

## Abstract

In the opportunity and spur of moment of Arab Spring, the people of Libya revolt against the 42 year-long regime of Colonel Muammar Al Gathafi was often coloured red with strict limitation of political rights, lack of civilian liberties, use of terror and violence against opposition, and even the violation of human rights itself. The Arab Spring that was once seemingly peaceful, had become a full on violence between government and civilians, resulting the urgency for the international community to act up. The international community quickly condemned the action of Gathafi. Through Resolution 1970 and 1973, the language of intervention under the umbrella of the Responsibility to Protect norm is used in attempt to stop the mass atrocity done by Gathafi's regime. However, the aftermath of R2P is more alluding Libya to a chaotic situation than it is to a successful resolution. As proven by the hyper focus of military power by NATO and other involved external actors, the National Transitional Council (NTC) as the new *de facto* government struggle to gain political leverage in Libya. Therefore, this research is done to dissect the reason behind the failure of R2P intervention in rebuilding Libya's political situation, yet managed to be a success in military measures and ended Gathafi's regime in the process.

Keywords: Libya Revolution, Gathafi, Responsibility to Protect, NATO, NTC

## Abstrak

Dalam kesempatan dan dorongan momen *Arab Spring*, rakyat Libya memberontak melawan rezim Kolonel Muammar Al Gathafi yang telah berusia 42 tahun dan penuh dengan pembatasan hak politik yang ketat, kurangnya kebebasan sipil, penggunaan teror dan kekerasan terhadap oposisi, bahkan pelanggaran atas hak asasi manusia. *Arab Spring* yang sebelumnya tampak damai, telah menjadi penuh dengan kekerasan antara pemerintah dan warga sipil, mengakibatkan urgensi bagi masyarakat internasional untuk bertindak. Komunitas internasional mengutuk tindakan Gathafi. Melalui Resolusi 1970 dan 1973, bahasa intervensi di bawah payung norma *Responsibility to Protect* digunakan dalam upaya untuk menghentikan kekejaman massa yang dilakukan rezim Gathafi. Namun, intervensi yang dilakukan melalui R2P menempatkan Libya ke dalam situasi yang lebih kacau kacau. Sebagaimana dibuktikan oleh fokus berlebihan kekuatan militer oleh NATO dan aktor-aktor eksternal lain yang terlibat, sulit bagi Dewan Transisi Nasional (NTC) sebagai pemerintah de facto yang baru untuk mendapatkan pengaruh politik secara total di Libya. Oleh karena itu, penelitian ini dilakukan untuk membedah alasan di balik kegagalan intervensi R2P dalam membangun kembali situasi politik Libya, namun berhasil menjadi sukses dalam tindakan militer dan mengakhiri rezim Gathafi dalam proses tersebut.

Kata Kunci: Revolusi Libya, Gathafi, *Responsibility to Protect*, NATO, NTC

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