducting operations under conditions of informationization, and strengthen its overall capabilities of operations in coastal waters, joint operations and integrated maritime support. Efforts are being made to improve and reform training programs and methods to intensify training in joint integrated maritime operations. The Navy is enhancing research into the theory of naval operations and exploring the strategy and tactics of maritime people's war under modern conditions.

The Air Force is working to build an informationized air fighting force with both offensive and defensive capabilities. It is reducing the number of combat aircraft, giving priority to the development of new fighters as well as air and missile defense weapons. It is working to enhance command and control systems. It stresses mission-oriented and confrontational training, increasing combined tactical training of different arms and aircraft types, and conducts training in flying refitted new aircraft and using new weaponry and equipment in an active and stable way. Air Force pilot training is conducted at flying colleges, training bases and combat units in five phases, namely, basic education, primary flying, advanced flying, refitted combat aircraft flying and tactical flying. Aviation units mainly conduct training in counter-air operations, air-to-ground attacks and joint operations. Pilots fly training hours are commensurate with the tasks assigned to pilots.

The Second Artillery Force is striving to build a streamlined and effective strategic force with both nuclear and conventional capabilities. It is quickening its steps to raise the informationization level of its weaponry and equipment systems, build an agile and efficient operational command and control system, and increase its capabilities of land-based strategic nuclear counterstrikes and precision strikes with conventional missiles. It is improving the construction of its battlefield system, and associated logistics and equipment, and raising the cost-effectiveness of integrated support. It is deepening the reform of training, enhancing integrated training, using scientific and technological achievements to raise training quality. It is strengthening the safety management and control mechanism of nuclear missiles, and improving the relevant rules and regulations and technical preventive measures as well as emergency steps for handling nuclear accidents. The Second Artillery Force is equipped with surface-to-surface strategic missiles and tactical operational missiles of various types.

Military Training

The PLA regards military training as a basic means to raise its combat effectiveness in peacetime, as well as an important method to foster and administer troops. It takes vigorous steps to accelerate the transition from military training under conditions of mechanization to military training under conditions of informationization. At the PLA-wide military training conference held in June 2006, the General Staff Headquarters put forward a comprehensive plan for carrying out military training in a creative way for the new stage in the new century. It called on all PLA troops to set high and strict standards, base their training on actual combat, use scientific and technological means in training, advance the reform of training, and elevate military training to a higher level.

The PLA conducts training in strict accordance with the requirements for winning local wars under conditions of informationization. It conducts basic technical and tactical training, combined tactical training, and strategic and operational training. The PLA conducts training and integration to boost its combat capabilities level by level. It conducts training with live ammunition and holds exercises with opposing players in a realistic manner to temper troops in near-real-war environment. The PLA conducts training by scientific and technological means,

employs modern training methods and means, and develops on-base, simulated and networked training. It is increasing the use of scientific and technological means with focus on improving the quality and effect of training.

The PLA focuses on enhancing joint training to improve the integrated joint operational capabilities of various services and arms. It gives priority to the training of joint campaign commanders and command organs, joint field exercises and the training of different support forces in integrated support. It works to enhance the commanding and organizing capabilities of strategic and operational commanders and command organs, and the joint operational capabilities of the services and arms. Keeping in mind the future informationized battlefield, the PLA closely follows the emerging trend of integrated joint operations, conducts integrated training in an innovative way, and actively explores training approaches for the internal integration of fighting units, systems integration of fighting elements and comprehensive integration of fighting systems.

The PLA conducts training in strict accordance with pre-set plans, and is strengthening the scientific management of the overall processes and all the aspects of training. It is exploring new modes for organizing and managing training under conditions of informationization, and intensifying precise and mission-oriented management according to law to keep training processes standardized. It is improving training procedures, making strict training assessments, and setting and improving training standards to meet the requirements of informationized operations. Priority is given to the training of command organs and collective training. The PLA uses live-ammunition exercises and means such as exercise assessment systems for a comprehensive evaluation of the training and combat capabilities of the troops.

Political Work

The basic tasks of the PLA's political work are as follows: ensuring the success of the reform and opening-up of the country and the building of a moderately prosperous society in an all-round way, as well as promoting the socialist modernization; advancing the revolution in military affairs with Chinese features, as well as the revolutionization, modernization and regularization of the PLA; guaranteeing --politically, ideologically and organizationally -- the nature of the people's army under the absolute leadership of the Party; upholding the PLA's socialist ethical standards, the goal of which is to cultivate military personnel with lofty ideals, high moral standards, a wide range of knowledge and a keen sense of discipline; ensuring the PLA's internal unity, unity between the PLA and the government, and unity between the PLA and the people; and ensuring the PLA's combat effectiveness and the accomplishment of the PLA's tasks.

In the long years of fighting revolutionary wars and seeking modernization, a fine tradition of democracy has taken root and a complete democratic system has developed within the PLA. The conference of servicemen's representatives at the levels of the brigade and regiment is part of this democratic system, which ensures the practice of democracy and the right of servicemen to exercise their democratic rights and participate in troop management. The conference of servicemen's representatives is mainly tasked with reviewing the work reports of their commanders, supervising their units' compliance with and implementation of regulations, orders and directives from the above, voicing servicemen's opinions, raising demands on their behalf and monitoring the use of funds in their units. Guided by Party committees and political organs at the same level, units at the levels of brigade and regiment hold annual conferences of servicemen's representatives. The representatives are selected through bottom-up democratic elections from among active servicemen and employees on the PLA payroll. Led by Party branches or grass-roots Party committees and directed by military and political chiefs, the servicemen's committee is an organization through which companies and company-level units practice democracy in political, economic and military affairs, ensure servicemen's democratic rights and conduct servicemen's activities.

The PLA conducts political work in a creative way to raise the overall performance of its officers and men. The PLA educates its officers and men in its historic mission, ideals, beliefs, fighting spirit, and the socialist concept of honor and disgrace, to raise mission awareness, foster revolutionary ideals, strengthen the will to fight, draw a clear line between right and wrong, and arouse enthusiasm for training. The PLA conducts psychological training and studies on psychological operations, and has in place a mechanism involving both political and medical institutions to provide psychological education, catharsis and health service. The CMC and the general headquarters/departments have formulated a series of policies and regulations to strengthen the building of grass-roots units. Most of the commanding organs at and above the regiment level have mechanisms to coordinate grass-roots work. In the course of implementing the Outline for Armed Forces Building at the Grass-Roots Level, a large number of advanced grass-roots units and excellent soldiers have come to the fore.

Logistical Support

To ensure the cost-effectiveness of logistical support, the PLA is enhancing the management and reform of logistical support in an effort to build a modern logistics system.

Upgrading logistics management. The PLA is speeding up the formulation of logistical rules, regulations and standards to establish a standardized system covering supply, consumption and management. During the period of the Tenth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development (2001-2005) (hereinafter referred to as the Tenth Five-Year Plan), the PLA conducted a comprehensive review of its logistical regulations and standards. Over 200 standards were adopted or revised, and more than 240 regulations were enacted. During the period of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development (2006-2010) (hereinafter referred to as the Eleventh Five-Year Plan), the PLA is giving priority to standardizing logistical supply and establishing a mechanism for the dynamic adjustment of supply and support standards. It is strengthening the management of logistics and ensuring the overall sound implementation of the military budget. In addition, it is enforcing financial and economic discipline through strict auditing supervision.

Improving the material life conditions of the officers and men. The PLA has adopted the practice of serving separate portions of food to improve hygienic conditions. Some organic battalions have begun to provide battalion-based food service. Board expenses of enlisted men have been increased substantially since January 1, 2005, and now the food supply for officers and men aims at providing sufficient nutrition rather than just serving enough food. From July 1, 2006, the salaries for service people have been increased by a wide margin. The PLA has issued new types of uniforms to the enlisted and Air Force officers and men, new types of special-purpose fatigue clothing to troops other than those of the Army, and new types of plateau cold-proof uniforms to some troops stationed in Xinjiang and Tibet.

Steadily advancing logistics reform. Adhering to the principles of the incorporation of tri-service components into joint logistical organs, joint management and employment of support entities, and unified organization of supply and support, the PLA is conducting experimental reforms in joint logistics in the Jinan Theatre. This marks an important step towards the goal of building an integrated tri-service logistical support system. It involves comprehensive efforts to expand the reform of the centralized payment system to establish a support mode of fund settlement with single financial accounts as the basis and centralized payment as the main form. The reform of the military medical support system is being smoothly carried out, with priority given to ensuring the medical care of military personnel. Over 70 percent of the PLA's employees are covered by the social medical insurance system. The housing system reform has made progress, and a housing system for military personnel has taken shape which combines military support with social support, government houses with self-owned houses, and supply in kind with supply in money.

In October 2004, the General Staff Headquarters, General Political Department and General Logistics Department jointly issued the Circular on Further Promoting the Reform of Military Materials Procurement under the Corps Level. The PLA has basically established a three-level (logistical organs of the general headquarters/departments, major units, and units) materials procurement and management system and a system of centralized procurement. During the Tenth Five-Year Plan period, the PLA's centralized procurement reached RMB 45 billion, enabling it to save RMB 3.15 billion and spend 7 percent less on average.

Weaponry and Equipment

With the backing of China's economic development and scientific and technological achievements, the PLA is accelerating its weaponry and equipment modernization drive mainly by relying on its own efforts.

Planning long-term weaponry and equipment development in a scientific way. Based on the military strategic guidelines of the new era and the outline for the building and development of the military, the PLA is making efforts to correctly handle the relationship between the needs of equipment development and the availability of funds. As required by comprehensive integration of the Army, Navy and Air Force, joint operation and systems building, the PLA has conducted studies and feasibility assessments of its weaponry and equipment development strategy, adopted the outline and the Eleventh Five-Year Plan for weaponry and equipment development, and set the direction, goals and priorities of its future weaponry and equipment development.

Enhancing the capability of independent weaponry and equipment innovation. The PLA is strengthening applied and basic research as well as research on key defense technologies, ensuring the application of technological achievements and raising its capabilities of original innovation, integrated innovation, and innovation through digesting and absorbing introduced technologies. It is improving the innovation mechanism for defense-related science and technology, and weaponry and equipment to support the independent, leapfrogging and sustainable development of new and high-tech weaponry and equipment.

Optimizing the system of weaponry and equipment. The PLA gives priority to developing new types of equipment which are advanced and reliable in technical performance, and effective in operations. It is speeding up the development of integrated electronic information systems, enhancing the comprehensive integration of various types of weapon systems and support systems, and facilitating information sharing and fusion. The PLA is accelerating the retirement of redundant equipment, carrying out the prioritized, selective and phased retrofitting of equipment and informationization of equipment on active service, and tapping the potential of existing equipment. It is strengthening the systematic development of equipment to form a complete system of equipment, weaponry and equipment support.

Increasing the capability of integrated equipment support. The PLA is strict with equipment management and carries out scientific, institutionalized and regular evaluation on such management in order to maintain and improve the operability of existing equipment. The PLA has established and improved mechanisms for integrated civilian-military equipment support. It is developing new and high maintenance technologies, widening their application and enhancing the capabilities of equipment maintenance, emergency rescue and repair, and remote technical support. It is strengthening equipment support force building, equipment support training, pre-field training and training of qualified equipment personnel, to promote the organic and systematic development of operational and support capabilities of equipment.

Actively advancing the reform of the equipment procurement system. In December 2005, the CMC approved and issued the Opinions on Some Issues Concerning the Deepening of the Equipment Procurement System Reform. In the past two years, the General Armaments Department has improved the review and approval of equipment procurement modes, and gradually enlarged the scope of competitive procurement, raising the percentage of funds for such procurement from 10 percent to 20 percent. The General Armaments Department has strengthened the management of the centralized procurement of equipment of the same kind for the whole PLA, formulated related rules, regulations and standards, and substantially increased the quantities and varieties of equipment procured in a centralized way, saving eight percent of the planned funds and greatly improving the efficiency of fund use.

Military Legal System

During the Tenth Five-Year Plan period, the Standing Committee of the NPC, the State Council and the CMC, exercising their prescribed functions and powers, formulated and revised 99 military laws and regulations. The general headquarters/departments, military area commands, Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force formulated and revised nearly 900 military rules and regulations. In 2006, the CMC began to implement its law-making program for the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period. In a period of five years, a military legal system will take shape which covers multiple aspects, and is coherent, scientific, closely knit and well-designed.

As military courts exercise the function of civil trial within the military, military procuratorates have begun to conduct civil prosecution on a trial basis and supervise civil trials in the military in accordance with the law. In line with the regulations on the people's supervisory system practiced by civil procuratorates, military procuratorates have started to introduce, on a trial basis, a system of servicemen's supervisors to strengthen supervision over investigation of misconduct on duty. In conformity with the requirements of the state's procedural law, a new servicemen's jury system has been established, which specifies the selection of jury members and the procedure for the performance of their duties. In keeping with the state's judicial system, the PLA has instituted a specialized rank system for military judges and procurators which consists of 11 grades at three levels. This has enhanced the professional performance of the military judicial personnel.

In recent years, based on the experience gained from appointing military lawyers at the three levels of combined corps, division and brigade in the Army, units at and above the brigade level in the Second Artillery Force have also started to be staffed with military lawyers. The General Armaments Department and the Navy have set up professional legal advisory offices concerning national defense patents and maritime issues. Military lawyers have played an active role in providing support to commanding officers and organs in decision-making, defending defendants in criminal trials, and undertaking civil cases to protect the legitimate rights and interests of military units and personnel.

Military Institutional Education

Under the unified leadership of the CMC, the PLA institutional education is managed at two levels: by the general headquarters/departments and by the military area commands (Navy, Air Force or Second Artillery Force). The four general headquarters/departments provide overall guidance for all PLA educational institutions, and the General Staff Headquarters administers military education. The development goal of military educational institutions is to establish and improve a new school system with distinct military features

to shift priority from education of officer candidates for academic credentials to pre-assignment education. The new system takes pre-assignment educational institutions as the main form, and makes a distinction between these two types of education. The PLA has 67 military educational institutions, which are divided into two types: those for academic credentials and those for pre-assignment education. The former offers undergraduate education for pre-commission officers and graduate education for officers. The latter consists of elementary, intermediate and advanced level institutions and NCO schools, and offers pre-assignment training and rotational training for active-duty officers and NCOs. Some pre-assignment educational institutions also offer graduate courses in military science. At the same time, 112 regular institutions of higher learning in China undertake the task of training defense students, thus gradually increasing the number of military officers trained in civilian educational institutions.

The PLA endeavors to improve the overall performance of military educational institutions through focused and coordinated development. It has launched a project for establishing key military colleges and schools in the Eleventh Five-Year Plan period. It continues to focus efforts on building a number of institutions and research centers for disciplines and specialties that are important in building an informationized military and winning informationized wars. A new round of reform in teaching is underway to improve the training target models for officers in different fields and at different levels, and to develop new programs and curricula for the training of military personnel. The PLA is also improving the information network for military training, and has built more virtual laboratories, digital libraries and digital campuses to provide distance learning and online teaching and training. In graduate education, the focus is shifted from academic-oriented to practice-oriented, from emphasis on quantity to emphasis on quality, and from a relatively closed-door approach to a more open and diversified approach. The PLA now has 41 educational institutions authorized to award doctor's degrees and 60 to award master's degrees.

Management System of Military Cadres

In 2005, the PLA began to reform the evaluation, selection and appointment system for military cadres, and to institute a system to evaluate commanding officers. It conducts both evaluation and examination in selecting leading officers at the level of deputy regimental commanders for combat troops. It has improved the regulations on reserve cadres, and works to establish a long-term mechanism to select and train outstanding young cadres. In March 2006, with the approval of the CMC, the four general headquarters/departments jointly promulgated the Provisions of the PLA on Rewarding Technical Experts, which gives awards and allowances to military technical experts.

In June 2005, the State Council and the CMC promulgated the Regulations of the PLA on Contract Civilians, deciding to introduce a system of employing contract civilians to fill some support posts in the military, so that active-duty officers, who are limited in number, mainly take up command and combat posts. The regulations contain specific provisions on the nature and status of contract civilians, the procedures of their employment, and the coordination of the civil and military authorities' relevant policies. In 2006, the PLA started the employment of contract civilians.

Officers and non-commissioned officers transferred to civilian work are resettled in one of the following two ways: state-planned job assignment, and finding jobs by themselves. The State Council has an office for overseeing the nationwide resettlement of such officers. The provinces (autonomous regions or municipalities directly under the central government) have corresponding offices for resettling such officers in their respective administrative areas. The General Political Department is in charge of PLA-wide transfer of officers and non-commissioned officers to civilian work, and Party committees and political organs at and above the regiment level are responsible for transferring officers to civilian work in their own units. The provincial military commands (garrison commands at the same level) are responsible for turning over PLA officers and non-commissioned officers transferred to civilian work in their respective provinces, autonomous regions or municipalities directly under the central government. In 2005, the state and the PLA began to deepen the reform and adjustment of the policies on resettling officers and non-commissioned officers transferred to civilian work.

Supporting the Government and Loving the People

The PLA attaches great importance to mass work, taking supporting the government and loving the people as its major thrust. The political organs of the four general headquarters/departments and the military area commands, the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force all have offices for mass work. The political organs of corps, divisions (brigades) and regiments also have special officers in charge of such work. These offices and officers are responsible for maintaining contacts and coordination with governments at all levels.

Education in supporting the government and loving the people is conducted PLA-wide. The PLA participates in national economic development, emergency rescue and disaster relief, and public welfare activities.

In the past two years, the engineering troops of the Army, Navy and Air Force have taken part in more than 430 key construction projects for transportation, hydropower, communication and energy infrastructure. The PLA has assisted in building new socialist villages in the countryside, and provided regular assistance to poor farmers in more than 19,000 villages. It has helped build over 48,000 small public projects such as water-saving irrigation projects, drinking water projects for both people and livestock, roads, and hydropower projects, bringing immediate benefits to nearly 800,000 people. In addition, it has helped build or enlarge 211 primary and secondary schools, enabling 142,000 school dropouts to return to class. PLA troops stationed in China's western region have taken part in such ecological engineering projects as the construction of shelterbelts and the improvement of small drainage areas. They have planted 210 million trees and sown grass on more than 13 million sq m of land. PLA hospitals have established regular assistance relations with more than 400 county or township hospitals in the western region. They have helped train key members of the medical staff, made rounds of visits offering free medical consultation and treatment, and donated medical equipment and medicine. The PLA and PAPF have dispatched over 340,000 troops to take part in more than 2,800 emergency rescue and disaster-relief operations, involving more than 40,000 vehicles, flown more than 2,000 sorties (including the use of helicopters), evacuated over 3.4 million people and prevented economic losses of several billion yuan. At the end of 2006, the PLA donated 230 million yuan and over 930,000 cotton-padded clothes and quilts to disaster- and poverty-stricken areas.

In June 2005, the State Council and the CMC promulgated the Regulations on Participation of the PLA in Emergency Rescue and Disaster Relief, prescribing the PLA's main tasks, coordination with local people's governments, limits of authority and procedures for employing troops, joint command with local authorities, preparations and readiness, financial and material support, etc., for such operations.

V. People's Armed Police Force

The People's Armed Police Force (PAPF) is charged with the fundamental task of safeguarding national security, maintaining social stability and ensuring that the people live and work in peace and contentment. It strives to make itself a powerful, disciplined and politically reliable force.

Structure and Organization

As a component of China's armed forces and subordinate to the State Council, the PAPF is under the dual leadership of the State Council and the CMC. The State Council exercises leadership over the PAPF through relevant functional departments, assigns routine tasks to it, decides its size and number of organizations, and is responsible for its command, operations, and financial and material support. The PAPF has an independent budgetary status in the financial expenditure of the state. The CMC is responsible for the PAPF's organizational structure, management of officers, command, training and political work. It exercises leadership over the PAPF through the four general headquarters/departments. In terms of conducting public security operations and relevant capability building, the PAPF General Headquarters is under the leadership and command of the Ministry of Public Security, and the PAPF units at and below the contingent level are under the leadership and command of the public security organs at the same level. The PAPF has a total force of 660,000.

The PAPF consists mainly of the internal security force and forces guarding gold mines, forests, water and electricity supply, and communications. The border security, firefighting and security guard forces are also components of the PAPF. The PAPF General Headquarters is the leading and commanding organ that directs and administers the internal security force and forces guarding gold mine, forest, water and electricity, and communications, etc., and provides guidance to other forces subordinate to the PAPF. Under it are the headquarters, political department and logistics department. The PAPF has one commander-in-chief, one first political commissar (assumed concurrently by the Minister of Public Security), one political commissar, and several deputy commanders-in-chief and deputy political commissars. The PAPF internal security force is composed of contingents at the level of the province (autonomous region or municipality directly under the central government) and armed police divisions. Contingents, detachments and squadrons are instituted at the province, prefecture, and county levels, respectively. The armed police divisions have regiments, battalions and companies in battle order, which are stationed in a number of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the central government. The forces guarding gold mines, forests, water and electricity supply, and communications have their own headquarters, which function as their leading and commanding organs. The PAPF General Headquarters has an educational institution directly under it. The

contingent headquarters and the headquarters of the forces guarding gold mines, forests, water and electricity supply, and communications have elementary command colleges under them.

Basic Tasks

In peacetime, the PAPF is tasked to perform guard duties, handle emergencies, combat terrorism, and participate in and support national economic development. In wartime, it assists the PLA in defensive operations.

Every day, more than 260,000 PAPF servicemen are on guard duty. Through the combined use of manpower, facilities and technologies, the PAPF has effectively enhanced the efficiency of guard duties and security in recent years. The PAPF annually handles an average of over 100 cases of attempted attacks against guarded targets and escape attempts by detained suspects and imprisoned criminals, organizes thousands of important temporary duties, and ensures the security of important international and national conferences and large-scale events, in cooperation with the government departments concerned. Adhering to the guidelines and principles for handling emergencies, and using proper methods and tactics, the PAPF effectively safeguards the fundamental interests of the people, social stability and the dignity of the law. The PAPF anti-terrorism units closely follow the state's anti-terrorism guidelines and principles, and enhance their combat-readiness training. They have been involved in the successful handling of cases of bombing attempts and kidnapping incidents. The various units of the PAPF take an active part in efforts to keep local order, and assist the public security departments in catching and arresting criminal suspects and cracking down on organized criminal gangs.

The PAPF gold mine force has completed 38 geological prospecting projects in a dozen provinces and autonomous regions, and found some rich gold deposits. In the last two years, the PAPF forest force has put out 552 forest or prairie fires, protecting valuable natural resources. The PAPF water and electricity force has taken part in the construction of 21 key national projects, including the Qinghai-Tibet Railway, the West-East Natural Gas Transmission Project, the South-North Water Diversion Project, and major hydropower projects. The PAPF communications force is responsible for the maintenance of the Xinjiang-Tibet Highway and the Sichuan-Tibet Highway, and has undertaken the construction of national high-grade highways, extra-long tunnels and bridges. Those projects built by the PAPF communications force are all up to standards. In the past two years, 224,000 PAPF troops have participated in 2,320 emergency rescue and disaster relief operations, and rescued and evacuated 250,000 people in disaster-stricken areas.

Force Building

The PAPF is working to strengthen itself through science and technology. It is enhancing staff competence, and conducting strict management so that its personnel can fully perform their duties. Using the national information infrastructure, the PAPF has established a preliminary system of three-level integrated information networks, linking general headquarters with the grass-roots squadrons. It has made progress in real-time command and control, management of duties through visual means, networked education and training, and office automation. The PAPF possesses a basically complete range of equipment through R&D and procurement of urgently needed weaponry and equipment. It has set up and improved a distinctive mechanism for the selection, training and employment of officers and NCOs. In particular, priority is given to the training of inter-disciplinary personnel. The PAPF conducts mission-oriented training on a priority basis to better perform guard duties, manage emergencies and combat terrorism. It participated in China's "Great Wall-2003" and "Great Wall II" anti-terrorism exercises, and the SCO's "Joint-2003" exercise, and sponsored the "Guard-04" and "Guard-06" exercises to deal with large-scale emergencies. The PAPF runs its forces strictly and pursuant to the law. It stresses that leaders make decisions, administrative organs conduct management, and officers and men perform their duties strictly in accordance with the law. As a result, its overall performance has been greatly boosted.

The PAPF is steadily improving its logistical support system based on self-support and supplemented by social and PLA support to raise the efficiency of integrated support. It runs a crisis response support system covering the three echelons of the general headquarters, contingents (divisions) and detachments (regiments), to better respond to emergencies, and unexpected and complex situations. It promotes standardized and institutional logistical management by exploitation of IT and uniformly standardizes its facility configurations, work procedures, operating mechanisms and management requirements. The PAPF is pursuing reforms in housing, procurement of bulk materials and project procurement, medical care, and outsources food, barracks and bedding and clothing services.

In recent years, the PAPF has conducted friendly exchanges with the armed police forces, military police, internal security forces, public security forces and other similar forces of more than 30 countries to draw on each other's practices and cooperate in conducting anti-terrorism training. Its medical personnel, as part of Chinese rescue teams, have participated in disaster-relief missions in the aftermath of the earthquakes in Iran, Pakistan and Indonesia, and the tsunami in the Indian Ocean.

VI. National Defense Mobilization and Reserve Force

China, responding to new developments in modern warfare and the needs of national security, is reinforcing national defense mobilization and reserve force building to enhance its capabilities of rapid mobilization, sustained support, comprehensive protection and swift shift from a peacetime to wartime footing.

Mobilization of the Armed Forces

China's mobilization of the armed forces includes the mobilization of manpower, weaponry and equipment, as well as logistical materials. The main tasks of the PLA's mobilization are as follows: to formulate plans for wartime troop mobilization and support according to operational plans, carry out pre-regimentation of reservists into active units and organization of reserve units, and expand and form units according to wartime structure and organization upon the state's issuance of a mobilization order. The main tasks of the PAPF's mobilization are to formulate mobilization and support plans based on the PAPF's possible wartime tasks, carry out pre-regimentation of reservists and adjustment, expansion and reorganization of units, and adjust the organizational system or form or expand units according to designated tasks after the state issues a mobilization order. The main tasks of the militia's mobilization are to call up militiamen, adjust and reinforce organizations, issue weapons and equipment, carry out pre-war training, and provide support in accordance with the needs of wartime manpower mobilization and plans for participating in warfare and supporting the front.

Acting on the directives of the State Council and the CMC, the General Staff Headquarters organizes and conducts mobilization of the armed forces with the assistance of the General Political Department, General Logistics Department and General Armaments Department as well as the relevant government departments. The Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery Force are responsible for the mobilization of their respective forces. The military area commands, provincial military commands and local Party committees and governments at different levels are responsible for the mobilization of reserve forces within their respective jurisdictions.

By maintaining a lean standing army, improving the reserve service system, setting up reserve units, designating manpower replenishment areas, pre-positioning equipment and supplies, and organizing civil-military mobilization rehearsals, China has ensured the smooth mobilization of the armed forces, enabling the latter to deter or defuse security crises with even a downsized standing force. In recent years, China has accelerated the adjustment and reform of the organization and structure of the militia and the reserve forces and increased the number of reservists with high-tech backgrounds, and strengthened the reserve forces of the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force. As a result, the level of the general quality of the backup forces of national defense has been raised notably.

Mobilization of the National Economy

The basic policies for the mobilization of the national economy are:

- i. To boost economic mobilization based on China's development strategy and its economic strength, and incorporate the development of the defense economy into that of the national economy;
- ii. To make economic mobilization a bridge between China's economic development and available national defense capacities, and strike a balance between military and civilian needs and between peacetime and wartime needs in economic restructuring, to keep the national defense economy at a proper level in peacetime;
- iii. To speed up the development and application of new and high technologies and dual-purpose technologies, and give priority to the mobilization of high-tech products and the reserves of high technology, to raise the overall scientific and technological level of economic mobilization;

▪ To build an organizational structure, mechanism and legal system of economic mobilization in keeping with the socialist market economy for dealing with both wars and emergencies in accordance with the assigned functions of economic mobilization, to serve economic development in peacetime and respond rapidly in cases of emergency or war; and

▪ To pursue the principle of self-defense by the whole nation and improve the capacity of economic mobilization to meet the needs of defensive operations under conditions of informationization.

The primary objective is to establish a complete economic mobilization system with the dual functions of responding to both wars and emergencies, and to set up an economic mobilization base that is an integral part of China's economy to meet the economic needs of local wars and unexpected incidents.

With the rapid growth of China's economy, the capacity of its economic mobilization has been steadily raised. In building information and communications systems, highways, railways, bridges, tunnels, airports, ports, docks and major urban infrastructures, China pays close attention to the requirements of national defense, and ensures that peacetime needs and wartime needs are properly balanced. In working to set up a mechanism of economic mobilization for responding to both wars and emergencies, China has set up a system of plans for economic mobilization that takes both peacetime and wartime needs into consideration. It has established economic mobilization centers in the machine-building, weaponry, aviation, space, shipbuilding and chemical industries, and has optimized the mobilization structure and layout. It has basically completed a survey on the potential of economic mobilization and set up an information system for economic mobilization management by the state and a number of provinces and municipalities directly under the central government. As a component of the national emergency response force, economic mobilization offices at different levels have established a mechanism for contacts between economic mobilization offices and emergency reaction management offices to provide support for handling public emergencies and ensure public security.

Civil Air Defense

Civil air defense (CAD), air defense of critical areas and field air defense constitute China's homeland defense structure. The tasks of the CAD in the new era are to protect the people and their property and China's economic development in wartime, and carry out disaster prevention and relief and handle public unexpected incidents in peacetime. The CAD expenses are born by the state and the public. The state has promulgated the Civil Air Defense Law, and the people's governments at various levels have formulated and improved corresponding CAD rules and regulations. CAD work is incorporated into plans for economic and social development by the people's governments at and above the county level.

China's CAD capabilities in preparations against war, integrated urban protection and public unexpected incident response have been greatly enhanced in recent years. Interconnected and interoperable communications networks for command and warning at the provincial, city and county levels have been basically established, and urban air defense early-warning networks have been improved. Over 85 percent of areas in major cities are covered by air-defense sirens. Most of the key CAD cities have CAD command posts. All large and medium-sized cities have protection and rescue contingents for emergency rescue, rush repair, medical aid, fire fighting, maintenance of order, chemical defense, epidemic prevention, communications and transportation. Short-term and full-time training courses are conducted, and emergency rescue drills for handling disasters are organized to help the public acquire CAD knowledge and skills. CAD courses are included in school teaching programs and curricula. Volunteer CAD teams have been formed in some factories, mines, enterprises and communities.

Militia Force Building

China's militia is under the unified direction of the State Council and the CMC, and the dual leadership of local Party committees and governments as well as the military commands. The concept of people's war, and the principle of combining regular work with military training and combining peacetime needs with wartime needs are observed in the building of the militia.

The focus of the militia work is being shifted from rural areas to cities and areas along communication lines. The setting up of militia forces has expanded from state-owned enterprises to private enterprises and from traditional industries to high-tech industries. Specialized technical units rather than infantry are becoming the backbone of the militia. The proportion of anti-aircraft artillery, ground artillery, missile, communications, engineering, anti-chemical, reconnaissance, information and other specialized technical units in the overall militia force is being raised. The building of militia units of the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force is

being strengthened. A new organizational structure of the militia has taken shape, with specialized technical units and units with corresponding specialties serving as the main body, and air defense units, units of the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force, and emergency response units playing a leading role.

The state has increased investment in militia weaponry and equipment, with priority given to equipment for air defense, emergency response and maintenance of stability. The state has phased out a number of out-dated weapons. Militia training reform has been deepened; a four-level system for organizing training is practiced, the four levels being provincial military commands, prefectural military commands, people's armed forces departments of counties (county-level cities or municipal districts) and basic-level people's armed forces departments. Through interlinked training as well as joint training and exercises with active PLA units, the militia has boosted its capabilities of conducting rapid mobilization and carrying out its specialized tasks.

Reserve Force Building

As a component of the PLA, the reserve force receives priority in the building of the defense reserve. The reserve force conducts peacetime training as provided for in relevant regulations, assists in maintaining order when necessary pursuant to the law, and activates its units in wartime in observance of the state's mobilization order.

In recent years, while keeping its overall size unchanged, the reserve force has reduced the number of Army reserve units, while increasing the numbers of reserve units of the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force, the proportion of specialized technical reserve units and the number of logistical and equipment support reserve units, thus accomplishing the task of forming new reserve units of the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force in the Tenth Five-Year Plan period. Most of the PLA's reserve divisions, brigades and regiments have training bases, armament depots, necessary office space and living quarters, and optical-fiber cable communication. With military training as the primary task, the PLA reserve units carry out training strictly pursuant to regulations, ensuring the accomplishment of all training tasks. The focus of training is being shifted from individuals and units to command posts, key technicians and higher levels of training such as joint and live-fire exercises.

VII. Border and Coastal Defense

Adhering to the principles of conducting overall planning, placing equal emphasis on land and sea, giving priority to defense, and integrating defense and administration, China is endeavoring to make its border and coastal defense unified, effective, solid and informationized.

Border and Coastal Defense System

China's border and coastal defense is under the unified leadership of the State Council and the CMC, and practices an administration system of sharing responsibilities between the military and the local authorities. The State Commission of Border and Coastal Defense, composed of the relevant departments of the State Council and the PLA, and under the dual leadership of the State Council and the CMC, guides and coordinates China's border and coastal defense. All military area commands, as well as border and coastal provinces, prefectures and counties have commissions to guide and coordinate border and coastal defense within their respective jurisdictions.

The PLA is the main force for defending China's borders and coasts. The PLA border defense force has a three-level structure, namely, regiment, battalion and company. The PLA coastal defense force has a five-level structure, namely, division, brigade, regiment, battalion and company. In 2003, the PLA border defense force took over the defense of the China-DPRK border and the Yunnan section of the China-Myanmar border from the border public security force, thus enabling the state to integrate land border defense and administration. The border public security force is tasked with safeguarding security and maintaining social order in border and coastal areas. Within the border public security force there are contingents in provinces (autonomous regions or municipalities directly under the central government), detachments, groups, border police substations and frontier inspection stations in border and coastal areas, border inspection stations in open ports, and marine police force in coastal waters. Since China launched its reform and opening-up program, the state has consolidated border and coastal law-enforcement functions in organizations responsible for public security, customs, inspection and quarantine, maritime surveillance, fisheries administration, marine affairs and environmental protection. The state has also established and reinforced the border public security force, as well as border and coastal law-enforcement contingents for marine affairs, anti-smuggling, fisheries administration and maritime surveillance.

Building Border and Coastal Defense

China has promulgated the Law on National Defense, the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf and other relevant laws and regulations, and updated its border and coastal defense policies and regulations pursuant to international laws and practices, to manage its border and sea areas in conformity with the law. China endeavors to strengthen its border and coastal defense, administration and control, and build a modern border and coastal defense force featuring joint military-police-civilian efforts in defense and administration. Over the past decade and more, the state has invested more than RMB 2 billion in construction of border defense infrastructure, building over 20,000 km of patrol roads, over 6,000 km of barbed-wire fences and installing some 600 sets of monitoring equipment. Construction of coastal defense infrastructure, including duty piers, monitoring stations and centers and auxiliary facilities has been underway since 2004.

China pursues a good-neighborliness policy, and works to enhance friendship and partnership with its neighbors. It calls for settling boundary and maritime demarcation issues with countries concerned in a fair and equitable manner, and through consultations on the basis of equality. China has signed land border treaties or agreements with Myanmar and 11 other neighboring countries, thus resolving boundary issues left from history with these countries; it is currently negotiating with India and Bhutan to settle boundary issues with those two countries respectively. Since 1996, China has set up bilateral consultation mechanisms on the law of the sea with the Republic of Korea and Japan, to exchange views on maritime demarcation and cooperation. In 2004, the Agreement Between China and Vietnam on the Demarcation of the Beibu Gulf officially entered into force.

China actively promotes border and coastal defense cooperation with its neighbors, strengthens border and coastal defense contacts in different fields and at various levels, and handles in an appropriate manner border and coastal-defense-related issues with countries concerned. In 2005, the Agreement on Joint Patrols by the Navies of China and Vietnam in the Beibu Gulf was signed, and China respectively signed with the Philippines and Indonesia the Memorandum of Understanding on Maritime Affairs Cooperation and the Memorandum of Understanding on Maritime Cooperation. In July 2006, China and India reopened the border trade route at Nathu La Pass, which links China's Tibet with Sikkim, India. China's border and coastal defense forces, acting strictly in accordance with international law and the agreements and understandings signed by China with its neighbors, have established and improved mechanisms for talks and meetings with their counterparts in the neighboring countries, and conduct law enforcement and anti-terrorism cooperation to jointly maintain peace and stability in border areas and related sea areas.

Ensuring the Stability of Border Areas

Stability and development of border areas are the foundation for border and coastal defense. The Chinese government attaches great importance to work related to ethnic minorities and economic development in border areas; it has formulated a series of policies and adopted many strategic measures in this regard. In the early days of New China, close to one million PLA officers and men were collectively transferred to civilian work in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, Tibet and Inner Mongolia autonomous regions, and Heilongjiang and Yunnan provinces. They were organized into production and construction corps and state farms, and made great contributions to the economic development of the border areas and the maintenance of border stability in those areas. In the 1950s and 1960s, the state moved a large number of industrial enterprises and skilled workers from inland and coastal areas to border areas, and set up a fairly complete industrial system and communications and transportation network there. Since the reform and opening-up policy was initiated in the late 1970s, the state has set up 253 open ports and implemented the strategy for developing the western region and revitalizing old industrial bases including Northeast China. It pursues the policy of developing border areas and making border inhabitants prosperous, and consolidating defense through building close ties with the local people. It has taken steps, including encouraging inland provinces to provide assistance to their border counterparts, to accelerate the economic development there. This has laid a solid foundation for strengthening border and coastal defense.

The PLA border defense force and the border public security force are resolute in maintaining social stability in border areas and unity among ethnic groups, and take an active part in the economic development of border areas. They take measures to crack down hard on cross-border crimes, such as weapon smuggling, drug trafficking, illegal border crossing and human trafficking, and on separatist, violent and terrorist activities. They strictly implement the ethnic and religious policies of the state, respect the customs and lifestyle of ethnic minorities, and strengthen PLA unity with the government and the people, together with unity among ethnic groups, thus contributing to maintaining political stability and promoting social development and progress in border areas.

VIII. Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense

China's defense-related science, technology and industry focuses on consolidating its foundation, making independent innovation, and speeding up the implementation of the strategy of transition and upgrading, so as to ensure the production and supply of military equipment and promote the development of national economy.

Improving the industrial structure, enhancing its capabilities of developing and producing new and high-tech weaponry and equipment. Defense-related science, technology and industry endeavors to accelerate structural adjustment in research and production, adopt advanced production modes, promote specialized production and upgrade processing technologies. Priority is given to R&D of new and high-tech weaponry and equipment, and endeavors to achieve breakthroughs in a number of key technologies and leapfrogging technological progress, thus speeding up weaponry and equipment modernization. Defense-related science, technology and industry is enhancing its core capabilities in R&D and production of the overall systems and key subsystems of major projects, and introducing more competition into the manufacturing and processing of general and supporting equipment, gradually establishing an all-round outsourcing system of cooperation for developing and producing weaponry and equipment. Priority is given to upgrading technologies and products in the nuclear, space, aviation, shipbuilding, weaponry, electronics and other defense-related industries, so as to form a cluster of high-tech industries to drive the growth of China's economy. In 2005, the output value, added value and gross revenue of the entire spectrum of defense-related science, technology and industry increased by 24.3 percent, 20.7 percent and 21.6 percent, respectively, over the previous year.

The defense manufacturing industries have been further informationized. The Tenth Five-Year Plan period saw the rapid development of digitalized manufacturing technology and wide application of computer-aided design, manufacturing and system-integrated manufacturing technologies in China's defense industries. The capabilities of master design and development, as well as of final assembly and integration, and the technological level of precision and super-precision processing were significantly raised. The means and methods of systems integration, experimentation and simulation, as well as of inspection and testing were upgraded.

The defense industry enterprises have stepped up restructuring and reform, and are exploring approaches for diversifying their ownership structure and steadily transforming themselves into share-holding enterprises. The reform of defense-related research institutes is being speeded up and greater support was given to research institutions engaged in strategic research, basic research and research in the public interest.

Strengthening capabilities of independent innovation. Efforts are being made to improve the innovative system of development and production of weaponry and equipment, and the innovative system of technology for high-tech industries combining military and civilian needs. The former takes master design, final assembly and manufacturing, and experimentation and verification as leading factors, and is supported by research and manufacturing of core systems and specialized equipment, and completed by an outsourcing system. The latter combines production, education and research, takes enterprises as the main body and research institutions as the mainstay, and is market-orientated. Priority is given to enhancing basic research, key technology research and frontier technology research. As a result, a number of state-of-the-art scientific and technological achievements that enjoy independent intellectual property rights have been made. Patent applications have increased rapidly -- at an average annual rate of over 40 percent. Major scientific and technological projects, such as manned space flights and the Lunar Probe Project, are being carried out to spur the leapfrogging development of high-tech enterprises combining military and civilian needs and to bring about overall improvements in defense-related science and technology. Platforms for developing weaponry systems, lab systems for defense-related science and technology, and research and application centers for advanced industrial technologies are being built. As a result, a fairly mature scientific and technological infrastructure is taking shape, which is well-configured, multi-functional, efficient and based on close cooperation between the military and civilian sectors. In addition, higher education and vocational education are being boosted for defense-related science, technology and industry. Three professionally specialized contingents are being constructed, namely, a contingent of business managers, a contingent of professionals and specialists and a contingent of skilled workers. Efforts are being made to establish an innovative mechanism to absorb and train high-caliber people for defense-related science, technology and industry.

On the premise of strictly honoring its international commitments, China encourages and supports participation in international cooperation and competition in civilian-military industries.


IX. Defense Expenditure

Pursuant to the National Defense Law and the Budget Law, and guided by the principle of coordinated development of national defense and the economy, the Chinese government decides on the size and use of defense expenditure in an appropriate way to meet the demands of national defense in keeping with China's economic development.

China's defense expenditure mainly comprises expenses for personnel, training and maintenance, and equipment. Personnel expenses mainly cover salaries, insurance, food, clothing, and welfare benefits for officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted men as well as for civilian employees. Training and maintenance expenses cover troop training, institutional education, construction and maintenance of installations and facilities, and other expenses on routine consumables. The equipment expenses mainly cover research on, experimentation with, and procurement, maintenance, transportation and storage of weaponry and equipment. The defense expenditure covers not only the active forces, but also the militia and reserve forces. Also covered by the defense expenditure are costs to support part of the retired officers, education of servicemen's children and the national economic development, as well as other social expenses.

Since the early 1990s, to safeguard its sovereignty, security and unity, and to keep pace with the global revolution in military affairs, China has gradually increased its defense expenditure on the basis of its economic development. This increase, however, is compensatory in nature, and is designed to enhance the originally weak defense foundation. It is a moderate increase in step with China's national economic development. In the 1980s, China began to shift the focus of its work to economic development. At that time, it was decided that national defense should be both subordinated to and serve the country's overall economic development. As a result, national defense received a low input, and was in a state of self-preservation. From 1979 to 1989, the average annual increase of defense expenditure was 1.23 percent. However, the defense expenditure actually registered an average annual decrease of 5.83 percent, given the 7.49 percent average annual increase of the consumer price index in the same period. From 1990 to 2005, the average annual increase in defense expenditure was 15.36 percent. As the average annual increase of the consumer price index during the same period was 5.22 percent, the actual average increase in defense expenditure was 9.64 percent.

Chart 1: Comparison Between the Growth Rate of China's Defense Expenditure and the National Residential Consumer Price Index (1989-2005)



China's GDP in 2004 and 2005 was RMB15,987.8 billion and RMB18,308.5 billion, respectively, with a growth rate of 10.1 percent in 2004 and of 10.2 percent in 2005. The state financial expenditure was RMB2,848.689 billion in 2004 and RMB3,393.028 billion in 2005, up 15.57 percent and 19.11 percent respectively over the previous year. China's defense expenditure in 2004 and 2005 was RMB220.001 billion and RMB247.496 billion, respectively, with growth rates of 15.31 percent and 12.50 percent. In the past two years, the share of China's annual defense expenditure in its GDP and in the state financial expenditure in the same period has decreased, being 1.40 percent and 7.74 percent respectively in 2003, 1.38 percent and 7.72 percent in 2004, and 1.35 percent and 7.29 percent in 2005. Its defense budget for 2006 is RMB283.829 billion.

Chart 2: Share of China's Annual Defense Expenditure in the State Financial Expenditure (1994-2005) (%)





Chart 3: Composition of China's Defense Expenditure in 2005 (unit: RMB billion)



The increased part of China's defense expenditure is primarily used for the following purposes: (1) Increasing salaries and allowances of military personnel and improving their living conditions. Along with the growth of China's economy and the steady improvement of the people's life, the salaries and allowances of military personnel and the pensions of retired officers are increased accordingly. The insurance, medical, housing and other benefits are also increased. Subsidies are being increased, too, to compensate for regional and post differences, and the living conditions of the troops stationed in hardship areas are being improved. (2) Increasing investment in weaponry and equipment and infrastructure. The PLA is accelerating its informationization drive, increasing the expenses on procurement and maintenance of weaponry and equipment, upgrading the military infrastructure, and increasing input for improving the facilities for border and coastal defense troops. (3) Supporting the training of military personnel. The PLA is increasing input into education and training through both military educational institutions and regular institutions of higher learning. It is also increasing subsidies for professionals with outstanding performance and incentives for experts, and increasing the budget for the employment of contract civilians. (4) Compensating for price rise. As the prices of oil, building materials and staple and non-staple foodstuffs rise, the PLA accordingly increases the expenses on military petroleum, oils and lubricants and defense engineering, and raises the boarding subsidies. (5) Increasing expenses for international cooperation in non-traditional security fields.

Both the total amount and per-serviceman share of China's defense expenditure is low compared with those of some other countries, particularly major powers. In 2005, China's defense expenditure equaled 6.19 percent of that of the United States, 52.95 percent of that of the United Kingdom, 71.45 percent of that of France and 67.52 percent of that of Japan. China's defense expenses per serviceman averaged RMB107,607, amounting to 3.74 percent of that of the United States and 7.07 percent of that of Japan.

China practices a strict system of financial appropriation of defense funds. The PLA's budgeting is based on the defense development strategy, military building objectives and annual military tasks set by the state. Budgeting units at each level carry out studies to decide on their budget items, make calculations of their requests for funds and then report to the next-higher authorities. The General Logistics Department, working with the relevant departments of other general headquarters/departments, analyzes, calculates and verifies the annual budget requests submitted by all the military area commands, the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force, and draws up the defense budget. After being reviewed and approved by the CMC, the defense budget is submitted to the Ministry of Finance. The latter, on the basis of medium- and long-term fiscal plans and the estimated revenue of the year, puts forward a plan for military expenditure appropriations after consultation with the General Logistics Department, and then incorporates it into the annual financial budget draft of the central government. Upon approval by the State Council, the annual financial budget is submitted to the

Budget Work Committee of the NPC Standing Committee and the Finance and Economic Committee of the NPC for review before it is submitted to the NPC for review. After the budget of the central government is approved by the NPC, the Ministry of Finance informs in writing the General Logistics Department of the approved defense budget. The defense budget is then implemented down to troops at different levels through prescribed procedures.

Financial departments are instituted at the General Logistics Department, military area commands, Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force, and units at the levels of corps, division (brigade) and regiment. These departments are responsible for the appropriation, management and supervision of the defense funds. The auditing offices of the state and the PLA conduct strict supervision of the defense budget.

Chart 4: Comparison of Defense Expenditures of Major Countries in 2005 (unit: US\$ billion)




Chart 5: Comparison of Percentages of Defense Expenditures in GDP of Major Countries in 2005





Chart 6: Comparison of Per Serviceman Share of Defense Expenditure of Major Countries in 2005 (unit: US\$1,000)



Source of the figures: Defense reports, budget reports or other government reports released by these countries.

Note: One pound is equivalent to 1.7439 US dollars.
 One Euro is equivalent to 1.3029 US dollars.
 One US dollar is equivalent to 28.5470 Russian rubles.
 One US dollar is equivalent to 106.9998 Japanese yen.
 One US dollar is equivalent to RMB8.0759 yuan.

X. International Security Cooperation

China pursues a new security concept featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination, and adheres to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. It works to promote good-neighborliness, mutual benefit and win-win, and endeavors to advance international security cooperation and strengthen military relations with other countries.

Regional Security Cooperation

Since its founding five years ago, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has steadily deepened and expanded cooperation in security, economic and cultural areas in practical terms. A decision-making mechanism has taken shape, with the Council of Heads of State and the Council of Heads of Government being its core. Two permanent bodies, namely, the Secretariat and the Regional Anti-terrorism Structure, have also been established. A number of documents on cooperation in fighting terrorism, separatism, extremism and drug trafficking have been adopted. In April 2005, the SCO, ASEAN and the Commonwealth of Independent States signed a memorandum of understanding on conducting cooperation in counter-terrorism. In July, the Concept of Cooperation between SCO Members on Combating Terrorism, Separatism and Extremism was adopted at the SCO Astana Summit. In April 2006, a meeting of SCO defense ministers was held in Beijing, and the Sixth SCO Summit was held in Shanghai in June. Ten documents, including the Declaration on the Fifth Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, were signed during the Summit.

China attaches great importance to the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). At the 13th ARF Ministerial Meeting in July 2006, China called for enhancing mutual trust, respecting diversity and properly handling the ARF's relations with other mechanisms. In the past two years, China has, within the ARF framework, hosted the Seminar on Enhancing Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues, sponsored the ARF Seminar on Non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction with the United States and Singapore, held the Fifth and Sixth ARF Inter-sessional Meetings on Disaster Relief with Indonesia, and held the Fourth ARF Inter-sessional Meeting on Counter-terrorism and Transnational Crime with Brunei.

China's cooperation in the non-traditional security area with ASEAN and within the framework of ASEAN and China, Japan and the Republic of Korea has achieved significant progress. In January 2005, China proposed a series of initiatives on disaster prevention and reduction at the Special ASEAN Leaders' Meeting on the Aftermath of Earthquake and Tsunamis. In August, China hosted the Workshop on Policing Exchanges and Cooperation among the Capital Police Agencies of ASEAN, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea, during which the Beijing Declaration on Policing Exchanges and Cooperation among the Capital Police Agencies of ASEAN, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea was signed. In October, China hosted the Second

International Congress of ASEAN and China on Cooperative Operations in Response to Dangerous Drugs. The Beijing Declaration and other documents were adopted. In November, China attended the Second ASEAN and China, Japan and the Republic of Korea Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime and the First China-ASEAN Informal Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime.

Honoring Commitment to International Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

China has made sound preparations for implementing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). To this end, a preparatory office has been established at the PLA General Armaments Department. With the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Health, the State Environmental Protection Administration, the China Earthquake Administration and other government departments, this office is responsible for setting up 11 monitoring stations in China as part of the international monitoring system, and formulating their administrative regulations and detailed rules for the implementation of the CTBT. Two primary seismological monitoring stations have been set up in Hailar and Lanzhou, respectively, and three radionuclide stations have been set up in Beijing, Guangzhou and Lanzhou, respectively. The surveying of the two sites for two infrasound stations in Beijing and Kunming has been completed, and construction is scheduled to start soon. The China National Data Center and the Beijing Radionuclide Laboratory have been built, and are now in trial operation.

China supports multilateral efforts aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the Biological Weapons Convention. It has attended the review conferences, annual meetings of State Parties and meetings of the Ad Hoc Group of Governmental Experts in an active and responsible manner. China has also submitted in a timely fashion to the United Nations declarations regarding confidence-building measures under the Convention.

China honors in good faith its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. It has promptly and completely submitted all the annual declarations, subsequent declarations regarding newly discovered chemical weapons abandoned by Japan in China and the annual national programs related to protective purposes. It has also received more than 100 on-site inspections by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The PLA is working, in strict compliance with the Convention, to ensure the smooth management and operation of the "single small-scale facility" and the "10kg Schedule I Chemical Synthesis Laboratory." China and Japan have held 42 rounds of bilateral consultations to accelerate the destruction of the chemical weapons abandoned by Japan in China. Since 2005, China has assisted Japan in 24 on-site verifications, and recovered over 3,100 chemical weapons abandoned by Japan. At the request of Japan, China has taken into temporary custody the recovered Japanese-abandoned chemical weapons confirmed by Japan. These chemical weapons will be destroyed by Japan in the future.

China fully honors its obligations under the amended Landmine Protocol to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. The PLA keeps its troops fully informed of China's obligations, and has implemented the technical standards and limitations specified in the Protocol. It has carried out a general check of all the anti-personnel landmines that do not meet the standards of the Protocol, and has destroyed several hundred thousand old landmines in a planned way. China has made technical modifications to usable anti-infantry landmines in inventory to make them conform to the technical standards of the Protocol. China continues to take an active part in international demining operations. In the period September-December 2005, Chinese military demining experts worked in Thailand to train demining personnel and give on-site instructions. China also provided Thailand with demining equipment. In the period September-December 2006, China ran demining training courses for Lebanon and Jordan in Nanjing, and provided the two countries with demining equipment. China has taken part in a constructive way in the discussions on anti-vehicle landmines by the Group of Governmental Experts of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, and is making preparations for ratifying the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War.

China is firmly opposed to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. It supports the United Nations in playing its due role in non-proliferation. China is a party to all international treaties on non-proliferation and related international organizations. It has established a complete legal regime for controlling the export of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, missiles and other related sensitive items and technologies, and all defense items. China follows strict procedures in approving exports, to ensure effective export control.

Military Exchanges and Cooperation

China has established military ties with over 150 countries and military attaché offices in 107 countries. A total of 85 countries have military attaché offices in China. In the past two years, senior PLA delegations have

visited more than 60 countries, and defense ministers, commanders-in-chief of the services, chiefs of the general staff and other high-ranking officers and military-related officials from more than 90 countries have visited China. China and Russia hold regular high-level military exchanges, and the general staff headquarters of the two countries have held the ninth and tenth rounds of strategic consultations. The military activities connected with "Russia Year" were successful. In October 2005 and July 2006, Chinese and US military leaders exchanged visits. China and the US maintain in-depth exchanges through institutionalized defense consultations and maritime military security consultations. China has enhanced high-level military contacts and defense consultations with the European countries, and China-Europe military exchanges have progressed steadily. China maintains military contacts with its neighbors, and has enhanced military exchanges with other developing countries. Since 2005, China has held workshops for senior officers from Latin American and Middle Eastern countries, and China-Germany, China-France workshops for senior officers. It has also hosted the SCO defense and security forum and the China-ASEAN workshop on Asia-Pacific security issues. Since 2002, China has held 16 joint military exercises with 11 countries. In August 2005, China and Russia conducted the "Peace Mission-2005" joint military exercise in Russia's Vladivostok and China's Shandong Peninsula, and their respective offshore waters. In November and December 2005, the PLA Navy held joint maritime search and rescue exercises with its Pakistani, Indian and Thai counterparts, respectively. In September 2006, China and Tajikistan conducted the "Cooperation-2006" joint counter-terrorism military exercise. In September and November 2006, the Chinese Navy and the US Navy conducted joint maritime search and rescue exercises in the offshore waters of San Diego and in the South China Sea. In December 2006, China and Pakistan held the "Friendship-2006" joint counter-terrorism military exercise. In the past two years, the PLA has sent observers to military exercises held by Turkey, Thailand, Pakistan, India, the US and Australia. In September 2005, the PLA invited 41 military observers and military attachés from 24 countries to attend the "North Sword-2005" maneuvers organized by the Beijing Military Area Command. Naval ships from Thailand, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the Republic of Korea, France, Singapore and Peru have paid port visits to China. PLA naval ships have visited Pakistan, India, Thailand, the United States, Canada and the Philippines. In the past two years, the PLA has continued to expand exchanges of professional expertise and military students with its foreign counterparts. It has sent division- and brigade-level officers of combat troops and relevant functional organs of the Navy, Air Force, Second Artillery Force, military area commands, and general headquarters/departments on overseas study tours. Over 500 military personnel have been dispatched to study in more than 20 countries, and over 2,000 military personnel from more than 140 countries have come to China to study in military schools.

Participation in UN Peacekeeping Operations and International Disaster Relief Operations

Since 1990, China has sent 5,915 military personnel to participate in 16 UN peacekeeping operations. Eight lost their lives and several dozens were wounded on duty. Since 2000, China has sent 893 peacekeeping police officers to seven mission areas. At present, China has 1,487 military peacekeeping personnel serving in nine UN mission areas and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Among them, 92 military observers and staff officers, 175 engineering troops and 43 medical personnel are in Congo (Kinshasa); 275 engineering troops, 240 transportation troops and 43 medical personnel are in Liberia; 275 engineering troops, 100 transportation troops and 60 medical personnel are in Sudan; and 182 engineering troops are in Lebanon. China also has a total of 180 peacekeeping police officers in Liberia, Kosovo, Haiti and Sudan.

The PLA has actively participated in the international disaster relief operations conducted by the Chinese government. It has set up an emergency command mechanism, sent personnel to join specialized rescue teams, provided equipment, and assisted in mission-oriented training. In the past two years, PLA personnel have joined China's international rescue teams in international rescue operations after the Indian Ocean tsunami and the earthquakes in Pakistan and Indonesia. They have conducted search and rescue operations for people in distress, treatment of the sick and injured and prevention of epidemics, and assisted the Chinese government in providing relief materials to disaster-stricken countries.

LAMPIRAN 2

PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY 2000-2006

| Variabel | | Tahun | | | |
|--|-----------------------|--|--|--|---|
| | | 2000-2001 | 2001-2002 | 2002-2003 | 2003-2004 |
| Jumlah Total Angkatan Bersenjata | | 2.470.000 orang (full-time duty) 500.000-600.000 (reserves) | 2.310.000 orang (full-time duty) 500.000-600.000 (reserves) | 2.270.000 orang (full-time duty) 500.000-600.000 (reserves) | 2.250.000 (full-time duty) 500.000-600.000 (reserves) |
| Angkatan Darat (People's Liberation Army) | Jumlah Pasukan | 1.700.000 (sekitar 800.000 wajib militer) | 1.600.000 (sekitar 800.000 wajib militer)s | 1.600.000 (sekitar 800.000 wajib militer) | 1.700.000 (sekitar 800.000 wajib militer) |
| | Group Army | 44 divisi infanteri; 10 divisi <i>tank</i> , 12 brigade <i>tank</i> , 13 brigade infanteri, 5 divisi artileri, 20 brigade artileri, 7 resimen helikopter. | 44 divisi infanteri; 9 divisi <i>tank</i> , 12 brigade <i>tank</i> , 13 brigade infanteri, 6 divisi artileri, 3 brigade ATK*, 20 brigade artileri, 12 brigade penerbang | 44 divisi infanteri; 9 divisi <i>tank</i> , 12 brigade <i>tank</i> , 1 infanteri mekanis, 22 brigade infanteri motor, 6 divisi artileri, 15 brigade artileri, 1 brigade ATK*. 8 brigade SAM/AAA*, 13 brigade AAA*, 3 resimen penerbang | 44 divisi infanteri; 9 divisi <i>tank</i> , 12 brigade <i>tank</i> , 1 infanteri mekanis, 22 brigade infanteri motor, 7 divisi artileri, 14 brigade artileri, 1 brigade ATK*, 4 resimen ATK*, 9 brigade SAM/AAA*, 12 brigade AAA* |
| | Reserves | Sekitar 500-600.000; 50 infanteri, artileri dan divisi <i>Air Defense</i> , 100 infanteri independen, resimen artileri | 500.000-600.000; 70 infanteri, divisi artileri dan <i>air defense</i> , 100 infanteri independen, resimen artileri | 500.000-600.000; 70 infanteri, divisi artileri dan <i>air defense</i> , 100 infanteri independen, resimen artileri | 500.000-600.000; 30 infanteri (masing-masing terdiri dari 3 infanteri, 1 resimen artileri), 13 divisi pertahanan udara, 7 brigade dukungan logistik |
| | Deployments | Timur Laut: Shenyang <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (Distrik militer Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning): 250.000 pasukan: 4 <i>Group Army</i> ; 2 <i>tank</i> , 10 divisi infanteri, 1 brigade <i>tank</i> , 1 divisi artileri Utara: | Timur Laut: Shenyang <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (Distrik militer Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning): 250.000 pasukan: 4 <i>Group Army</i> ; 1 <i>tank</i> , 10 divisi infanteri, 1 brigade <i>tank</i> , 1 divisi artileri, 1 brigade | Timur Laut: Shenyang <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (Distrik militer Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning): 250.000 pasukan: 4 <i>Group Army</i> ; 2 <i>tank</i> , 2 mekanik, 3 motor, 1 divisi artileri; 2 <i>tank</i> , 5 motor, 3 | Timur Laut: Shenyang <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (Distrik militer Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning): 250.000 pasukan: 4 <i>Group Army</i> ; 2 <i>tank</i> , 2 mekanik, 3 motor, 1 divisi artileri; 2 <i>tank</i> , 5 |

| | | | | | |
|--|--|---|---|--|--|
| | | <p>Beijing Maritime Reconnaissance (Distrik militer Beijing, Tianjin Garrison, Nei Mongol, Hebei, Shanxi): 300.000 pasukan: 5 <i>Group Army</i>, 2 <i>tank</i>, 12 divisi infanteri, 3 brigade <i>tank</i>, 3 brigade infanteri, 1 divisi artileri</p> <p>Barat:</p> <p>Lanzhou Maritime Reconnaissance (Distrik militer Ningxia, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qing-hai, Xinjiang): 220.000 pasukan: 2 <i>Group Army</i>, 2 <i>tank</i>, 4 divisi infanteri, 1 brigade <i>tank</i></p> <p>Barat Daya:</p> <p>Chengdu Maritime Reconnaissance (Distrik militer Chongqing Garrison, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Xizang) : 180.000 pasukan: 2 <i>Group Army</i>, 4 infanteri, 1 divisi artileri ditambah 2 brigade <i>tank</i></p> <p>Selatan:</p> <p>Guangzhou Maritime Reconnaissance (Distrik militer Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan): 180.000 pasukan: 2 <i>Group Army</i>, 4 infanteri ditambah 2 brigade <i>tank</i></p> <p>Hong Kong: 7.000 pasukan: 1 brigade infanteri (3 infanteri, 1 infanteri mekanik, 1 resimen artileri, 1 batalion <i>engineer</i>), 1 unit helikopter</p> <p>Pusat:</p> | <p>ATK*</p> <p>Utara:</p> <p>Beijing Maritime Reconnaissance (Distrik militer Beijing, Tianjin Garrison, Nei Mongol, Hebei, Shanxi): 300.000 pasukan: 5 <i>Group Army</i>, 2 <i>tank</i>, 12 divisi infanteri, 3 brigade <i>tank</i>, 3 brigade infanteri, 1 divisi artileri, 1 brigade ATK*</p> <p>Barat:</p> <p>Lanzhou Maritime Reconnaissance (Distrik militer Ningxia, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qing-hai, Xinjiang): 220.000 pasukan: 2 <i>Group Army</i>, 2 <i>tank</i>, 4 divisi infanteri, 1 brigade <i>tank</i></p> <p>Barat Daya:</p> <p>Chengdu Maritime Reconnaissance (Distrik militer Chongqing Garrison, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Xizang) : 180.000 pasukan: 2 <i>Group Army</i>, 4 infanteri, 1 divisi artileri ditambah 2 brigade <i>tank</i></p> <p>Selatan:</p> <p>Guangzhou Maritime Reconnaissance (Distrik militer Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan): 180.000 pasukan: 2 <i>Group Army</i>, 4 infanteri ditambah 2 brigade <i>tank</i>.</p> <p>Hong Kong: 7.000 pasukan: 1</p> | <p>artileri, 1 SAM/AAA*, 3 AAA*, 1 brigade ATK*</p> <p>Utara:</p> <p>Beijing Maritime Reconnaissance (Distrik militer Beijing, Tianjin Garrison, Nei Mongol, Hebei, Shanxi): 300.000 pasukan: 5 <i>Group Army</i>; 2 <i>tank</i>, 1 mekanik, 5 motor, 1 divisi artileri; 3 <i>tank</i>, 7 infanteri motor, 4 artileri, 2 SAM/AAA*, 3 brigade AAA*; 1 resimen ATK*</p> <p>Barat:</p> <p>Lanzhou Maritime Reconnaissance (Distrik militer Ningxia, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qing-hai, Xinjiang): 220.000 pasukan: 2 <i>Group Army</i>; 1 <i>tank</i>, 2 divisi infanteri motor; 1 <i>tank</i>, 2 infanteri motor, 2 artileri, 2 brigade AAA*; 1 resimen ATK*</p> <p>Barat Daya:</p> <p>Chengdu Maritime Reconnaissance (Distrik militer Chongqing Garrison, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Xizang) : 180.000 pasukan: 2 <i>Group Army</i>; 4 infanteri motor, 1 divisi artileri; 2 <i>tank</i>, 1 artileri, 2 brigade AAA*</p> <p>Selatan:</p> <p>Guangzhou Maritime Reconnaissance (Distrik militer Hubei, Hunan,</p> | <p>motor, 3 artileri, 1 SAM/AAA*, 3 AAA*, 1 brigade ATK*</p> <p>Utara:</p> <p>Beijing Maritime Reconnaissance (Distrik militer Beijing, Tianjin Garrison, Nei Mongol, Hebei, Shanxi): 300.000 pasukan: 5 <i>Group Army</i>; 2 <i>tank</i>, 1 mekanik, 5 motor, 1 divisi artileri; 3 <i>tank</i>, 7 infanteri motor, 4 artileri, 2 SAM/AAA*, 3 brigade AAA*; 1 resimen ATK*</p> <p>Barat:</p> <p>Lanzhou Maritime Reconnaissance (Distrik militer Ningxia, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qing-hai, Xinjiang): 220.000 pasukan: 2 <i>Group Army</i>; 1 <i>tank</i>, 2 infanteri motor; 1 divisi artileri; 1 <i>tank</i>, 2 infanteri motor, 1 artileri, 1 brigade AAA*; 1 resimen ATK*</p> <p>Barat Daya:</p> <p>Chengdu Maritime Reconnaissance (Distrik militer Chongqing Garrison, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Xizang) : 180.000 pasukan: 2 <i>Group Army</i>; 4 infanteri motor, 1 divisi artileri; 2 <i>tank</i>, 1 artileri, 2 brigade AAA*</p> <p>Selatan:</p> |
|--|--|---|---|--|--|

| | | | | | |
|--|--|--|--|--|---|
| | | <p>Jinan <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (distrik militer Shandong, Henan): 190.000 pasukan: 3 <i>Group Army</i>, 3 <i>tank</i>, 7 divisi infanteri, 2 brigade <i>tank</i>, 4 brigade infanteri, 1 divisi artileri</p> <p>Timur: Nanjing <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (Distrik militer Shanghai Garrison, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Jiangxi, Anhui): 250.000 pasukan: 3 <i>Group Army</i>, 1 <i>tank</i>, 5 divisi infanteri, 1 brigade <i>tank</i>, 3 brigade infanteri, 1 divisi artileri</p> | <p>brigade infanteri (3 infanteri, 1 infanteri mekanik, 1 resimen artileri, 1 batalion <i>engineer</i>), 1 unit helikopter</p> <p>Pusat: Jinan <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (distrik militer Shandong, Henan): 190.000 pasukan: 3 <i>Group Army</i>, 2 <i>tank</i>, 7 divisi infanteri, 1 brigade <i>tank</i>, 4 brigade infanteri, 1 divisi artileri, beberapa brigade artileri</p> <p>Timur: Nanjing <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (Distrik militer Shanghai Garrison, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Jiangxi, Anhui): 250.000 pasukan: 3 <i>Group Army</i>, 2 <i>tank</i>, 5 divisi infanteri, 1 brigade <i>tank</i>, 3 brigade infanteri, 1 divisi artileri, 1 brigade ATK*</p> | <p>Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan): 180.000 pasukan: 2 <i>Group Army</i>; 4 infanteri motor, 1 divisi artileri; 2 <i>tank</i>, 1 artileri, 1 SAM/AAA*, 1 brigade AAA*</p> <p>Hong Kong: 7.000 pasukan: 1 brigade infanteri (3 infanteri, 1 infanteri mekanik, 1 resimen artileri, 1 batalion <i>engineer</i>), 1 unit helikopter</p> <p>Pusat: Jinan <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (distrik militer Shandong, Henan): 190.000 pasukan: 3 <i>Group Army</i>; 2 <i>tank</i>, 1 infanteri mekanik, 3 infanteri motor, 1 divisi artileri; 1 <i>tank</i>, 1 infanteri mekanik, 4 infanteri motor, 2 artileri, 2 SAM/AAA*, 1 brigade AAA*</p> <p>Timur: Nanjing <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (Distrik militer Shanghai Garrison, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Jiangxi, Anhui): 250.000 pasukan: 3 <i>Group Army</i>; 2 <i>tank</i>, 1 infanteri mekanik, 4 infanteri motor, 2 artileri, 2 SAM/AAA*, 1 brigade AAA; 1 resimen ATK*</p> | <p>Guangzhou <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (Distrik militer Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan): 180.000 pasukan: 2 <i>Group Army</i>; 4 infanteri motor, 1 divisi artileri; 2 <i>tank</i>, 1 artileri, 1 SAM/AAA*, 1 brigade AAA*</p> <p>Hong Kong: 7.000 pasukan: 1 brigade infanteri (3 infanteri, 1 infanteri mekanik, 1 resimen artileri, 1 batalion <i>engineer</i>), 1 unit helikopter</p> <p>Pusat: Jinan <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (distrik militer Shandong, Henan): 190.000 pasukan: 3 <i>Group Army</i>; 2 <i>tank</i>, 1 infanteri mekanik, 3 infanteri motor, 1 divisi artileri; 1 <i>tank</i>, 1 infanteri mekanik, 4 infanteri motor, 2 artileri, 2 SAM/AAA*, 1 brigade AAA*</p> <p>Timur: Nanjing <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (Distrik militer Shanghai Garrison, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Jiangxi, Anhui): 250.000 pasukan: 3 <i>Group Army</i>; 2 <i>tank</i>, 1 infanteri mekanik, 3 infanteri motor, 1 divisi</p> |
|--|--|--|--|--|---|

| | | | | | |
|----------------------|-------------------------------------|--|---|---|---|
| | | | | | artileri; 1 tank, 4 infanteri motor, 2 artileri, 2 SAM/AAA*, 1 brigade AAA; 1 resimen ATK* |
| Angkatan Laut | Jumlah pasukan | 220.000 (termasuk <i>Coastal Regional Defense Forces</i> , 26.000 penerbang, 5.000 <i>marines</i> , 40.000 wajib militer) | 250.000 (termasuk <i>Coastal Regional Defense Forces</i> , 26.000 penerbang, 10.000 <i>marines</i> , 40.000 wajib militer) | 250.000 (termasuk <i>Coastal Regional Defense Forces</i> , 26.000 penerbang, 10.000 <i>marines</i> , 40.000 wajib militer) | 250.000 (termasuk <i>Coastal Regional Defense Forces</i> , 26.000 penerbang, 10.000 <i>marines</i> , 40.000 wajib militer) |
| | Submarine | 65 buah: 1 buah kapal selam strategis (misil balistik dengan tenaga nuklir); 64 kapal selam taktis (5 SSN*, 1 SSG*, 57 SSK*, dan 1 SS* bertenaga diesel) | 69 buah: 1 buah kapal selam strategis (misil balistik dengan tenaga nuklir); 67 kapal selam taktis (5 SSN*, 61 SSK*, dan 1 SS*) | 69 buah: 1 buah kapal selam strategis (misil balistik dengan tenaga nuklir); 67 kapal selam taktis (5 SSN*, 1 SSG*, 61 SSK*, dan 1 SS*) | 69 buah: 1 buah kapal selam strategis (misil balistik dengan tenaga nuklir); 67 kapal selam taktis (5 SSN*, 1 SSG*, 61 SSK*, dan 1 SS*) |
| | Principal Surface Combatans | 60 buah: 20 Penghancur 40 <i>Frigates*</i> | 62 buah: 21 Penghancur 41 <i>Frigates*</i> | 63 buah: 21 Penghancur 42 <i>Frigates*</i> | 63 buah: 21 Penghancur 42 <i>Frigates*</i> |
| | Patrol and Coastal Combatant | 368 buah: 93 <i>missile craft</i> , 16 <i>torpedo craft</i> , 259 <i>patrol craft</i> | 368 buah: 93 <i>missile craft</i> , 16 <i>torpedo craft</i> , 259 <i>patrol craft</i> | 368 buah: 93 <i>missile craft</i> , 16 <i>torpedo craft</i> , 259 <i>patrol craft</i> | 368 buah: 93 <i>missile craft</i> , 16 <i>torpedo craft</i> , 259 <i>patrol craft</i> |

| | | | | | |
|--|--|--|---|---|--|
| | Amfibi | 59 buah | 56 buah | 56 buah | 56 buah |
| | Coastal Regional Defence Forces | 40 artileri independen dan 10 resimen SSM* | 40 artileri independen dan 10 resimen SSM* | 40 artileri independen dan 10 resimen SSM* | 40 artileri independen dan 10 resimen SSM* |
| | Marines | 5.000 pasukan: 2 brigade, 3 divisi amfibi | 10.000 pasukan: 2 brigade, 3 divisi amfibi | 10.000 pasukan: 2 brigade, 3 divisi amfibi | 10.000 pasukan: 2 brigade, 3 divisi amfibi |
| | Naval Air Forces | 25.000 orang | 26.000 orang | 26.000 orang | 26.000 orang |
| | Deployments and Bases | <p><u>NORTH SEA FLEET:</u> Coastal Defence terbentang dari perbatasan Korea Utara (Sungai Yalu) sampai Lianyungang bagian selatan (35° 10' N); terkoneksi dengan Shenyang, Beijing dan Jinan <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> sampai zona laut.</p> <p>BASES: Qingdao (pusat kontrol), Dalian, Huludao, Weihai, Chengshan, Yuchi; 9 distrik <i>Coastal Defence</i></p> <p>FORCES: 2 kapal selam bertenaga diesel, 3 <i>escort</i>, 1 <i>mine countermeasures</i>, 1 skuadron amfibi; ditambah kelompok kecil kapal "Bohai Gulf" untuk pelatihan; sekitar 300 patroli dan <i>coastal</i></p> | <p><u>NORTH SEA FLEET:</u> Coastal Defence terbentang dari perbatasan Korea Utara (Sungai Yalu) sampai Lianyungang bagian selatan (35° 10' N); terkoneksi dengan Shenyang, Beijing dan Jinan <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> sampai zona laut.</p> <p>BASES: Qingdao (pusat kontrol), Dalian, Huludao, Weihai, Chengshan, Yuchi; 9 distrik <i>Coastal Defence</i></p> <p>FORCES: mengalami perkembangan, masih dalam pengamatan</p> <p><u>EAST SEA FLEET:</u> Coastal Defence terbentang dari Lianyungang bagian</p> | <p><u>NORTH SEA FLEET:</u> Coastal Defence terbentang dari perbatasan Korea Utara (Sungai Yalu) sampai Lianyungang bagian selatan (35° 10' N); terkoneksi dengan Shenyang, Beijing dan Jinan <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> sampai zona laut.</p> <p>BASES: Qingdao (pusat kontrol), Dalian, Huludao, Weihai, Chengshan, Yuchi; 9 distrik <i>Coastal Defence</i></p> <p>FORCES: mengalami perkembangan, masih dalam pengamatan</p> <p><u>EAST SEA FLEET:</u> Coastal Defence terbentang dari Lianyungang bagian</p> | <p><u>NORTH SEA FLEET:</u> Coastal Defence terbentang dari perbatasan Korea Utara (Sungai Yalu) sampai Lianyungang bagian selatan (35° 10' N); terkoneksi dengan Shenyang, Beijing dan Jinan <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> sampai zona laut.</p> <p>BASES: Qingdao (pusat kontrol), Dalian, Huludao, Weihai, Chengshan, Yuchi; 9 distrik <i>Coastal Defence</i></p> <p>FORCES: mengalami perkembangan, masih dalam pengamatan</p> <p><u>EAST SEA FLEET:</u> Coastal Defence</p> |

| | | | | | |
|--|--|---|--|--|---|
| | | <p><i>combatants</i> EAST SEA FLEET: <i>Coastal Defence</i> terbentang dari Lianyungang bagian selatan sampai Dongshan (35° 10' N sampai 23° 30' N) terkoneksi dengan Nanjing <i>military region</i> sampai zona laut. BASES: Danau Dongqian (pusat kontrol), Shanghai <i>naval base</i>, Dinghai, Hangzhou, Xiangshan; 7 distrik <i>Coastal Defence</i> FORCES: 2 kapal selam bertenaga diesel, 3 <i>escort</i>, 1 <i>mine countermeasures</i>, 1 skuadron amfibi; sekitar 250 patroli dan <i>coastal combatants</i> Marines: 1 divisi Coastal Regional Defence Forces: Distrik Pantai Nanjing SOUTH SEA FLEET: <i>Coastal Defence</i> terbentang dari Dongshan (23° 30' N) sampai perbatasan Vietnam; terkoneksi dengan <i>Guangzhou Maritime Reconnaissance</i> sampai zona laut (termasuk Kepulauan Paracel dan Spratly) BASE: Hong Kong Patrol and Coastal Combatants: 4 buah kapal patroli pantai (dengan 6 buah YJ-8/C-801 SSM*) dan 4 buah</p> | <p>selatan sampai Dongshan (35° 10' N sampai 23° 30' N) terkoneksi dengan Nanjing <i>military region</i> sampai zona laut. BASES: Danau Dongqian (pusat kontrol), Shanghai <i>naval base</i>, Dinghai, Hangzhou, Xiangshan; 7 distrik <i>Coastal Defence</i> SOUTH SEA FLEET: <i>Coastal Defence</i> terbentang dari Dongshan (23° 30' N) sampai perbatasan Vietnam; terkoneksi dengan <i>Guangzhou Maritime Reconnaissance</i> sampai zona laut (termasuk Kepulauan Paracel dan Spratly) BASE: Hong Kong, Yulin, Guangzhou</p> | <p>selatan sampai Dongshan (35° 10' N sampai 23° 30' N) terkoneksi dengan Nanjing <i>military region</i> sampai zona laut. BASES: Danau Dongqian (pusat kontrol), Shanghai <i>naval base</i>, Dinghai, Hangzhou, Xiangshan; 7 distrik <i>Coastal Defence</i> SOUTH SEA FLEET: <i>Coastal Defence</i> terbentang dari Dongshan (23° 30' N) sampai perbatasan Vietnam; terkoneksi dengan <i>Guangzhou Maritime Reconnaissance</i> sampai zona laut (termasuk Kepulauan Paracel dan Spratly) BASE: Hong Kong, Yulin, Guangzhou</p> | <p>terbentang dari Lianyungang bagian selatan sampai Dongshan (35° 10' N sampai 23° 30' N) terkoneksi dengan Nanjing <i>military region</i> sampai zona laut. BASES: Danau Dongqian (pusat kontrol), Shanghai <i>naval base</i>, Dinghai, Hangzhou, Xiangshan; 7 distrik <i>Coastal Defence</i> SOUTH SEA FLEET: <i>Coastal Defence</i> terbentang dari Dongshan (23° 30' N) sampai perbatasan Vietnam; terkoneksi dengan <i>Guangzhou Maritime Reconnaissance</i> sampai zona laut (termasuk Kepulauan Paracel dan Spratly) BASE: Hong Kong, Yulin, Guangzhou</p> |
|--|--|---|--|--|---|

| | | | | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|---|---|---|---|
| | | <p>kapal patroli <i>inshore</i>. Support and Miscellaneous: 2 buah <i>landing ship medium</i> kapasitas 250 pasukan dan 2 <i>tank</i>, dan 3 buah <i>Catamaran</i> OTHER BASES: Zhanjiang (pusat kontrol), Shantou, Guangzhou, Haikou, Dongguan City, Yulin, Beihai, Huangpu; ditambah pos di Kepulauan Paracel dan Spratly; 9 distrik <i>Coastal Defence</i> FORCES: 2 buah kapal selam bertenaga diesel, 2 <i>escort</i>, 1 <i>mine countermeasures</i>, 1 skuadron amfibi; sekitar 300 patroli dan <i>coastal combatants</i>. Marines: 1 brigade</p> | | | |
| Angkatan Udara | Jumlah Pasukan | 420.000; (Termasuk kekuatan strategis, 220.000 personil Air Defense, dan 160.000 wajib militer) | 420.000; (Termasuk kekuatan strategis, 220.000 personil Air Defense, dan 160.000 wajib militer) | 420.000; (Termasuk kekuatan strategis, 220.000 personil Air Defense, dan 160.000 wajib militer) | 400.000; (Termasuk kekuatan strategis, 220.000 personil Air Defense, dan 160.000 wajib militer) |
| | Bomber | 3 resimen dengan 120 buah H-6E/F (beberapa bersenjata nuklir, 30 buah dimodifikasi untuk membawa <i>Anti-Surface Unit Warfare Missile</i> YJ-6/C-601) | 1-2 resimen dengan 40 buah H-5, 3 resimen dengan 110 buah H-6E/F (beberapa bersenjata nuklir, 30 buah dimodifikasi untuk membawa <i>Anti-Surface Unit Warfare Missile</i> YJ-6/C-601), H-6H (dapat membawa YJ-63) | 6 resimen dengan 120 buah H-6E/F (1 resimen berkekuatan nuklir), 1resimen dengan 20 buah H-6H (dapat membawa YJ-63), 1 resimen pelatihan dengan 40 buah H-5 | 6 resimen dengan 120 buah H-6E/F (1 resimen berkekuatan nuklir), 1resimen dengan 20 buah H-6H (dapat membawa YJ-63), 1 resimen pelatihan dengan 40 buah H-5 |
| | Fighter | 400 buah J-7II/IIA/IIH/IIIM, 100 | 300 buah J-7II/IIA, | 300 buah J-7II/IIA, | 39 resimen dengan sekitar |

| | | | | | |
|--|--|--|---|--|--|
| | | buah J-7III, 200 buah J-7E, 100 buah J-8A/E, 150 buah J-8B/D, 65 buah Su-27SK/UBK Flanker (J-11) | 50 buah J-7IIH, 24 buah J-7IIM, 100 buah J-7III, 150 buah J-7E, 70 buah J-8A/E, 100 buah J-8B/D, 70 buah Su-27, 20 buah Su-27UBK | 50 buah J-7IIH, 24 buah J-7IIM, 80 buah J-7III, Lebih 200 buah J-7E, 40 buah J-8IIA, 104 buah J-8B/D, 60 buah J-8E, 70 buah Su-27, 20 buah Su-27UBK | 1000 angkutan udara: 400 buah J-7II/IIA (16 resimen), 50 buah J-7IIH (2 resimen), 24 buah J-7IIM (1 resimen), 50 buah J-7C/D (2 resimen), 150 buah J-7E (6 resimen), 20 buah J-8 (1 resimen), 40 buah J-8IIA (2 resimen), 50 buah J-8IIB (2 resimen), 24 buah J-8IID (1 resimen), 50 buah J-8E (2 resimen), 100 buah Su-27SK/UBK J- 11 (4 resimen) |
| Fighter Ground Attack | Lebih dari 40 buah Su-30 MKK, 300 buah Q-5, 60 resimen dengan sekitar 1.500 buah J-6/B/D/E | Lebih dari 40 buah Su-30 MKK, 300 buah Q-5, 60 resimen dengan lebih dari 1.500 buah J-6/B/D/E | 38 buah Su-30 MKK, 300 buah Q-5, sekitar 20 resimen dengan lebih dari 500 buah J-6/B/D/E | 24 resimen dengan 700 angkutan udara: 300 buah J-6 (10 resimen), 50 buah J-6A (2 resimen), 300 buah Q-5 C/D (9 resimen), 58 buah Su-30 MKK (3 resimen) | |
| Reconnaissance/ Electronic Intelligence | 290 buah: 40 buah HZ-5 100 buah JZ-6 Beberapa JZ-7, 2 buah Tu-154M | 290 buah: 40 buah HZ-5 100 buah JZ-6 Beberapa JZ-7, 4 buah Tu-154M | 290 buah: 40 buah HZ-5 100 buah JZ-6 Beberapa JZ-7, 4 buah Tu-154M | 290 buah: 40 buah HZ-5 100 buah JZ-6 Beberapa JZ-7, 4 buah Tu-154M | |
| Transport | 425 buah: 15 buah Tu-154M, 2 buah Il-18, 14 buah Il-76MD, 300 buah Y-5, 45 buah Y-7/An-24/An-26, 68 buah Y-8/An-12, 15 buah Y-11, 8 buah Y-12, 6 buah Boeing 737-200 (VIP), | 513 buah: 15 buah Tu-154M, 2 buah Il-18, 14 buah Il-76MD, 300 buah Y-5, 100 buah Y-7/An-24/An-26, 48 buah Y-8/An-12, 15 buah Y-11, 8 buah Y-12, 6 buah Boeing 737-200 | 513 buah: 15 buah Tu-154M, 2 buah Il-18, 20 buah Il-76MD, 300 buah Y-5, 100 buah Y-7/An-24/An-26, 48 buah Y-8/An-12, 15 buah Y-11, 8 buah Y-12, 6 buah Boeing 737-200 (VIP), | 513 buah: 15 buah Tu-154M, 2 buah Il-18, 20 buah Il-76MD, 300 buah Y-5, 100 buah Y-7/An-24/An-26, 48 buah Y-8/An-12, 15 buah Y-11, 8 buah Y-12, 6 buah Boeing 737-200 | |

| | | | | | |
|------------------------------|--|---|--|--|---|
| | | 2 buah CL-601 <i>Challenger</i> | (VIP), 5 buah CL-601 <i>Challenger</i> | 5 buah CL-601 <i>Challenger</i> | (VIP), 5 buah CL-601 <i>Challenger</i> |
| Tanker | | 6 buah HY-6 | Lebih dari 10 buah HY-6 | 1 resimen dengan 8 buah HY-6 | 1 resimen dengan 10 buah HY-6 |
| Helicopter | | 170 buah: 6 buah AS-332 (VIP), 4 buah Bell 214, 30 buah Mi-8, 100 buah Z-5, 30 buah Z-9 | 170 buah: 6 buah AS-332 (VIP), 4 buah Bell 214, 40 buah Mi-8, 20 buah Z-9 | 170 buah: 6 buah AS-332 (VIP), 4 buah Bell 214, 40 buah Mi-8, 20 buah Z-9 | 100 buah: 6 buah AS-332 (VIP), 4 buah Bell 214, 40 buah Mi-8, 20 buah Z-9 |
| Training | | 200 buah: Termasuk HJ-5, JJ-6, JJ-7, JL-8, k-8, PT-6 (CJ-6) | 200 buah: Termasuk HJ-5, JJ-6, JJ-7, JL-8, k-8, PT-6 (CJ-6) | 200 buah: Termasuk HJ-5, JJ-6, JJ-7, JL-8, k-8, PT-6 (CJ-6) | 200 buah: Termasuk HJ-5, JJ-6, JJ-7, JL-8, k-8, PT-6 (CJ-6) |
| Missiles | | AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE: PL-2, PL-5, PL-8, PL-9, lebih dari 250 buah AA-10, lebih dari 250 buah AA-11, <i>Phyton</i> 3, 100 buah AA-12 untuk pemesanan Su-30 MKK AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE: YJ-6/C-601, YJ-61/C-611, HY-2/HY-4; YJ-81K/C-801K, YJ-81K UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE: Chang Hong 1 | AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE: PL-2, PL-5, PL-8, PL-9, lebih dari 250 buah AA-10, lebih dari 250 buah AA-11, <i>Phyton</i> 3, 100 buah AA-12 untuk pemesanan Su-30 MKK AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE: YJ-6/C-601, YJ-61/C-611, YJ-63, HY-2/HY-4; YJ-81K/C-801K UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE: Chang Hong 1 | AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE: PL-2, PL-5, PL-8, PL-9, lebih dari 250 buah AA-10, lebih dari 250 buah AA-11, <i>Phyton</i> 3, 100 buah AA-12 untuk pemesanan Su-30 MKK AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE: YJ-6/C-601, YJ-61/C-611, YJ-63, HY-2/HY-4; YJ-81K/C-801K UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE: Chang Hong 1 | AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE: PL-2B, PL-5B, PL-8, 1200 buah P27 (AA-10), 3200 buah P-73 (AA-11), 100 buah P77 (AA-12) AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE: Kh-29 (AS-14), Kh-31P (AS-17), Kh-59 (AS-18), YJ-63 UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE: Chang Hong 1 |
| Air Defence Artillery | | 8000 buah, 8 resimen | 10 brigade Air Defense (6 brigade campuran AAA/SAM*, 4 brigade AAA*) | 3 divisi SAM*, 1 divisi campuran SAM/AAA*; 11 brigade Air Defense (7 brigade SAM*, 4 brigade AAA*) | 3 divisi SAM*, 1 divisi campuran SAM/AAA*; 11 brigade Air Defense (6 brigade SAM*, 4 brigade AAA*), <i>Beijing Maritime Reconnaissance</i> : 3 SAM*, 1 divisi SAM/AAA* <i>Shenyang Maritime</i> |

| | | | | | |
|---------------------------------|--|---|---|---|--|
| | | | | | <i>Reconnaissance: 1 SAM*, 1 brigade AAA* Jinan Maritime Reconnaissance: 1 brigade AA* Ninjing Maritime Reconnaissance: 2 SAM*, 1 brigade AAA* Guangzhou: 2 brigade SAM* Chengdu: 1 brigade SAM*</i> |
| Strategic Missile Forces | <p>OFFENSIVE: (lebih dari 100.000 buah), terorganisasi dalam 6 basis ditambah 1 basis percobaan, dengan brigade/resimen termasuk 1 misil percobaan dan resimen pelatihan; sistem organisasi bervariasi bergantung pada tipe misil tetapi kemungkinan termasuk lebih dari 5 basis resimen bantuan per basis misil</p> <p>INTER-CONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE: Lebih dari 20 buah [DF-5A (CSS-4)]</p> <p>INTERMEDIATE-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE: Lebih dari 100 buah; 20% DF-4 (CSS-3) 30% DF-3A (CSS-2) 50% DF-21 (CSS-5)</p> <p>SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE: 1 kapal selam bertenaga nuklir <i>Xia</i> dengan 12 CSS-N-3 (JL-1)</p> | <p>OFFENSIVE: (lebih dari 100.000 buah), terorganisasi ke dalam 18 brigade luncur dengan 6 misil di dalamnya; sistem organisasi bervariasi bergantung pada tipe misil; satu basis percobaan dan satu basis pelatihan</p> <p>INTER-CONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE: Lebih dari 20 buah [DF-5A (CSS-4)] Brigade pertama DF-31 (CSS-9)</p> <p>INTERMEDIATE-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE: 130-150 buah; Lebih dari 20 buah DF-4 (CSS-3) 60-80 buah DF-3A (CSS-2) 50 buah DF-21 (CSS-5)</p> <p>SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE: 1 kapal selam bertenaga nuklir <i>Xia</i> dengan 12 CSS-N-</p> | <p>OFFENSIVE: (lebih dari 100.000 buah), terorganisasi ke dalam 18 brigade luncur dengan 6 misil di dalamnya; sistem organisasi bervariasi bergantung pada tipe misil; satu basis percobaan dan satu basis pelatihan</p> <p>INTER-CONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE: Lebih dari 20 buah [DF-5A (CSS-4)] Brigade pertama DF-31 (CSS-9)</p> <p>INTERMEDIATE-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE: 130-150 buah; Lebih dari 20 buah DF-4 (CSS-3) 60-80 buah DF-3A (CSS-2) 50 buah DF-21 (CSS-5)</p> <p>SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE: 1 kapal selam bertenaga nuklir <i>Xia</i> dengan 12 CSS-N-</p> | <p>OFFENSIVE: (lebih dari 100.000 buah), terorganisasi ke dalam 21 brigade luncur dengan 7 misil di dalamnya; sistem organisasi bervariasi bergantung pada tipe misil; satu basis percobaan dan satu basis pelatihan</p> <p>INTER-CONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE: Lebih dari 30 buah; 3 brigade DF-5A (CSS-4) 1 brigade DF-31 (CSS-9)</p> <p>INTERMEDIATE-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE: Lebih dari 110 buah; Lebih dari 20 buah DF-4 (CSS-3) → 3 brigade 32 buah DF-3A (CSS-2) → 4 brigade 60 buah DF-21 (CSS-5) → 5 brigade</p> <p>SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE:</p> | |

| | | | | | |
|---|---------------------------------------|--|---|---|--|
| | | <p>SHORT RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE: Sekitar 20 DF-15 dengan lebih dari 200 misil (CSS-6 / M-9 dengan jarak tembak 600 km) 40 DF-11 (CSS-7 / M-11 dengan jarak tembak 120-300 km)</p> <p>DEFENSIVE: Tracking Stations; Xinjiang (menjangkau Asia Tengah) dan Shanxi (perbatasan Utara) Phased-array Radar Complex: sistem peringatan dini misil-balistik</p> | <p>3 (JL-1)</p> <p>SHORT RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE: Sekitar 25 DF-15 dengan lebih dari 160 misil (CSS-6 / M-9 dengan jarak tembak 600 km) 25 DF-11 dengan 175 misil (CSS-7 / M-11 dengan jarak tembak 120-300 km)</p> <p>DEFENSIVE: Tracking Stations; Xinjiang (menjangkau Asia Tengah) dan Shanxi (perbatasan Utara) Phased-array Radar Complex: sistem peringatan dini misil-balistik</p> | <p>3 (JL-1)</p> <p>SHORT RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE: Sekitar 25 DF-15 dengan lebih dari 160 misil (CSS-6 / M-9 dengan jarak tembak 600 km) 25 DF-11 dengan 175 misil (CSS-7 / M-11 dengan jarak tembak 120-300 km)</p> <p>DEFENSIVE: Tracking Stations; Xinjiang (menjangkau Asia Tengah) dan Shanxi (perbatasan Utara) Phased-array Radar Complex: sistem peringatan dini misil-balistik</p> | <p>1 kapal selam bertenaga nuklir Xia dengan 12 CSS-N-3 (JL-1)</p> <p>SHORT RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE: Sekitar 25 DF-15 dengan lebih dari 160 misil (CSS-6 / M-9 dengan jarak tembak 600 km) 25 DF-11A dengan 175 misil (CSS-7 / M-11 dengan jarak tembak 120-300 km) 30 DF-7 (CSS-8) dengan 450 misil</p> <p>DEFENSIVE: Tracking Stations; Xinjiang (menjangkau Asia Tengah) dan Shanxi (perbatasan Utara) Phased-array Radar Complex: sistem peringatan dini misil-balistik</p> |
| Paramilitary (PEOPLE'S ARMED POLICE) | Jumlah Pasukan Kelompok Divisi | 1.300.000 | 1.500.000 | 1.500.000 | 1.500.000 |
| | | 45 divisi (14 diantaranya terdiri dari masing-masing 4 resimen; 1-2 divisi tiap propinsi) termasuk Internal Security (800.000), Border Defence (100.000) Guards (69.000) | 45 divisi (14 diantaranya terdiri dari masing-masing 4 resimen; 1-2 divisi tiap propinsi) termasuk Internal Security (800.000), Border Defence (100.000) Guards (69.000) | 45 divisi (14 diantaranya terdiri dari masing-masing 4 resimen; 1-2 divisi tiap propinsi) termasuk Internal Security (800.000), Border Defence (100.000) Guards (69.000) | 45 divisi (14 diantaranya terdiri dari masing-masing 4 resimen; 1-2 divisi tiap propinsi) termasuk Internal Security (800.000), Border Defence (100.000) Guards (69.000) |

| | |
|-----------------|--------------|
| Variabel | Tahun |
|-----------------|--------------|

| | | 2004-2005 | 2005-2006 | 2006 |
|--|-----------------------|--|--|--|
| Jumlah Total Angkatan Bersenjata | | 2.255.000 (full-time duty) 800.000 (reserves) | 2.255.000 (full-time duty) 800.000 (reserves) | 2.255.000 (full-time duty) 800.000 (reserves) |
| Angkatan Darat (People's Liberation Army) | Jumlah Pasukan | 1.600.000 (sekitar 800.000 wajib militer) | 1.600.000 (sekitar 800.000 wajib militer) | 1.600.000 (sekitar 800.000 wajib militer) |
| | Group Army | 44 divisi infanteri, 9 divisi <i>tank</i> , 12 brigade <i>tank</i> , 1 infanteri mekanis, 22 brigade infanteri motor, 7 divisi artileri, 14 brigade artileri, 1 brigade ATK*, 4 resimen ATK*, 9 brigade SAM/AAA*, 12 brigade AAA* | Organisasi bersifat variatif, pada umumnya tersusun dari 2-3 brigade/divisi infanteri motor/mekanik, 1 divisi/brigade <i>tank</i> , 1 divisi/brigade artileri, 1 brigade SAM/AAA* atau AAA* | Organisasi bersifat variatif, pada umumnya tersusun dari 2-3 brigade/divisi infanteri motor/mekanik, 1 divisi/brigade <i>tank</i> , 1 divisi/brigade artileri, 1 brigade SAM/AAA* atau AAA* |
| | Reserves | 800.000; 30 infanteri (1 resimen artileri tiap 3 infanteri), 3 artileri, 13 divisi <i>Air Defence</i> , 7 brigade dukungan logistik | 800.000; 30 divisi infanteri (1 resimen artileri tiap 3 infanteri); 12 divisi <i>Air Defence</i> ; 7 brigade dukungan logistik | 800.000; 30 divisi infanteri (1 resimen artileri tiap 3 infanteri); 12 divisi <i>Air Defence</i> ; 7 brigade dukungan logistik |
| | Deployments | Timur Laut: <i>Shenyang Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (Distrik militer Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning): 250.000 pasukan: 4 <i>Group Army</i> ; 2 <i>tank</i> , 2 mekanik, 3 motor, 1 divisi artileri; 2 <i>tank</i> , 5 motor, 3 artileri, 1 SAM/AAA*, 3 AAA*, 1 brigade ATK* Utara: <i>Beijing Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (Distrik militer Beijing, Tianjin Garrison, Nei Mongol, Hebei, Shanxi): 300.000 pasukan: 5 <i>Group Army</i> ; 2 <i>tank</i> , 1 mekanik, 5 motor, 1 divisi artileri; 3 <i>tank</i> , 7 infanteri motor, 4 artileri, 2 SAM/AAA*, 3 brigade AAA*; 1 resimen ATK* Barat: <i>Lanzhou Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (Distrik militer Ningxia, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qing-hai, Xinjiang): 220.000 pasukan: 2 | Timur Laut: <i>Shenyang Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (Distrik militer Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning): 250.000 pasukan: 3 <i>Group Army</i> ; 2 <i>tank</i> , 1 mekanik, 4 motor, 1 divisi artileri; 2 <i>tank</i> , 5 motor, 3 artileri, 1 SAM/AAA*, 3 AAA*, 1 brigade ATK* Utara: <i>Beijing Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (Distrik militer Beijing, Tianjin Garrison, Nei Mongol, Hebei, Shanxi): 300.000 pasukan: 3 <i>Group Army</i> ; 2 <i>tank</i> , 1 mekanik, 5 motor, 1 divisi artileri; 3 <i>tank</i> , 7 infanteri motor, 4 artileri, 2 SAM/AAA*, 3 brigade AAA*; 1 resimen ATK* Barat: <i>Lanzhou Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (Distrik militer Ningxia, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qing-hai, Xinjiang): 220.000 pasukan: 2 | Timur Laut: <i>Shenyang Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (Distrik militer Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning): 250.000 pasukan: 3 <i>Group Army</i> ; 2 <i>tank</i> , 1 mekanik, 4 motor, 1 divisi artileri; 2 <i>tank</i> , 5 motor, 3 artileri, 1 SAM/AAA*, 3 AAA*, 1 brigade ATK* Utara: <i>Beijing Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (Distrik militer Beijing, Tianjin Garrison, Nei Mongol, Hebei, Shanxi): 300.000 pasukan: 3 <i>Group Army</i> ; 2 <i>tank</i> , 1 mekanik, 5 motor, 1 divisi artileri; 3 <i>tank</i> , 7 infanteri motor, 4 artileri, 2 SAM/AAA*, 3 brigade AAA*; 1 resimen ATK* Barat: <i>Lanzhou Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (Distrik militer Ningxia, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qing-hai, Xinjiang): 220.000 pasukan: 2 |

| | | | |
|--|---|--|---|
| | <p><i>Group Army</i>; 1 <i>tank</i>, 2 infanteri motor; 1 divisi artileri; 1 <i>tank</i>, 2 infanteri motor, 1 artileri, 1 brigade AAA*; 1 resimen ATK*</p> <p>Barat Daya: <i>Chengdu Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (Distrik militer Chongqing Garrison, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Xizang) : 180.000 pasukan: 2 <i>Group Army</i>; 4 infanteri motor, 1 divisi artileri; 2 <i>tank</i>, 1 artileri, 2 brigade AAA*</p> <p>Selatan: <i>Guangzhou Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (Distrik militer Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan): 180.000 pasukan: 2 <i>Group Army</i>; 4 infanteri motor, 1 divisi artileri; 2 <i>tank</i>, 1 artileri, 1 SAM/AAA*, 1 brigade AAA*</p> <p>Hong Kong: 7.000 pasukan: 1 brigade infanteri (3 infanteri, 1 infanteri mekanik, 1 resimen artileri, 1 batalion <i>engineer</i>), 1 unit helikopter</p> <p>Pusat: <i>Jinan Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (distrik militer Shandong, Henan): 190.000 pasukan: 3 <i>Group Army</i>; 2 <i>tank</i>, 1 infanteri mekanik, 3 infanteri motor, 1 divisi artileri; 1 <i>tank</i>, 1 infanteri mekanik, 4 infanteri motor, 2 artileri, 2 SAM/AAA*, 1 brigade AAA*, 1 resimen ATK*</p> <p>Timur: <i>Nanjing Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (Distrik militer Shanghai Garrison, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Jiangxi, Anhui): 250.000 pasukan: 3 <i>Group Army</i>; 2 <i>tank</i>, 1 infanteri mekanik, 3 infanteri motor, 1 divisi artileri; 1 <i>tank</i>, 4 infanteri motor, 2 artileri, 2 SAM/AAA*, 1 brigade AAA; 1 resimen ATK*</p> | <p>artileri; 1 <i>tank</i>, 2 infanteri motor, 1 artileri, 1 brigade AAA*; 1 resimen ATK*</p> <p>Barat Daya: <i>Chengdu Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (Distrik militer Chongqing Garrison, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Xizang) : 180.000 pasukan: 2 <i>Group Army</i>; 4 infanteri motor, 1 divisi artileri; 2 <i>tank</i>, 1 artileri, 2 brigade AAA*</p> <p>Selatan: <i>Guangzhou Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (Distrik militer Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan): 180.000 pasukan: 2 <i>Group Army</i>; 1 mekanik, 3 infanteri motor, 1 divisi artileri; 2 <i>tank</i>, 1 artileri, 1 SAM/AAA*, 1 brigade AAA*</p> <p>Hong Kong: 7.000 pasukan: 1 brigade infanteri (3 infanteri, 1 infanteri mekanik, 1 resimen artileri, 1 batalion <i>engineer</i>), 1 unit helikopter</p> <p>Pusat: <i>Jinan Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (distrik militer Shandong, Henan): 190.000 pasukan: 3 <i>Group Army</i>; 2 <i>tank</i>, 1 infanteri mekanik, 3 infanteri motor, 1 divisi artileri; 1 <i>tank</i>, 1 infanteri mekanik, 4 infanteri motor, 2 artileri, 2 SAM/AAA*, 1 brigade AAA*, 1 resimen ATK*</p> <p>Timur: <i>Nanjing Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (Distrik militer Shanghai Garrison, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Jiangxi, Anhui): 250.000 pasukan: 3 <i>Group Army</i>; 2 <i>tank</i>, 1 infanteri mekanik, 3 infanteri motor, 1 divisi artileri; 1 <i>tank</i>, 4 infanteri motor, 2 artileri, 2 SAM/AAA*, 1 brigade AAA; 1 resimen ATK*</p> | <p>divisi artileri; 1 <i>tank</i>, 2 infanteri motor, 1 artileri, 1 brigade AAA*; 1 resimen ATK*</p> <p>Barat Daya: <i>Chengdu Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (Distrik militer Chongqing Garrison, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Xizang) : 180.000 pasukan: 2 <i>Group Army</i>; 4 infanteri motor, 1 divisi artileri; 2 <i>tank</i>, 1 artileri, 2 brigade AAA*</p> <p>Selatan: <i>Guangzhou Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (Distrik militer Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan): 180.000 pasukan: 2 <i>Group Army</i>; 1 mekanik, 3 infanteri motor, 1 divisi artileri; 2 <i>tank</i>, 1 artileri, 1 SAM/AAA*, 1 brigade AAA*</p> <p>Hong Kong: 7.000 pasukan: 1 brigade infanteri (3 infanteri, 1 infanteri mekanik, 1 resimen artileri, 1 batalion <i>engineer</i>), 1 unit helikopter</p> <p>Pusat: <i>Jinan Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (distrik militer Shandong, Henan): 190.000 pasukan: 3 <i>Group Army</i>; 2 <i>tank</i>, 1 infanteri mekanik, 3 infanteri motor, 1 divisi artileri; 1 <i>tank</i>, 1 infanteri mekanik, 4 infanteri motor, 2 artileri, 2 SAM/AAA*, 1 brigade AAA*, 1 resimen ATK*</p> <p>Timur: <i>Nanjing Maritime Reconnaissance</i> (Distrik militer Shanghai Garrison, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Jiangxi, Anhui): 250.000 pasukan: 3 <i>Group Army</i>; 2 <i>tank</i>, 1 infanteri mekanik, 3 infanteri motor, 1 divisi artileri; 1 <i>tank</i>, 4 infanteri motor, 2 artileri, 2 SAM/AAA*, 1 brigade AAA; 1 resimen ATK*</p> |
|--|---|--|---|

| | | | | |
|----------------------|-------------------------------------|---|---|---|
| | | infanteri motor, 2 artileri, 2 SAM/AAA*, 1 brigade AAA; 1 resimen ATK* | | |
| Angkatan Laut | Jumlah pasukan | 255.000 (termasuk <i>Coastal Regional Defense Forces</i> , 26.000 penerbang, 10.000 <i>marines</i> , 40.000 wajib militer) | 255.000 (termasuk <i>Coastal Regional Defense Forces</i> , 26.000 penerbang, 10.000 <i>marines</i> , 40.000 wajib militer) | 255.000 (termasuk <i>Coastal Regional Defense Forces</i> , 26.000 penerbang, 10.000 <i>marines</i> , 40.000 wajib militer) |
| | Submarine | 68 buah: 1 buah kapal selam strategis (misil balistik dengan tenaga nuklir); 67 kapal selam taktis (5 SSN*, 1 SSG*, 61 SSK*, dan 1 SS*) | 69 buah: 1 buah kapal selam strategis (misil balistik dengan tenaga nuklir); 68 kapal selam taktis (5 SSN*, 1 SSG*, 61 SSK*, dan 1 SS*) | 68 buah: 1 buah kapal selam strategis (misil balistik dengan tenaga nuklir); 67 kapal selam taktis (5 SSN*, 1 SSG*, 61 SSK*, dan 1 SS*) |
| | Principal Surface Combatans | 63 buah: 21 Penghancur 42 <i>Frigates</i> * | 63 buah: 21 Penghancur 42 <i>Frigates</i> * | 71 buah: 27 Penghancur 44 <i>Frigates</i> * |
| | Patrol and Coastal Combatant | 331 buah: 96 <i>missile craft</i> , 9 <i>torpedo craft</i> , 226 <i>patrol craft</i> | 331 buah: 96 <i>missile craft</i> , 9 <i>torpedo craft</i> , 226 <i>patrol craft</i> | 254 buah: 55 buah PFM*, 98 buah PFC*, 21 buah PCC*, 50 buah PCI*, 30 buah PCR* |
| | Amfibi | 50 buah | 50 buah | 234 buah: 76 buah LS*, 158 buah LC* |

| | | | | |
|--|--|---|--|--|
| | Coastal Regional Defence Forces | 40 artileri independen dan 10 resimen SSM* | 40 artileri independen dan 10 resimen SSM* | 40 artileri independen dan 10 resimen SSM* |
| | Marines | 10.000 pasukan: 2 brigade, 3 divisi amfibi | 10.000 pasukan: 2 brigade, 3 divisi amfibi | 10.000 pasukan: 2 brigade, 3 divisi amfibi |
| | Naval Air Forces | 26.000 orang | 26.000 orang Pesawat: 573 buah, 436 <i>combat capable</i> ; Bomber: 68 buah Fighter: 74 buah Fighter Ground Attack: 274 buah Anti Submarine Warfare: 4 buah Reconnaissance: 7 buah Maritime Patrol: 4 buah Tanker: 3 buah Transport: 66 buah Training: 73 buah Helikopter: 51 buah; Search and Rescue: 27 buah Anti Submarine Warfare: 27 buah Anti Submarine Tube: 8 buah Support: 8 buah Misil: Tactical; Air-to-Surface Missile; Air-Launched Cruise Missile: YJ-6 (CAS-1) YJ-8K (CSS-N-4) | 26.000 orang Pesawat: 573 buah, 436 <i>combat capable</i> ; Bomber: 68 buah Fighter: 74 buah Fighter Ground Attack: 274 buah Anti Submarine Warfare: 4 buah Reconnaissance: 7 buah Maritime Patrol: 4 buah Tanker: 3 buah Transport: 66 buah Training: 73 buah Helikopter: 51 buah; Search and Rescue: 27 buah Anti Submarine Warfare: 27 buah Anti Submarine Tube: 8 buah Support: 8 buah Misil: Tactical; Air-to-Surface Missile; Air-Launched Cruise Missile: YJ-6 (CAS-1) YJ-8K (CSS-N-4) |
| | Deployments and Bases | <u>NORTH SEA FLEET:</u> <i>Coastal Defence</i> terbentang dari perbatasan Korea Utara (Sungai Yalu) sampai Lianyungang bagian selatan | <u>NORTH SEA FLEET:</u> <i>Coastal Defence</i> terbentang dari perbatasan Korea Utara (Sungai Yalu) sampai Lianyungang bagian selatan (35° 10' | <u>NORTH SEA FLEET:</u> <i>Coastal Defence</i> terbentang dari perbatasan Korea Utara (Sungai Yalu) sampai Lianyungang bagian selatan (35° |

| | | | | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|---|---|--|
| | | <p>(35° 10' N); terkoneksi dengan Shenyang, Beijing dan Jinan <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> sampai zona laut. BASES: Qingdao (pusat kontrol), Dalian, Huludao, Weihai, Chengshan, Yuchi; 9 distrik <i>Coastal Defence</i> FORCES: mengalami perkembangan, masih dalam pengamatan EAST SEA FLEET: <i>Coastal Defence</i> terbentang dari Lianyungang bagian selatan sampai Dongshan (35° 10' N sampai 23° 30' N) terkoneksi dengan Nanjing <i>military region</i> sampai zona laut. BASES: Danau Dongqian (pusat kontrol), Shanghai <i>naval base</i>, Dinghai, Hangzhou. Xiangshan; 7 distrik <i>Coastal Defence</i> SOUTH SEA FLEET: <i>Coastal Defence</i> terbentang dari Dongshan (23° 30' N) sampai perbatasan Vietnam; terkoneksi dengan Guangzhou <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> sampai zona laut (termasuk Kepulauan Paracel dan Spratly) BASE: Hong Kong, Yulin, Guangzhou</p> | <p>N); terkoneksi dengan Shenyang, Beijing dan Jinan <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> sampai zona laut. BASES: Qingdao (pusat kontrol), Dalian, Huludao, Weihai, Chengshan, Yuchi; 9 distrik <i>Coastal Defence</i> FORCES: Qingdao (pusat kontrol) mengalami perkembangan, masih dalam pengamatan EAST SEA FLEET: <i>Coastal Defence</i> terbentang dari Lianyungang bagian selatan sampai Dongshan (35° 10' N sampai 23° 30' N) terkoneksi dengan Nanjing <i>military region</i> sampai zona laut. BASES: Danau Dongqian (pusat kontrol). Shanghai <i>naval base</i>, Dinghai, Hangzhou. Xiangshan; 7 distrik <i>Coastal Defence</i> SOUTH SEA FLEET: <i>Coastal Defence</i> terbentang dari Dongshan (23° 30' N) sampai perbatasan Vietnam; terkoneksi dengan Guangzhou <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> sampai zona laut (termasuk Kepulauan Paracel dan Spratly) BASE: Hong Kong, Yulin, Guangzhou</p> | <p>10' N); terkoneksi dengan Shenyang, Beijing dan Jinan <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> sampai zona laut. BASES: Qingdao (pusat kontrol), Dalian, Huludao, Weihai, Chengshan, Yuchi; 9 distrik <i>Coastal Defence</i> FORCES: Qingdao (pusat kontrol) EAST SEA FLEET: <i>Coastal Defence</i> terbentang dari Lianyungang bagian selatan sampai Dongshan (35° 10' N sampai 23° 30' N) terkoneksi dengan Nanjing <i>military region</i> sampai zona laut. BASES: Danau Dongqian (pusat kontrol), Shanghai <i>naval base</i>, Dinghai, Hangzhou, Xiangshan; 7 distrik <i>Coastal Defence</i> SOUTH SEA FLEET: <i>Coastal Defence</i> terbentang dari Dongshan (23° 30' N) sampai perbatasan Vietnam; terkoneksi dengan Guangzhou <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> sampai zona laut (termasuk Kepulauan Paracel dan Spratly) BASE: Hong Kong, Yulin, Guangzhou</p> |
| Angkatan Udara | Jumlah Pasukan | 400.000 | 400.000 | 400.000 |
| | Bomber | 6 resimen dengan 120 buah H-6E/F (1 resimen berkekuatan nuklir); 1 resimen dengan 20 buah H-6H (dapat membawa YJ-63); 1 resimen pelatihan dengan 40 buah H-5 | 5 resimen dengan lebih dari 50 buah H-6E/H-6F/H-6H; 8 resimen dengan 94 buah H-5, F, 5, F-5B; 1 resimen dengan lebih dari 20 buah H-6 (Tu-16) berkekuatan nuklir; 3 resimen dengan 46 buah H-6H (cruise missile YJ-63) | 5 resimen dengan lebih dari 50 buah H-6E/H-6F/H-6H; 8 resimen dengan 94 buah H-5, F, 5, F-5B; 1 resimen dengan lebih dari 20 buah H-6 (Tu-16) berkekuatan nuklir; 3 resimen dengan 46 buah H-6H (cruise missile YJ-63) |

| | | | |
|--|--|---|--|
| Fighter | 39 resimen dengan sekitar 1000 angkutan udara: 400 buah J-7II/IIA (16 resimen), 50 buah J-7IIH (2 resimen), 24 buah J-7IIM (1 resimen), 50 buah J-7C/D (2 resimen), 150 buah J-7E (6 resimen), 20 buah J-8 (1 resimen), 40 buah J-8IIA (2 resimen), 50 buah J-8IIB (2 resimen), 24 buah J-8IID (1 resimen), 50 buah J-8E (2 resimen), 100 buah Su-27SK/UBK J-11 (4 resimen) | 3 resimen dengan 28 buah J-8 IIB <i>Finback</i> ; 3 resimen dengan 62 buah J-8D <i>Finback</i> ; 16 resimen dengan 400 buah J-7II <i>Fishbed</i> / J-7IIA; 1resimen dengan 11 buah J-8F <i>Finback</i> ; 9 resimen dengan 116 buah J-11 (Su- 27SK) <i>Flanker</i> ; 12 resimen dengan 296 J-7E <i>Fishbed</i> ; 5 resimen dengan 32 buah Su-27UBK <i>Flanker</i> ; 2 resimen dengan 36 buah J-7C <i>Fishbed</i> ; 1 resimen dengan 24 buah J-7G <i>Fishbed</i> ; 4 resimen dengan 80 buah J-8 <i>Finback</i> ; 1 resimen dengan 24 buah J-8 IID <i>Finback</i> ; 2 resimen dengan 40 buah J-8III <i>Finback</i> | 3 resimen dengan 28 buah J-8 IIB <i>Finback</i> ; 3 resimen dengan 62 buah J-8D <i>Finback</i> ; 16 resimen dengan 400 buah J-7II <i>Fishbed</i> / J-7IIA; 1resimen dengan 11 buah J-8F <i>Finback</i> ; 9 resimen dengan 116 buah J-11 (Su- 27SK) <i>Flanker</i> ; 12 resimen dengan 296 J-7E <i>Fishbed</i> ; 5 resimen dengan 32 buah Su-27UBK <i>Flanker</i> ; 2 resimen dengan 36 buah J-7C <i>Fishbed</i> ; 1 resimen dengan 24 buah J-7G <i>Fishbed</i> ; 4 resimen dengan 80 buah J-8 <i>Finback</i> ; 1 resimen dengan 24 buah J-8 IID <i>Finback</i> ; 2 resimen dengan 40 buah J-8III <i>Finback</i> |
| Fighter GroundAttack | 24 resimen dengan 700 angkutan udara: 300 buah J-6 (10 resimen), 50 buah J-6A (2 resimen), 300 buah Q-5 C/D (9 resimen), 58 buah Su-30 MKK (3 resimen) | 12 resimen dengan 408 buah Q-5C <i>Fantan</i> / Q-5D <i>Fantan</i> ; 2 resimen masing-masing dengan 31 buah J-10; 25 resimen dengan 722 buah MiG-19 <i>Farmer</i> ; 4 resimen dengan 73 buah Su-30MKK <i>Flanker</i> ; 2 resimen masing-masing dengan 13 buah JH-7A | 12 resimen dengan 408 buah Q-5C <i>Fantan</i> / Q-5D <i>Fantan</i> ; 2 resimen masing-masing dengan 31 buah J-10; 25 resimen dengan 722 buah MiG-19 <i>Farmer</i> ; 4 resimen dengan 73 buah Su-30MKK <i>Flanker</i> ; 2 resimen masing-masing dengan 13 buah JH-7A |
| Reconnaissance/ Electronic Intelligence | 290 buah: 40 buah HZ-5 100 buah JZ-6 Beberapa JZ-7, 4 buah Tu-154M | 2 resimen dengan 45 buah JZ-6 (MiG-19R); Beberapa resimen dengan sekitar 126 pesawat; JZ-7 (MiG-21R) <i>Fishbed H</i> ; 1 buah Tu-154M <i>Careless</i> ; 1resimen dengan lebih dari 8 buah JZ-8 <i>Finback</i> | 2 resimen dengan 45 buah JZ-6 (MiG- 19R); Beberapa resimen dengan sekitar 126 pesawat; JZ-7 (MiG-21R) <i>Fishbed H</i> ; 1 buah Tu-154M <i>Careless</i> ; 1resimen dengan lebih dari 8 buah JZ-8 <i>Finback</i> |
| Transport | 513 buah: 15 buah Tu-154M. 2 buah Il-18, | 1 resimen dengan lebih dari 16 buah Tu- 154M <i>Careless</i> ; 3 resimen dengan 13 buah Il-76MD <i>Candid</i> | 1 resimen dengan lebih dari 16 buah Tu- 154M <i>Careless</i> ; 3 resimen dengan 13 buah Il-76MD |

| | | | | |
|--|-------------------|---|--|--|
| | | 20 buah II-76MD, 300 buah Y-5, 100 buah Y-7/An-24/An-26, 48 buah Y-8/An-12, 15 buah Y-11, 8 buah Y-12, 6 buah Boeing 737-200 (VIP), 5 buah CL-601 <i>Challenger</i> | <i>B</i> ; 3 resimen dengan sekitar 4 <i>transport</i> ; 1 buah An-12 <i>Cub</i> ; 170 buah Y-5 (An-2) <i>Colt</i> ; 41 buah Y-7 (An-24) <i>Coke/Y-7H</i> (An-26) <i>Curt</i> ; 15 buah Boeing 737-200 (VIP); 5 buah CL-601 <i>Challenger</i> ; 2 buah II-18 <i>Cool</i> ; 20 buah Y-11, 8 buah Y-12 | <i>Candid B</i> ; 3 resimen dengan sekitar 4 <i>transport</i> ; 1 buah An-12 <i>Cub</i> ; 170 buah Y-5 (An-2) <i>Colt</i> ; 41 buah Y-7 (An-24) <i>Coke/Y-7H</i> (An-26) <i>Curt</i> ; 15 buah Boeing 737-200 (VIP); 5 buah CL-601 <i>Challenger</i> ; 2 buah II-18 <i>Cool</i> ; 20 buah Y-11, 8 buah Y-12 |
| | Tanker | 1 resimen dengan 10 buah HY-6 | 1 resimen dengan 10 buah HY-6 | 1 resimen dengan 10 buah HY-6 |
| | Helicopter | 100 buah: 6 buah AS-332 (VIP), 4 buah Bell 214, 40 buah Mi-8, 20 buah Z-9 | Support: 56 buah; 6 buah AS-332 <i>Super Puma</i> (VIP) 50 buah Mi-8 <i>Hip</i> Utility: 24 buah; 20 buah Z-9 (AS-365N) <i>Dauphin 2</i> 4 buah Bell 214 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle: Beberapa buah <i>Chang Hong 1</i> Air Defence; Surface-to-Air Missile: lebih dari 1.578 buah Guns: 16.000 buah senapan 100 mm /85 mm Missile, Tactical: lebih dari 4.500 buah; Air-to-Surface Missile Air-to-Air Missile | Support: 56 buah; 6 buah AS-332 <i>Super Puma</i> (VIP) 50 buah Mi-8 <i>Hip</i> Utility: 24 buah; 20 buah Z-9 (AS-365N) <i>Dauphin 2</i> 4 buah Bell 214 Unmanned Aerial Vehicle: Beberapa buah <i>Chang Hong 1</i> Air Defence; Surface-to-Air Missile: lebih dari 1.578 buah Guns: 16.000 buah senapan 100 mm /85 mm Missile, Tactical: lebih dari 4.500 buah; Air-to-Surface Missile Air-to-Air Missile |
| | Training | 200 buah; Termasuk HJ-5, JJ-6, JJ-7, JL-8, k-8, PT-6 (CJ-6) | 1 resimen dengan 12 buah H-6H; Beberapa resimen dengan 142 buah PT-6 (CJ-6); lebih dari 179 buah JJ-7 <i>Mongol A</i> ; 140 buah JL-8 (K-8); JJ-6 (Mi-G-19UTI) <i>Farmer</i> | 1 resimen dengan 12 buah H-6H; Beberapa resimen dengan 142 buah PT-6 (CJ-6); lebih dari 179 buah JJ-7 <i>Mongol A</i> ; 140 buah JL-8 (K-8); JJ-6 (Mi-G-19UTI) <i>Farmer</i> |
| | Missiles | AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE: PL-2B, PL-5B, PL-8, 1200 buah P27 (AA-10), 3200 buah P-73 (AA-11), 100 buah P77 (AA-12) AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE: Kh-29 (AS-14), Kh-31P (AS-17), Kh-59 | AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE: PL-2B, PL-5B, PL-8, 1200 buah P27 (AA-10), 3200 buah P-73 (AA-11), 100 buah P77 (AA-12) AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE: Kh-29 (AS-14), Kh-31P (AS-17), Kh-59 (AS- | AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE: PL-2B, PL-5B, PL-8, 1200 buah P27 (AA-10), 3200 buah P-73 (AA-11), 100 buah P77 (AA-12) AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILE: Kh-29 (AS-14), Kh-31P (AS-17), Kh-59 |

| | | (AS-18), YJ-63 UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE: Chang Hong 1 | 18), YJ-63 UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE: Chang Hong 1 | (AS-18), YJ-63 UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE: Chang Hong 1 |
|---------------------------------|--|---|--|--|
| Air Defence Artillery | | 3 divisi SAM*, 1 divisi campuran SAM/AAA*; 11 brigade Air Defense (6 brigade SAM*, 4 brigade AAA*), Beijing <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> : 3 SAM*, 1 divisi SAM/AAA* Shenyang <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> : 1 SAM*, 1 brigade AAA* Jinan <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> : 1 brigade AA* Ninjing <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> : 2 SAM*, 1 brigade AAA* Guangzhou: 2 brigade SAM* Chengdu: 1 brigade SAM* | 3 divisi SAM*, 1 divisi campuran SAM/AAA*, 11 brigade Air Defense (6 brigade SAM*, 4 brigade AAA*), Beijing <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> : 3 SAM*, 1 divisi SAM/AAA* Shenyang <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> : 1 SAM*, 1 brigade AAA* Jinan <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> : 1 brigade AA* Ninjing <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> : 2 SAM*, 1 brigade AAA* Guangzhou: 2 brigade SAM* Chengdu: 1 brigade SAM* | 3 divisi SAM*, 1 divisi campuran SAM/AAA*; 11 brigade Air Defense (6 brigade SAM*, 4 brigade AAA*), Beijing <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> : 3 SAM*, 1 divisi SAM/AAA* Shenyang <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> : 1 SAM*, 1 brigade AAA* Jinan <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> : 1 brigade AA* Ninjing <i>Maritime Reconnaissance</i> : 2 SAM*, 1 brigade AAA* Guangzhou: 2 brigade SAM* Chengdu: 1 brigade SAM* |
| Strategic Missile Forces | | OFFENSIVE: (lebih dari 100.000 buah), terorganisasi ke dalam 21 brigade luncur dengan 7 misil di dalamnya; sistem organisasi bervariasi bergantung pada tipe misil; satu basis percobaan dan satu basis pelatihan INTER-CONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE: Lebih dari 30 buah: 3 brigade DF-5A (CSS-4) 1 brigade DF-31 (CSS-9) INTERMEDIATE-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE: Lebih dari 110 buah; Lebih dari 20 buah DF-4 (CSS-3) → 3 brigade 32 buah DF-3A (CSS-2) → 4 brigade 60 buah DF-21 (CSS-5) → 5 brigade SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE: | OFFENSIVE: (lebih dari 100.000 buah), terorganisasi ke dalam 20 brigade luncur dengan 6 misil di dalamnya; sistem organisasi bervariasi bergantung pada tipe misil; satu basis percobaan dan satu basis pelatihan INTER-CONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE: 46 buah: 4 brigade DF-5A (CSS-4) 1 brigade DF-31 (CSS-9) 2 brigade DF-4 (CSS-3) INTERMEDIATE-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE: Lebih dari 110 buah; Lebih dari 20 buah DF-4 (CSS-3) → 3 brigade 32 buah DF-3A (CSS-2) → 4 brigade 60 buah DF-21 (CSS-5) → 5 brigade SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE: | OFFENSIVE: (lebih dari 100.000 buah), terorganisasi ke dalam 20 brigade luncur dengan 6 misil di dalamnya; sistem organisasi bervariasi bergantung pada tipe misil; satu basis percobaan dan satu basis pelatihan INTER-CONTINENTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE: 46 buah: 4 brigade DF-5A (CSS-4) 1 brigade DF-31 (CSS-9) 2 brigade DF-4 (CSS-3) INTERMEDIATE-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE: Lebih dari 110 buah; Lebih dari 20 buah DF-4 (CSS-3) → 3 brigade 32 buah DF-3A (CSS-2) → 4 brigade 60 buah DF-21 (CSS-5) → 5 brigade SUBMARINE LAUNCHED BALLISTIC MISSILE: |

| | | | | |
|---|---|--|---|--|
| | 1 kapal selam bertenaga nuklir <i>Xia</i> dengan 12 CSS-N-3 (JL-1) SHORT RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE: Sekitar 25 DF-15 dengan lebih dari 160 misil (CSS-6 / M-9 dengan jarak tembak 600 km) 25 DF-11A dengan 175 misil (CSS-7 / M-11 dengan jarak tembak 120-300 km) 30 DF-7 (CSS-8) dengan 450 misil DEFENSIVE: Tracking Stations; Xinjiang (menjangkau Asia Tengah) dan Shanxi (perbatasan Utara) Phased-array Radar Complex: sistem peringatan dini misil-balistik | 1 kapal selam bertenaga nuklir <i>Xia</i> dengan 12 CSS-N-3 (JL-1) SHORT RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE: 725 buah: Sekitar 225 buah DF-15 dengan lebih dari 160 misil (CSS-6 / M-9 dengan jarak tembak 600 km) 500 buah DF-11A dengan 175 misil (CSS-7 / M-11 dengan jarak tembak 120-300 km) 30 DF-7 (CSS-8) dengan 450 misil DEFENSIVE: Tracking Stations; Xinjiang (menjangkau Asia Tengah) dan Shanxi (perbatasan Utara) Phased-array Radar Complex: sistem peringatan dini misil-balistik | MISSILE: 1 kapal selam bertenaga nuklir <i>Xia</i> dengan 12 CSS-N-3 (JL-1) SHORT RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE: 725 buah: Sekitar 225 buah DF-15 dengan lebih dari 160 misil (CSS-6 / M-9 dengan jarak tembak 600 km) 500 buah DF-11A dengan 175 misil (CSS-7 / M-11 dengan jarak tembak 120-300 km) 30 DF-7 (CSS-8) dengan 450 misil DEFENSIVE: Tracking Stations; Xinjiang (menjangkau Asia Tengah) dan Shanxi (perbatasan Utara) Phased-array Radar Complex: sistem peringatan dini misil-balistik | |
| | Jumlah Pasukan | 1.500.000 | 1.500.000 | 1.500.000 |
| Paramilitary (PEOPLE'S ARMED POLICE) | Kelompok Divisi | 45 divisi (14 diantaranya terdiri dari masing-masing 4 resimen; 1-2 divisi tiap propinsi) termasuk Internal Security (800.000) , Border Defence (100.000) Guards (69.000) | 45 divisi (14 diantaranya terdiri dari masing-masing 4 resimen; 1-2 divisi tiap propinsi) termasuk Internal Security (800.000) , Border Defence (100.000) Guards (69.000) | 45 divisi (14 diantaranya terdiri dari masing-masing 4 resimen; 1-2 divisi tiap propinsi) termasuk Internal Security (800.000) , Border Defence (100.000) Guards (69.000) |

Sumber: *The Military Balance* 2000-2001, 2001-2002, 2002-2003, 2004-2005, 2005-2006, 2006.

LAMPIRAN 3

Two Proposals for the Referendum Law

| | DPP Version as of July 9, 2003 | KMT-PFP Version as of November 24, 2003 |
|------------------------|---|---|
| Eligible topics | <p>Law passed by the legislature; proposed new laws; major national policies, questions related to national sovereignty, new constitution, country appellation, flag, anthem, territory.</p> <p>Excluded are budget, taxation, salaries, and regional policies.</p> <p>The president is entitled to initiated a referendum on national security issues when the country faces an external threat that could interfere with national sovereignty (the “defensive referendum”).</p> | <p>Law passed by the legislature; proposed new laws; major national policies.</p> <p>Excluded are questions related to national sovereignty, constitutional amendment, diplomacy, military affairs, the budget, taxation, salaries, social welfare, and ethnic affairs.</p> |
| Initiative | Government agencies as well as people can initiate referendums. | Government agencies are prohibited from initiating referendums. |
| Threshold | <p>A quorum of 2% of votes cast in the previous presidential election would be required to call for a national referendum.</p> <p>A quorum of 5% of votes cast in the previous presidential election</p> | <p>A quorum of 1% of votes cast in the previous presidential election would be required to call for a national referendum.</p> <p>The referendum would then be held only if 5% of the</p> |

| | | |
|-------------------|--|--|
| | would be required to call for a national referendum concerning a new constitution or constitutional amendment. | electorate endorsed the call with a petition. In a regional referendum, 2% of votes cast in elections for municipality and local government chiefs would be required to call for a national referendum, and signatures of 10% of that electorate would be required to hold a referendum. A 21-person review committee should be established in the Cabinet to study the proposals. |
| Date | No restriction. | Not in tandem with presidential elections. |
| Punishment | No punishment clause. | Government officials would face legal punishment for violation of the referendum law. |

Sumber: *Taipei Times*, 9 Juli dan 24 November 2003

LAMPIRAN 4

**The April 2001 U.S. Arms Sales
To Taiwan**

(Unless specified, it is unclear how many of each item Taiwan will receive)

- Four *Kidd*-class destroyers
- Twelve P-3C *Orion* aircraft
- Eight diesel submarines
- *Paladin* self-propelled artillery system
- MH-53E mine-sweeping helicopters
- AAV7A1 Amphibious Assault Vehicles
- Mk 48 torpedoes without advanced capabilities
- *Avenger* surface-to-air missile system
- Submarine-launched and surface-launched torpedoes
- Aircraft survivability equipment
- The U.S. will also give Taiwan a technical briefing on the *Patriot* anti-missile system

Sumber: "Weapons the U.S. Will Sell Taiwan", dalam *Associated Press*, 23 April 2001